Excuse inference modification in children and adults

The ability of first- and third-grade children and college adults to make excuse inferences about a speaker's use of an utterance and to modify those inferences appropriately upon receiving later information was examined in four experiments. Short stories containing an utterance by a speaker were read aloud. Utterances in the story were preceded by contextual information that suggested either that the speaker was truthful or making an excuse. Utterances were followed by information that confirmed or disconfirmed the excuse interpretation. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that even first and third graders can make excuse inferences, but these children rarely modify these interpretations upon receiving disconfirming information. In Experiments 2–4 possible reasons for the children's interpretive inflexibility were examined by varying the difficulty of relating the excuse interpretation and succeeding information. Results suggested processing difficulty, as well as an interpretive “set,” contributed to the children's inflexibility.     

Intervening causation and the mitigation of responsibility for harm doing II. The role of limited mental capacities

The present study investigated (i) the conditions under which the proximal cause of an event affects judgments of a distal cause, (ii) the capacities persons need to be held responsible for their actions, and (iii) the relationship between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution. Subjects read about situations in which an initial act, in combination with a later behavior by a second person, produced harm. The age and mental state of the second person were varied. It was found that cause and blame assigned to the initial action was greater when the second person was a child or mentally disturbed, as compared to a sane adult. Causal and moral responsibility were related to the understanding, reasoning capacity, and ability to control behavior of the person judged. Finally, support was obtained for an entailment model of the relations between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution.     

Complex decision making: A longitudinal study of process and performance

Two studies using a computer-simulated, strategy-formulation game and business students were conducted using simultaneous verbal protocols. It was found that a number of information-processing and information-evaluation thought processes were significantly related to game performance. Consistent with what is known about individual decision making, the present results suggest that, for the task used in this study, individuals who engage in causal analysis perform better than those who do not. But those who focus on negative emotions, blindly repeat previously successful decisions, and engage in illogical through processes perform more poorly than those who do not. Causal replication using real managers within organizational settings, however, is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn from this research.     

Conceptualizations of valence and instrumentality: A fourfold model

Within the framework of valence-instrumentality (VI) theory, a fourfold model is developed to predict the contribution which is made by one outcome of an alternative to the valence of that alternative. The proposed model uses four subjective conditional probabilities which are based on the presence and absence of an alternative, and on the occurrence and nonoccurrence of an outcome. Valence is defined as the difference between the attractiveness values of the occurrence of an alternative (or an outcome) and the nonoccurrence of an alternative (or an outcome). Also, differences between subjective probabilities replace instrumentalities. Alternative valence-instrumentality formulations are analyzed in relation to the proposed fourfold model. The proposed model can be understood as a consistent application of Vroom's model (1964, Work and motivation, New York: Wiley), while other models are judged to be relatively deficient. The fourfold model, in combination with a matrix formulation of expectancy concepts, addresses a number of criticisms of VI theory and makes possible a test of the theory within the limits of its own assumptions.     

Realism,instrumentalism, and the intentional stance

One of Dennett's principal arguments for an instrumentalistic construal of intentional attributions (e.g., attributions of belief, etc.) is that such attributions are environment relative. I argue that one can and should adopt a realist perspective toward such attributions, but accommodate their environmental relativity by treating intentional properties as relational properties. By doing so one acquires a useful perspective on experimental cognitive psychology; in particular, one can overcome the temptation to treat ecological accounts and information processing accounts as incompatible alternatives and come to see them as mutually supportive. Treating intentional properties as relational may be counter-intuitive, but I provide examples of how other sciences have had to treat what seem to be intrinsic properties as relational.     

Moral judgment in adults with autism spectrum disorders

The ability of a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) to distinguish moral, conventional and disgust transgressions was investigated using a set of six transgression scenarios, each of which was followed by questions about permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification. The results showed that although individuals with HFA or AS (HFA/AS) were able to distinguish affect-backed norms from conventional affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness and authority-dependence, they failed to distinguish moral and disgust transgressions along the seriousness dimension and were unable to provide appropriate welfare-based moral justifications. Moreover, they judged conventional and disgust transgressions to be more serious than did the comparison group, and the correlation analysis revealed that the seriousness rating was related to their ToM impairment. We concluded that difficulties providing appropriate moral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions in individuals with HFA/AS may be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while responsive to rule violations, fails to use relevant information about the agent’s intentions and the affective impact of the action outcome in conscious moral reasoning.