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排序方式: 共有504条查询结果,搜索用时 421 毫秒
421.
422.
Sanford I. Nidich Randi J. Nidich Charles N. Alexander 《Journal of Adult Development》2000,7(4):217-225
This paper discusses possible relationships between the cognitive–moral development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg and Charles Alexander's life-span model. Central to Alexander's model is the role which levels of mind and higher states of consciousness play throughout the general periods of development. Parallel to Kohlberg's cosmic perspective Stage 7—which goes beyond the representational logic and reasoning identified by Piaget's highest stage—are the postrepresentational stages of development, described by Vedic psychology and Alexander's model as "higher states of consciousness"—transcendental consciousness, cosmic consciousness, God consciousness, and unity consciousness. Research indicates that EEG brainwave coherence is associated with the development of higher states of consciousness and Kohlberg's Stage 7. Studies on the Transcendental Meditation (TM) and TM-Sidhi programs as effective technologies for promoting moral development are further discussed. 相似文献
423.
Critical Consciousness: An Alternative Pathway for Positive Personal and Social Development 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Elena Mustakova-Possardt 《Journal of Adult Development》1998,5(1):13-30
This paper presents a conceptual model of the integrative psychological construct of critical consciousness (CC), defined as a moral awareness which propels individuals to disembed from their cultural, social, and political environment, and engage in a responsible critical moral dialogue with it, making active efforts to construct their own place in social reality and to develop internal consistency in their ways of being. The ontogeny of CC is analyzed in terms of the synergistic interaction between its two main components, structural developmental and moral motivation. The paper describes the cross-cultural interview research which allowed the elaboration of the CC developmental pathway. It posits the dimension of moral motivation as distinguishing the CC pathway, and illustrates the continuum between predominantly moral and expediency motivation through brief case vignettes. The paper differentiates three developmental macrolevels of CC, and illustrates through case vignettes two alternatives of social consciousness at the level of conventional morality—CC and non-CC. Some possible sources of moral motivation in personal history and biography are discussed. 相似文献
424.
Nathan Stout 《Philosophical Papers》2017,46(2):297-313
One key desideratum of a theory of blame is that it be able to explain why we typically have differing blaming responses in cases involving significant degrees of luck. T.M. Scanlon has proposed a relational account of blame, and he has argued that his account succeeds in this regard and that this success makes his view preferable to reactive attitude accounts of blame. In this paper, I aim to show that Scanlon's view is open to a different kind of luck-based objection. I then offer a way of understanding moral luck cases which allows for a plausible explanation of our differential blaming responses by appealing to the salience of certain relevant features of the action in question. 相似文献
425.
People judge that an individual who attempts to harm someone but fails should be blamed and punished more when they imagine how things could have turned out worse, compared to when they imagine how things could have turned out the same, or when they think only about what happened. This moral counterfactual amplification effect occurs when people believe the protagonist had no reason for the attempt to harm, and not when the protagonist had a reason, as Experiment 1 shows. It occurs for intentional failed attempts to harm and also for accidental near-misses, as Experiment 2 shows, but not for failed attempts in which the harm occurs anyway by another cause, for both general judgments about the event and specific judgments about the individual's actions, as Experiments 3 and 4 show. The implications for understanding the role of counterfactual thoughts in moral judgement are discussed. 相似文献
426.
Jonathan Trerise 《Theology & Science》2017,15(2):153-156
I disagree with Hawking, arguing that there are some good reasons to believe that ETI would not be out to harm us. 相似文献
427.
Xiaomei Yang 《Dao》2009,8(2):173-188
No one denies the importance of applying knowledge to actions. But claiming identity (unity) of knowledge and action is quite
another thing. There seem to be two problems with the claim: (1) the identity claim implies that the sole cause for one to
fail to act on what one judges to be right is ignorance, but it is obviously false that the sole cause of failure in moral
actions is ignorance. (2) The identity statement implies non-separation of knowledge and action. But knowledge does not necessarily
lead to action. However, the identity of knowledge and action is what a famous Ming Confucian scholar, Wang Yang-ming, proposed and the concept became the central doctrine of his teaching. Though there are several major interpretations
of Wang’s doctrine in contemporary literature, it is not clear to me how they deal with the above mentioned difficulties.
In this article, I will discuss these interpretations of the doctrine and propose a new interpretation. My purpose is to give
an interpretation of Wang’s doctrine that has the capacity of dealing with these challenges to the doctrine and also captures
the essence of his teaching. 相似文献
428.
Waelbers K 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):51-68
This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility
in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological
delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter
and outcomes are often different from those intended. Third, since the outcomes are often unforeseen and unintended, we can
no longer simply apply the traditional (modernist) models for discussing moral responsibility. We need to reinterpret moral
responsibility. A schematic layout of a model on Social Role-Responsibility that incorporates these three premises is presented
to allow discussion of a new way of interpreting moral responsibility.
相似文献
Katinka WaelbersEmail: |
429.
In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or “personal”. Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people’s real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas. 相似文献
430.
Derk Pereboom 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):21-33
In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest
a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether
he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the
role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument
is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility
is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.
相似文献
Derk PereboomEmail: |