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501.
Although intellectuals have been a part of the cultural landscape, it is in post-conflict societies, such as those found in
Kosovo and Bosnia, that there has arisen a need for an intellectual who is more than simply a social critic, an educator,
a man of action, and a compassionate individual. Enter the hyperintellectual. As this essay will make clear, it is the hyperintellectual,
who through a reciprocating critique and defense of both the nationalist enterprise and strong interventionism of the International
Community, as well as being a man of action and compassionate and empathic insider, strives to create a climate of understanding
and to enlarge the moral space so as to reduce the divisiveness between opposing parties. In this way the hyperintellectual
becomes a catalyst for the creation of a democratic culture within the civil societies of Kosovo and Bosnia.
相似文献
Rory J. ConcesEmail: |
502.
同情在亚当·斯密伦理思想中的作用 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
亚当.斯密是18世纪的著名道德哲学家和西方古典经济学的奠基人。同情在亚当.斯密的伦理思想体系中具有多种意义。同情不仅是亚当.斯密建构和评价其道德情操的工具,而且成为其经济伦理的认识论基础。斯密的同情论为我们把握"亚当.斯密问题"提供了一个独特的视角。 相似文献
503.
This study examined the judgments and reasoning of adolescents (ages 12–19 years) from three sites in urban and rural China (n = 270) and in an urban Canadian comparison sample (n = 72), about the fairness of various forms of democratic and non-democratic government. Adolescents from both China and Canada preferred democratic forms of government, such as representative or direct democracy, to non-democratic systems, such as a meritocracy and an oligarchy of the wealthy, at all ages. Adolescents appealed to fundamental democratic principles, such as representation, voice, and majority rule, to justify their judgments. Similar age-related patterns in judgments and reasoning were found across cultures and across diverse settings within China. 相似文献
504.
Seth Shabo 《Philosophia》2007,35(1):63-74
In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative
possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this
link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues,
she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper,
I argue that Timpe’s response to Stump exploits concessions she need not have made. The upshot is that, contrary to what Timpe
maintains, there is no reason to doubt that Stump's brand of incompatibilism is a genuine alternative to the traditional variety.
相似文献
Seth ShaboEmail: |
505.
Recently, the Eriksonian midlife personality strength of generativity has been described as existing in many forms and in persons of differing ages (McAdams, 2001). In this longitudinal study, narratives of life “turning points” and significant accomplishments were examined for generative themes in 32 adolescent/emerging adults (aged 16 and 20 years). We also explored these emerging adults’ volunteering behavior, prosocial reasoning, and parental influence as potential factors in generativity. Several parenting factors when adolescents were 16 (parents’ autonomy-encouraging practices, their emphasis on caring in stories of family value teaching, and adolescents’ reports of authoritative parenting style) were associated with more generative themes in narratives at age 20. Adolescents’ levels of prosocial reasoning, volunteering behavior, and personal value choices were also associated as expected with generative theme usage at age 20 in life stories, supporting the meaningfulness of this construct in emerging adulthood. 相似文献
506.
Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of
a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that
people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition,
and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model
has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their
moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not
really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation.
Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’
because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical
individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular
moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically.
In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters
of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making
moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments.
相似文献
Mark TimmonsEmail: |
507.
Richard Garner 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):499-513
Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral
judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making
statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are
uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore
a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is
to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking.
After clarifying the choice that arises for the moral error theorist, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend
it. I discuss Mackie’s defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan,
Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his
criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology
by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism
as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing
that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude
with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists
and moral fictionalists have always cherished.
相似文献
Richard GarnerEmail: |
508.
509.
Mary-Ellen Boyle 《Journal of Academic Ethics》2007,5(1):85-104
Service-learning has received a great deal of attention in the management education literature over the past decade, as a
method by which students can acquire moral and civic values as well as gain academic knowledge and practice real-world skills.
Scholars focus on student and community impact, curricular design, and rationale. However, the educational environment (“context”)
in which service-learning occurs has been given less attention, although experienced educators know that the classroom is
hardly a vacuum and that students learn a great deal from the non-curricular aspects of their educational experience. Moral
values in particular are conveyed by what is not said. Given this, I argue that the contexts in which service-learning takes place are as important as the activity itself.
Three perspectives on context will be described and assessed: the “hidden” curriculum, the educational atmosphere, and the
university’s orientation towards social responsibility.
相似文献
Mary-Ellen BoyleEmail: |
510.