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101.
Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation
and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program.
This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem;
it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals
concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity
and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim
that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that
such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.
相似文献
Mark TimmonsEmail: |
102.
We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that
yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled
by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims
supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments.
If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral
philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.
相似文献
Fiery CushmanEmail: |
103.
Richard Joyce 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(1):53-75
Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (e.g., what is meant by “objective”? what is meant by “experience”?). Finally, attention is given to the relation between (a) acknowledging that the projectivist account might be true of a token moral judgment and (b) maintaining moral projectivism to be true as a general thesis. 相似文献
104.
Jon Tresan 《The Journal of Ethics》2009,13(1):51-72
‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive
way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological.
The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between
two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the
items specified in the claim. In part one I explain this distinction and the problems neglecting it may cause. In part two
I show that it has been neglected, and has caused those problems, at least with respect to one version of internalism. That
is judgment internalism, which claims that moral beliefs are necessarily related to pro- or con-attitudes; e.g., that if you
believe you ought to x you must have some motivation to x. The considerations standardly adduced in favor of judgment internalism
support only a version which lacks the metaethical implications typically attributed to it, at least so far as anyone has
shown. Proponents and opponents of judgment internalism fail to realize this because of their neglect of the modality/relation
distinction. I illustrate by considering discussions of judgment internalism by Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, James
Dreier, David Brink, and others.
相似文献
Jon TresanEmail: |
105.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):169-179
Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for
the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism
expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical
reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's
imperiling practical reason.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
106.
107.
Mark Moller 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(2):131-145
Many who believe that human embryos have moral status are convinced that their use in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research
can be morally justified as long as they are discarded embryos left over from fertility treatments. This is one reason why
this view about discarded embryos has played such a prominent role in the debate over publicly funding hESC research in the
United States and other countries. Many believe that this view offers the best chance of a compromise between the different
sides in this debate. This paper focuses on what seems to be the most plausible argument for this view about discarded embryos.
It shows that this argument is unsound regardless of how one understands the claim that embryos have moral status. It also
discusses the implications of this conclusion for attempts to use this argument as a basis for public policy.
相似文献
Mark MollerEmail: |
108.
Nano-ethics as NEST-ethics: Patterns of Moral Argumentation About New and Emerging Science and Technology 总被引:6,自引:3,他引:3
There might not be a specific nano-ethics, but there definitely is an ethics of new & emerging science and technology (NEST),
with characteristic tropes and patterns of moral argumentation. Ethical discussion in and around nanoscience and technology
reflects such NEST-ethics. We offer an inventory of the arguments, and show patterns in their evolution, in arenas full of
proponents and opponents. We also show that there are some nano-specific issues: in how size matters, and when agency is delegated
to smart devices. Our overall approach is a pragmatist ethics, and we conclude that struggle (and learning) might be more
productive than models emphasizing consensus.
相似文献
Tsjalling SwierstraEmail: |
109.
正确认识马克思的道德理论在其思想体系中的地位,关系到对整个马克思思想及其贡献的理解。针对中外学界对这一问题的种种不同看法和误解,本文认为,伦理道德是马克思一生学术实践所关注的,是马克思思想体系的灵魂,自由与解放则是马克思道德研究及其整个思想体系的主旨。 相似文献
110.
从GDP崇拜到GNH关怀,是两种发展观的转变,其实质就是对幸福的一种崭新诠释和评价标准的转变。GDP崇拜其实质就是唯效率崇拜,促进了经济的发展,但也带来了道德的困惑和系列社会问题,由政府善治,经济增长,文化发展和环境保护四极组成的GNH关怀发展理念,已成为我们党和政府的执政理念和行政理念,具有积极的伦理意义,必须予以高度重视。 相似文献