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421.
Ronald N. Giere 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(3):425-427
Hanson claims that moral responsibility should be distributed among both the humans and artifacts comprising complex wholes
that produce morally relevant outcomes in the world. I argue that this claim is not sufficiently supported. In particular,
adopting a consequentialist understanding of morality does not by itself support the view that the existence of a causally
necessary object in such a complex whole is sufficient for assigning moral responsibility to that object. Moreover, there are good reasons, both evolutionary and contemporary,
for not adopting this stance. 相似文献
422.
C. Daniel Batson 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(1):51-66
Why do people act morally – when they do? Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that acting morally in the absence of incentives or sanctions is a product of a desire to uphold one or another moral principle (e.g., fairness). This form of motivation might be called moral integrity because the goal is to actually be moral. In a series of experiments designed to explore the nature of moral motivation, colleagues and I have found little evidence of moral integrity. We have found considerable evidence of a different form of moral motivation, moral hypocrisy. The goal of moral hypocrisy is to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of being moral. To fully reach the goal of moral hypocrisy requires self-deception, and we have found evidence of that as well. Strengthening moral integrity is difficult. Even effects of moral perspective taking – imagining yourself in the place of the other (as recommended by the Golden Rule) – appear limited, further contributing to the moral masquerade. 相似文献
423.
Michael B. Gill 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(1):99-113
Many moral philosophers in the Western tradition have used phenomenological claims as starting points for philosophical inquiry; aspects of moral phenomenology have often been taken to be anchors to which any adequate account of morality must remain attached. This paper raises doubts about whether moral phenomena are universal and robust enough to serve the purposes to which moral philosophers have traditionally tried to put them. Persons’ experiences of morality may vary in a way that greatly limits the extent to which moral phenomenology can constitute a reason to favor one moral theory over another. Phenomenology may not be able to serve as a pre-theoretic starting point or anchor in the consideration of rival moral theories because moral phenomenology may itself be theory-laden. These doubts are illustrated through an examination of how moral phenomenology is used in the thought of Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Francis Hutcheson, and Søren Kierkegaard. 相似文献
424.
明代独特的道德生活是有其偏执的政治导向、失序的商品经济发展以及无根社会文化综合作用的结果.究其实质乃是在商品经济发展的过程中,传统儒家的价值观念无力为新的社会经济生产方式提供价值支撑,道德生活中的种种失范现象最终都导源于核心价值观的缺失. 相似文献
425.
We surveyed 225 Year 9 and 10 students at T1 regarding their attitude, social norms, control, experience, plans and intentions to find a part-time job while at school. Of these, 149 did not have a job and were surveyed again four months later about their job-seeking and job outcomes (104 responded at T2). Job-seeking intentions at T1 were associated with past experience, plans and beliefs that getting a job was the right thing to do. Job-seeking at T2 was associated with beliefs about the value of job-seeking. Job interviews attended were related to job-seeking, and job offers were related to interviews attended. Students with higher job-seeking intentions and behaviours differed on most variables from students with lower intentions and behaviours. Students need to be aware of the relationship between job-seeking, interviews and offers, and be provided with strategies that increase their interviews and assist to manage unsuccessful job attempts. 相似文献
426.
Emotional expressions of moral value 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Julie Tannenbaum 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):43-57
In “Moral Luck” Bernard Williams describes a lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child, and feels “agent-regret.”
I believe that the driver’s feeling is moral since the thought associated with this feeling is a negative moral evaluation
of his action. I demonstrate that his action is not morally inadequate with respect his moral obligations. However, I show
that his negative evaluation is nevertheless justified since he acted in way that does not live up to his moral values. I
then use this distinctive negative moral evaluation to distinguish agent-regret from guilt and mere regret.
相似文献
Julie TannenbaumEmail: |
427.
Educating moral emotions: a praxiological analysis 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
This paper presents a praxiological analysis of three everyday educational practices or strategies that can be considered
as being directed at the moral formation of the emotions. The first consists in requests to imagine other's emotional reactions.
The second comprises requests to imitate normative emotional reactions and the third to re-appraise the features of a situation
that are relevant to an emotional response. The interest of these categories is not just that they help to organize and recognize
the significance of what might otherwise appear to be a disparate set of ordinary moral-educational interactions between children
and educators. We suggest, further, that this analysis provides some new insight into what distinguishes the broad and recurrent
conceptions of moral education from one another. Rather than being straightforwardly reducible to intractable differences
over core normative or meta-ethical questions they can also be seen as correlating with different suppositions about the central
role of the emotions in moral life and, correspondingly, different but to a large degree compatible interpretations of what
the "education of the moral emotions" primarily means.
相似文献
Bruce MaxwellEmail: |
428.
Caj Strandberg 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):249-260
In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses. 相似文献
429.
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development conceives conventional and post-conventional moral reasoning as consecutive levels in a developmental sequence. This claim was examined in terms of the relationship between preference for these two styles of reasoning on the one hand and moral identity as perceived by others (reputation) and as self-perceived and on the other. Participants (n = 172), in groups of four mutual acquaintances, provided ratings of one another’s standing, and estimates of their own standing and reputation, on four trait dimensions (moral responsibility, consideration for others, respect for authority, and political orientation). Post-conventional moral reasoning, assessed using the Defining Issues Test, was not significantly related either to reputation or to self-rating on any dimension except political orientation. Conventional reasoning was related to politics though in the opposite direction, but additionally to both self- and other-ratings of moral responsibility and to the corresponding ratings of respect for authority. Findings do not support the view that the conventional/post-conventional distinction in moral reasoning is a developmental difference. An alternative proposed is that these are independent domains of moral thought, related to quite different aspects of social behaviour and political attitudes. 相似文献
430.
Edward Omar Moad 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,62(3):135-148
I propose a framework for comparative Islamic—Western ethics in which the Islamic categories Islam, Iman, and Ihsan are juxtaposed with the concepts of obligation, value, and virtue, respectively. I argue that shari’a refers to both the obligation component and the entire structure of the Islamic ethic; suggesting a suspension of the understanding
of shari’a as simply Islamic “law,” and an alternative understanding of usul al-fiqh as a moral epistemology of obligation. I will test this approach by addressing the question of reason in Islamic moral epistemology
via an examination of an argument advanced by a founding usul scholar Muhammad bin Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī (150 A.H./767 C.E.). 相似文献