The self-composing brain: towards a glial-neuronal brain theory

A brain model is proposed which describes its structural organization and the related functions as compartments organized in time and space. On a molecular level the negative feedback loops of clock-controlled genes are interpreted as compartments. This spatio-temporal operational principle may also work on the cellular level as glial-neuronal interactions, wherein glia have a spatio-temporal boundary setting function. The synchronization of the multi-compartmental operations of the brain is compared to the harmonization in a symphony and appears as an integrated behavior of the whole organism, defined as modes of behavior. For explanation of the principle of harmonization, an example from Schubert's Symphony No. 8 has been chosen. While harmonization refers to the synchronization of diverse systems, it seems appropriate to select the brain of a composer and the structure of musical composition as a paradigm towards a glial-neuronal brain theory. Finally, some limitations of experimental brain research are discussed and robotics are proposed as a promising alternative.     

Adaptive and maladaptive ruminative self-focus during emotional processing

Ruminative self-focus on mood, problems and other aspects of self-experience can have both mal adaptive consequences, perpetuating depression, and, adaptive consequences, promoting recovery from upsetting events. Increasing evidence suggests that these contrasting effects may be explained by distinct varieties of ruminative self-focus, each with distinct functional properties. This study tested the prediction (Emotional processing, three modes of mind and the prevention of relapse in depression. Behav. Res. Therapy, 37 (1999) S53) that an experiential mode of self-focused attention would facilitate recovery from an upsetting event in comparison to a conceptual-evaluative mode of self-focused attention. To test these contrasting effects experimentally, 69 participants wrote about an induced failure experience in either a conceptual-evaluative condition (e.g. "Why did you feel this way?"), or an experiential condition ("How did you feel moment-by-moment?"). Consistent with the hypothesis, higher levels of trait disposition to ruminate were associated with relatively greater increases in negative mood 12 h after the failure in the conceptual-evaluative condition compared to the experiential condition. Furthermore, the conceptual-evaluative condition resulted in more intrusions about the failure than the experiential condition. These results support the differentiation of rumination into distinct modes of self-focused attention with distinct functional effects; a conceptual-evaluative mode that is maladaptive and an experiential mode that is adaptive.     

The Formal Structure of Kind Representations

Kind representations, concepts like table, triangle, dog, and planet, underlie generic language. Here, we investigate the formal structure of kind representations—the structure that distinguishes kind representations from other types of representations. The present studies confirm that participants distinguish generic-supporting properties of individuals (e.g., this watch is made of steel) and accidental properties (e.g., this watch is on the nightstand). Furthermore, work dating back to Aristotle establishes that only some generic-supporting properties bear a principled connection to the kind, that is, are true of an individual by virtue of its being a member of a specific kind (e.g., telling time for a watch). The present studies tested the hypothesis that principled connections are part of the formal structure of kind representations. Specifically, they tested whether they structure a newly learned kind representation. Experiment 1 found that introducing a property of a newly encountered novel kind in any one of four linguistic frames that provide evidence that a property has a principled connection to a kind (e.g., “It has fur because it is a blick”) led participants to infer a different conceptual consequence of principled connections (i.e., “There is something wrong with this blick, which does not have fur”) for which they had no direct evidence. Two introduction frames that provided no evidence for principled connections (e.g., “Almost all blicks have fur”) did not generate the same consequence. Experiment 2 found that all of the targeted properties were generic licensing, irrespective of the introduction frame. That the distinction between properties that bear principled connections to their kinds, and merely generic-supporting properties structures novel kind representations, provides strong evidence that this distinction is part of the formal structure of kind representations.     

Representation of principled connections: a window onto the formal aspect of common sense conception

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. Recent research suggests that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g., DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g., having four legs for dogs) but not other properties (t-properties; e.g., being brown for dogs). Principled connections differ from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections license (i) the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess their k-properties, (ii) formal explanations (i.e., explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is), and (iii) normative expectations concerning the presence of k-properties in tokens of the type. The present paper investigates the hypothesis that representing principled connections requires representing properties as aspects of being the relevant kind of thing (Aspect Hypothesis). Experiment 1 provides a direct test of the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiments 2 and 3 provide indirect tests of the Aspect Hypothesis. All three experiments provide support for the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiment 4 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the manner in which formal explanations are licensed by principled connections. Finally, Experiment 5 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the nature of the normative expectations licensed by principled connections. Together these results provide strong evidence for the idea that representing principled connections involves representing a property as being an aspect of being a given kind of thing. The results also help clarify the manner in which formal explanation differs from other modes of explanation. Finally, the results of the experiments are used to motivate a proposal concerning the formal structure of the conceptual representations implicated by principled connections. This structure provides a domain-general way of structuring our concepts and embodies the perspective we take when we think and talk of things as being instances of a kind.     

《易经》:人类科学思维和审美思维方式的精典阐释

一本诞生于五千年前的中国古书《易经》,已经包含着深刻的现代科学数理逻辑原理,且与美学的审美逻辑原理互为支持、互为表里,使这两大类本来被认为水火不相容的领域及其独具的思维方式得到了高度完善统一的阐释。从这样的角度来看《易经》,也许会有助于目前心理学界对思维方式及逻辑问题的研究,拓开一条崭新的思路。     

Are there differential word length effects in the two visual fields?

This study examined whether differential word length effects in the two visual fields imply hemisphere-dependent modes of word recognition. Length was defined as the number of constituent characters of Chinese foreign names (Experiments 1 and 2), as the number of constituent morphemes of three-character words (Experiments 3 and 4), and as that of constituent words of phrases (Experiments 5 and 6). Two types of experimental tasks were adopted, one required linguistic judgments on overall items (Experiments 1, 3, and 5) and the other was target detection tasks performed on the same set of stimuli (Experiments 2, 4, and 6). Five of the six experiments failed to find any kind of interaction between length and visual field. An interaction was observed only for the detection of characters embedded in foreign names, that is, when lexical access is least involved in the task, suggesting that word recognition plays a minimum role in the phenomenon. Other observations suggested that modes of word recognition are more frequency-dependent than hemisphere-dependent, and that Chinese compound words and phrases, although hardly distinguishable, do behave differently.