Moral antitheodicy: prospects and problems

Proponents of the view which I call ‘moral antitheodicy’ call for the theistic discourse of theodicy to be abandoned, because, they claim, all theodicies involve some form of moral impropriety. Three arguments in support of this view are examined: the argument from insensitivity, the argument from detachment, and the argument from harmful consequences. After discussing the merits of each argument individually, I attempt to show that they all must presuppose what they are intended to establish, namely, that the set of premises advanced in any given theodicy will be untenable. I conclude by discussing what uses there might be for the moral critique of theodicy, if it cannot be used to ground a global rejection of theodical practice.     

Priming family values: How being a parent affects moral evaluations of harmless but offensive acts

In modern liberal societies people are generally reluctant to morally condemn acts that they find personally distasteful so long as those acts are not harmful or unfair to others. However, in providing character education for their children, parents often have to censure harmless but offensive acts. Thus, we hypothesize that the parental role broadens the scope of morality beyond narrow considerations of harm and fairness. To test this idea we asked parents and nonparents to morally evaluate harmless/offensive acts and a control harmful act. We manipulated whether the parental role was primed before they evaluated these acts. Parents and nonparents did not differ in their moral objections to the control act regardless of parental role priming. However, when the parental role was primed parents were more morally opposed to harmless but offensive acts than were nonparents. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding the dynamics of moral judgment and the recruitment of parents into moral reform movements.     

A coherent moral relativism

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.     

Skeptical theism and moral obligation

Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics object that skeptical theism implies a degree of moral skepticism that even skeptical theists will find objectionable and that it undermines moral obligations that even skeptical theists will want to preserve. I discuss a version of the first objection and defend a version of the second.     

Community vs. Clinic-Based Modular Treatment of Children with Early-Onset ODD or CD: A Clinical Trial with 3-Year Follow-Up

This study examines the treatment outcomes of 139, 6–11 year-old, clinically referred boys and girls diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) or Conduct Disorder (CD) who were randomly assigned to a modular-based treatment protocol that was applied by research study clinicians either in the community (COMM) or a clinic office (CLINIC). To examine normative comparisons, a matched sample of 69 healthy control children was included. Multiple informants completed diagnostic interviews and self-reports at six assessment timepoints (pretreatment to 3-year follow-up) to evaluate changes in the child’s behavioral and emotional problems, psychopathic features, functional impairment, diagnostic status, and service involvement. Using HLM and logistic regression models, COMM and CLINIC showed significant and comparable improvements on all outcomes. By 3-year follow-up, 36% of COMM and 47% of CLINIC patients no longer met criteria for either ODD or CD, and 48% and 57% of the children in these two respective conditions had levels of parent-rated externalizing behavior problems in the normal range. We discuss the nature and implications of these novel findings regarding the role of treatment context or setting for the treatment and long-term outcome of behavior disorders. This study was supported by grants to the first author from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 57727) and to the second author by the National Institute of Nursing Research (NR 07615). The fourth author was supported by grant K01 MH078039 from the National Institute of Mental Health. The authors acknowledge the research and clinical staff of the Resources to Enhance the Adjustment of Children (REACH) program, and Drs. David Brent, Tammy Chung, William Gardner, John Lochman, and Wayne Osgood. Reprints may be obtained from Dr. Kolko, WPIC, 3811 O’Hara St., Pittsburgh, PA 15213.     

Deficits in executed and imagined aiming performance in brain-injured children

Motor disorders are a frequent consequence of acquired brain injury (ABI) in children and much effort is currently invested in alleviating these deficits. The aim of the present study was to test motor imagery (MI) capabilities in children with ABI (n=25) and an age- and gender-matched control group (n=25). A computerized Virtual Radial Fitts Task (VRFT) was used to investigate the speed-accuracy trade-offs (or Fitts' law) that occur as target size is varied for both executed and imagined performance. In the control group, the speed for accuracy trade-off for both executed and imagined performance conformed to Fitts' law. In the ABI group, only executed movements conformed to Fitts' law. These findings suggest that children with ABI show an inferior ability to imagine the time needed to complete goal-directed movements with differential difficulty levels.     

Measuring Moral Progress

The study provides an in-depth analysis of two young adult subjects from a longitudinal study who underwent successive and significant developmental changes. Their developmental patterns, however, are only revealed by a new conception of moral stages, which is both more comprehensive and more detailed than Kohlberg’s original approach. In particular, the suggested alternative taxonomy neatly accommodates what appears as developmental anomalies in the Kohlbergian frame of reference. What is more, apart from merely matching with the observed data, the new theory also explains why the subjects developed the way they did, since it reveals the inherent cognitive conflicts at each stage and how these are resolved at the following one. Although the theory stands against the Kohlberg theory as it is, it may be understood as an extension and further development of the latter, in the sense that Kohlbergian stages are differentiated, supplemented, and theoretically substantiated within the new framework.

What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?

Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.

The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality

We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments. If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.

Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?

Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (e.g., what is meant by “objective”? what is meant by “experience”?). Finally, attention is given to the relation between (a) acknowledging that the projectivist account might be true of a token moral judgment and (b) maintaining moral projectivism to be true as a general thesis.