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81.
Edmund Wall 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):237-249
82.
How Should We Do Nanoethics? A Network Approach for Discerning Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Ibo van de Poel 《Nanoethics》2008,2(1):25-38
There is no agreement on how nanoethics should proceed. In this article I focus on approaches for discerning ethical issues
in nanotechnology, which is as of yet one of the most difficult and urging tasks for nanoethics. I discuss and criticize two
existing approaches for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology and propose a network approach as alternative. I discuss
debates in nanoethics about the desirable role of ethics in nanotechnological development and about the newness of ethical
issues in nanotechnology. On basis of a critical analysis of both debates, I formulate a number of desiderata for a method
for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology and argue that the network approach that my colleagues and I have developed
for ethical issues in research and development networks is also appropriate in nanotechnology.
相似文献
Ibo van de PoelEmail: |
83.
The psychology of meta-ethics: exploring objectivism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes. 相似文献
84.
Bouville M 《Science and engineering ethics》2008,14(1):111-120
Many engineering ethics classes and textbooks introduce theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism (and most others draw from these theories without mentioning them explicitly). Yet using ethical theories to teach engineering ethics is not devoid of difficulty. First, their status is unclear (should one pick a single theory or use them all? does it make a difference?) Also, textbooks generally assume or fallaciously ‘prove’ that egoism (or even simply accounting for one’s interests) is wrong. Further, the drawbacks of ethical theories are underestimated and the theories are also otherwise misrepresented to make them more suitable for engineering ethics as the authors construe it, viz. the ‘moral reasoning’ process. Stating in what various theories disagree would allow the students to frame the problem more productively in terms of motive–consequence or society–individual dichotomies rather than in terms of Kant–utilitarian. 相似文献
85.
Varelius J 《Science and engineering ethics》2008,14(1):65-76
Services of ethics consultants are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as engineering, public administration, business, law, health care, journalism, and scientific research. It has however been maintained that use of ethics consultants is incompatible with personal autonomy; in moral matters individuals should be allowed to make their own decisions. The problem this criticism refers to can be conceived of as a conflict between the professional autonomy of ethics experts and the autonomy of the persons they serve. This paper addresses this conflict and maintains that when the nature of both ethics consultation and individual autonomy is properly understood, the professional autonomy of ethics experts is compatible with the autonomy of the persons they assist. 相似文献
86.
John Martin Fischer 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):167-189
I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues
that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that
her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible,
unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that
we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that
even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned
(even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main
objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own
account.
相似文献
John Martin FischerEmail: |
87.
Richard M. Glatz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):257-272
Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible
for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an
agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent
lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism
and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the
grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening
of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative
to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically
fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle
to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability
to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that
Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.
相似文献
Richard M. GlatzEmail: |
88.
Business schools are often thought of as being accountable for the individual student’s personal development and preparation
to enter the business community. While true that business schools guide knowledge development, they must also fulfill a social
contract with the business community to provide ethical entry-level business professionals. Three stakeholders, students,
faculty, and the business community, are involved in developing and strengthening an understanding of ethical behavior and
the serious impacts associated with an ethical lapse. This paper discusses the ways the business schools may enhance the student’s
ethical knowledge and understanding, and proposes a roadmap that business schools may use to develop or strengthen a strong
ethical culture.
The authors, Leland Horn and Michael Kennedy, are third year doctorate of management students at Colorado Technical University,
4435 North Chestnut Street, Colorado Springs CO 80907. 相似文献
89.
Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are
accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness.
In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance
for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought
to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics
that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Mark Timmons (Corresponding author)Email: |
90.