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81.
Nancy Murphy 《Zygon》1993,28(3):351-359
Abstract. I argue here for a limited version of pragmatism—called conceptual pragmatism—that recognizes that conceptual systems are to be evaluated according to their usefulness for helping us get around in the world. Once a conceptual system is in place, however, the truth of sentences is a matter of both empirical tit and coherence with the rest of our knowledge. The error of critical realists is to fail to take into account the limited conceptual relativity that is to be expected on the basis of conceptual pragmatism. The conceptual realist thesis applies equally in science and theology. 相似文献
82.
by Klaus Nürnberger 《Zygon》2010,45(1):127-148
The approach of experiential realism could indicate where science and faith deal with the same reality, where science questions faith assumptions, and where faith goes beyond the mandate and method of science. Although prescientific, Martin Luther's theology is the classical prototype of an experiential theology. We experience God's creative power in all of reality. We discern its regularities through observation and reason. So faith opens up all the space needed by science. However, experienced reality is highly ambiguous. It obscures God's intentions. God's intentions are revealed in the proclamation of the gospel: God is unconditionally for us and with us and not against us. This proclamation is a promise, appropriated in faith, and geared to a vision of what ought to become. It is based on the interpretation of a catastrophe—the cross of Christ—as God's pivotal redemptive act in human history. It goes beyond the mandate and method of science, yet it is capable of giving the latter a sense of purpose, criteria of acceptability, and authority to act in the interests of humanity and the earth. Theology challenges science to acknowledge the necessity of a transcendent frame of reference and moral accountability. Scientific insight challenges theology to reconceptualize its assumptions on God, creation, and eschatology to integrate best science. 相似文献
83.
IntroductionThe extent to which coaches and athletes can effectively work together is an essential consideration in the pursuit of athletic success. This is particularly important at the elite level due to the high pressures on tangible outcomes, such as reaching the podium of a major competition. This study sought to explore and explain how both coaches and athletes identify personality traits in themselves and their partners to manage and maintain a positive relationship.MethodsUsing a mixed methodological design underpinned by critical realism, four elite coach-athlete dyads (four male coaches, one male athlete, three female athletes) were purposefully recruited from a single sport. Each participant completed the 44-item Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999) on their own and their partner’s perceived personality traits. The data generated were used to inform the discussions in follow-up, individual semi-structured interviews with all participants.ResultsThe interview data were analysed using thematic analysis, which generated three higher themes and seven lower order themes. The three higher order themes were perceived compatibility, relationship persona and collective personality.ConclusionThe present investigation has identified what coaches and athletes perceive to be the key personality characteristics to manage and maintain a successful working relationship. 相似文献
84.
James Kinkaid 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2019,27(3):593-614
Martin Heidegger closes his Winter Semester 1927–28 lectures by claiming that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, read through the lens of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, confirmed the accuracy of his philosophical path culminating in Being and Time. A notable interpretation of Heidegger’s debt to Kant, advanced by William Blattner, presents Heidegger as a temporal idealist. I argue that attention to Husserl’s adaptation of Kant’s critical philosophy shows that both Husserl and Heidegger are realists. I make my case by tracing a unified philosophical problematic through three puzzling passages: the Schematism chapter of the first Critique, Husserl’s thought experiment of the destruction of the world in Ideas, and the passage in Being and Time that motivates Blattner’s idealist reading. Husserl and Heidegger give accounts, derived from Kant, of how the consciousness of time makes it possible for objects to be perceived as enduring unities, as well as ‘genealogies of logic’ that show how a priori knowledge, including ontology, is possible. These accounts are idealistic only in the sense that they concern the ideal or essential features of intentionality in virtue of which it puts us in touch with things as they are independently of the contributions of any mind of any type. 相似文献
85.
Polly Young-Eisendrath 《The Journal of analytical psychology》1997,42(1):157-166
This paper develops a theoretical and clinical approach to the self which is non-essentialist and post-modem. Briefly, it offers a framework for theorizing Self based on hermeneutics and psychological constructivism. It then develops a critique of the essentialist Jungian theory of Self in which the Self is frequently described as a human subject with views, intentions and desires of its own. With this is background, a post-modern Jungian framework for Self is advanced, with a brief clinical account of the self in analysis. 相似文献
86.
J. Wesley Robbins 《Zygon》1999,34(4):655-666
Pragmatism and critical realism are different vocabularies for talking about the cognitive value of religion and science. Each can be, and has been, used to make the case for cognitive parity between religious and scientific discourse. Critical realism presupposes a particular form of cognitive psychology that entails general skepticism about the external world and forecloses scientific inquiry in the name of a preconceived idea of what the nature of human cognition must be. Thus, of the two, pragmatism is the better vocabulary for fostering mutual understanding between religion and science. 相似文献
87.
Jürgen Dümont 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):341-364
Two of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism are examined in detail. One of them is developed
as an extension of a model-theoretic argument against mathematical realism based on considerations concerning the so-called
Skolem-Paradox in set theory. This argument against mathematical realism is also treated explicitly. The article concentrates
on the fine structure of the arguments because most commentators have concentrated on the major premisses of Putnam's argument
and especially on his treatment of metaphysical realism. It is shown that the validity of Putnam's arguments is doubtful and
that realists are by no means forced to accept the theses Putnam ascribes to them. It is concluded that Putnam fails to give
convincing arguments for rejecting mathematical or metaphysical realism. Furthermore, Putnam's internal realism is discussed
critically.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
88.
Reinhard Schulz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):365-378
Representing and Reconstructing: A Hermeneutical Reply to Ian Hacking. Hacking published in 1983 Representing and Intervening
which has provoked, particularly in the US, the so called realism/anti-realism debate which is still alive today. He lays
claim to anti-realism for theory and to realism for the experiment. Following him, only that which can be used for manipulating
something (e.g., the path of an electon) is realistic. H. Putnam is a severe critic of this dualism. In my paper I am going
to take the Hacking-Putnam controversy as a starting-point for the problem about the determination of the relation between
theory and experiment in the natural sciences. I shall then follow M. Schlick's discussion of this problem and the current
solution to the problem as offered by H. Pietschmann. The differing interpretation of Kant according to the three perspectives
shall be the guideline for the argumentation. The goal of my argumentation is that theory and experiment do not live their
own lives, that in experimenting one always continues traditional chains of action, and that natural science cannot be regarded
independently of the life world it takes place in. This insight into the representing and reconstructing overturns in natural
science, due to the necessity of human decisions, opens up their hermeneutical dimension.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
89.
Valer Ambrus 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(1):1-16
Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability.
Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his
mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually
is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis
of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that
Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of
internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force
as a weapon against incommensurability.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
90.
William James Earle 《Metaphilosophy》2023,54(2-3):341-351
An examination of late Rorty shows that he does not abandon belief in an external world about which we can, and indeed must, acquire knowledge. His disapproval of the correspondence theory of truth does not involve the idea that anything other than local weather, for example, could falsify remarks about local weather. It is just that once we get done looking out the window or, if we are outside, feeling the right kind of drops make contact with our skin, there is nothing else we can do, nothing better, to make ourselves more certain, more cognitively secure. One can see this in the detailed work that enables scientific progress. Science improves itself by doing more of the same. G. E. Moore's famous open question stays open only as a reminder that our fallibility never disappears and that our cognitive security is never better than pro tem. Rorty, as a faithful pragmatist and undogmatic meliorist, thinks this is perfectly O.K. 相似文献