A grotesque and dark beauty: How moral identity and mechanisms of moral disengagement influence cognitive and emotional reactions to war

Two studies examine the extent to which moral identity and moral disengagement jointly drive reactions to war. Study 1 finds support for a hypothesized positive relationship between moral disengagement and the perceived morality of a highly punitive response to the perpetuators of the September 11th attacks. It also finds that this effect was eliminated for participants who place high self-importance on their moral identities. Study 2 finds that moral disengagement effectively reduced the extent to which participants experienced negative emotions in reaction to abuses of Iraqi detainees by American soldiers; however, the effectiveness of moral disengagement was negated when participants’ moral identities were primed.     

Harm concerns predict moral judgments of suicide: Comment on Rottman,Kelemen and Young (2014)

Two prominent theories offer different perspectives on the role of harm in moral cognition. Dyadic morality suggests that harm-related concerns are pervasive, whereas moral pluralism suggests that these concerns apply only to canonically harmful violations (e.g., murder), and not impure violations (e.g., suicide). Rottman et al. (2014) contrast these two theories by examining moral judgments of suicide. They conclude that suicide wrongness is independent of harm, therefore arguing against dyadic morality and for moral pluralism. However, these conclusions may be overstated; across all these studies, a meta-analysis reveals that harm is a significant predictor of suicide judgments. Moreover, the association between harm and suicide wrongness may be suppressed in individual studies by insufficient power, restrictive exclusion criteria, a single bivariate outlier, and reliance upon the conventional significance threshold of p < .05. In revised analyses harm is robustly associated with suicide wrongness, consistent with dyadic morality.     

Moral expertise

We offer a theory of moral expertise based on an updated version of the Thomistic concept of habitus. We maintain that mature moral control arises from internalized standards of belief married to corresponding actions; the result is moral expertise. Beliefs and actions (conceptualized as habitus) coalesce in a moral identity, which is then sustained by the beliefs and actions that comprise the habitus; what we do affects who we are and what we believe, just as what we believe guides what we do. In support of these claims, we examine recent research on moral judgment, moral identity, and moral emotions.     

The role of moral commitment within the Investment Model

The Investment Model (Rusbult, 1980) defines general commitment as a long‐term orientation towards relationship maintenance and feelings of psychological attachment, influenced by satisfaction, quality of alternatives and intrinsic/extrinsic investments. We suggest the importance of additionally assessing moral commitment, defined by an intrapersonal predisposition to remain in the relationship (Johnson, 1991). We argue moral commitment's association to perceived intrinsic investments acting as internal barriers influencing general commitment and promoting relationship maintenance. A correlational study resorting to structural equation modelling showed that moral commitment predicted intrinsic investments, which in turn predicted general commitment (Model 1). No direct paths emerged from moral commitment to satisfaction or quality of alternatives (Model 2), nor it emerged as a fourth direct predictor of general commitment (Model 3). Results are discussed under relationships maintenance and dissolution frameworks.     

Eavesdropping on character: Assessing everyday moral behaviors

Despite decades of interest in moral character, comparatively little is known about moral behavior in everyday life. This paper reports a novel method for assessing everyday moral behaviors using the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR)—a digital audio-recorder that intermittently samples snippets of ambient sounds from people’s environments—and examines the stability of these moral behaviors. In three samples (combined N = 186), participants wore an EAR over one or two weekends. Audio files were coded for everyday moral behaviors (e.g., showing sympathy, gratitude) and morally-neutral comparison language behaviors (e.g., use of prepositions, articles). Results indicate that stable individual differences in moral behavior can be systematically observed in daily life, and that their stability is comparable to the stability of neutral language behaviors.     

Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets

In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.     

Development and validation of a scale of social and moral judgments (ABB scale) and its use in prison settings

IntroductionThe traditional approach to value judgments involves determining the position of an individual on a scale designed to evaluate the underlying mechanisms and dimensions of judgments.ObjectiveThe purpose of this study was to develop and validate a scale among a general population and to apply it to individuals particularly affected by, or directly involved in, acts of transgression.MethodThe scale comprises three types of behavior involving an expression of personal values (atypism or idiosyncratic behavior) or a violation of moral or conventional standards. Subjects were asked to assess a range of actions and behaviors on three dimensions (Likert format): seriousness, excusability and rejection of the transgressor.Results and conclusionAs predicted, factor analysis shows a clear hierarchy of values. The results demonstrate the multidimensional nature of the instrument and indicate good reliability. Tolerance and severity indices were developed to understand the underlying dynamics of social and moral judgments. The study found that inmates’ judgments of violations and transgressions differed in some respects from the judgments made by the general population. The influence of context and the role of group membership as an explanatory factor are examined from the point of view of the identity strategies used.     

On having very long arms: how the availability of technological means affects moral cognition

Modern technological means allow for meaningful interaction across arbitrary distances, while human morality evolved in environments in which individuals needed to be spatially close in order to interact. We investigate how people integrate knowledge about modern technology with their ancestral moral dispositions to help relieve nearby suffering. Our first study establishes that spatial proximity between an agent's means of helping and the victims increases people's judgement of helping obligations, even if the agent is constantly far personally. We then report and meta-analyse 20 experiments elucidating the cognitive mechanisms behind this effect, which include inferences of increased efficaciousness and personal involvement. Implications of our findings for the scientific understanding of ancestral moral dispositions in modern environments are discussed, as well as suggestions for how these insights might be exploited to increase charitable giving. Our meta-analysis provides a practical example for how aggregating across all available data, including failed replication attempts, allows conclusions that could not be supported in single experiments.     

Swedish youth football players’ attitudes towards moral decision in sport as predicted by the parent-initiated motivational climate

ObjectivesThe purpose of this study was to examine associations between late adolescent football players’ perceptions of the motivational climate – as initiated by mothers and fathers – and attitudes towards moral decision making in sports.DesignCross-sectional.MethodsParticipants were 213 Swedish football players (144 males, 67 females) aged 16–19 years who completed measures assessing perceived parent-initiated motivational climate (i.e., success-without-effort climate [SWEC]; worry conducive climate [WCC]; and learning/enjoyment climate [LEC]) and attitudes towards moral decision-making in sport (i.e., acceptance of cheating [AOC]; acceptance of gamesmanship [AOG] and keeping winning in proportion [KWIP]).ResultsCanonical correlations demonstrated moderate positive relations between parent-initiated − both mother and father − performance climates (WCC and SWEC) and AOC and AOG. Moreover, the relationship between mother and father-initiated learning/enjoyment climate (LEC) were shown to be moderately and positively associated with the prosocial attitude dimension of KWIP. Results also showed that a mother-initiated LEC and a mother-initiated SWEC were stronger predictors of the criterion variables (AOC, AOG, and KWIP) than equivalent father-initiated climate dimensions.ConclusionsThe results highlight the importance of considering the relationship between parent-initiated climates − especially initiated by mothers − and the development of moral decision-making among youth football players.     

Conflict detection during moral decision-making: evidence for deontic reasoners’ utilitarian sensitivity

Moral dilemmas often force us to decide between deontological (harming others is wrong) and utilitarian (harming others can be acceptable depending on the consequences) considerations. Cognitive scientists have shown that utilitarian responders typically engage demanding deliberate thinking to override a conflicting intuitive deontological response. A key question is whether deontic responders also take utilitarian considerations into account and detect that there are conflicting responses at play. The present study addressed this issue by contrasting people's processing of moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions. Results showed that deontic responders were slower and less confident about their decision when solving the conflict (vs. no-conflict) dilemmas. This suggests that they are considering both deontic and utilitarian aspects of their decision and indicates that a deontic decision is more informed and less oblivious than it might appear.