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61.
Matthias Adam 《Synthese》2007,158(1):93-108
Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical
arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality
of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are
well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion.
By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification
employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest
on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for
their interrelation are explored. 相似文献
62.
Edmund N. Santurri 《The Journal of religious ethics》2005,33(4):783-814
In The Law of Peoples John Rawls casts his proposals as an argument against what he calls “political realism.” Here, I contend that a certain version of “Christian political realism” survives Rawls's polemic against political realism sans phrase and that Rawls overstates his case against political realism writ large. Specifically, I argue that Rawls's dismissal of “empirical political realism” is underdetermined by the evidence he marshals in support of the dismissal and that his rejection of “normative political realism” is in tension with his own normative concessions to political reality as expressed in The Law of Peoples. That is, I contend that Rawls, himself, needs some form of political realism to render persuasive the full range of normative claims constituting the argument of that work. 相似文献
63.
Ted Peters 《Zygon》1996,31(2):323-343
Abstract. Revolutionary developments in both science and theology are moving the relation between the two far beyond the nineteenth-century “warfare” model. Both scientists and theologians are engaged in a common search for shared understanding. Eight models of interaction are outlined: scientism, scientific imperialism, ecclesiastical authoritarianism, scientific creationism, the two-language theory, hypothetical consonance, ethical overlap, and New Age spirituality. Developments in hypothetical consonance are explored in the work of various scholars, including Ian Barbour, Philip Clayton, Paul Davies, Willem Drees, Langdon Gilkey, Philip Hefner, Nancey Murphy, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Robert John Russell, Thomas Torrence and Wenzel van Huyssteen. 相似文献
64.
James W. Hikins 《Argumentation》1995,9(1):137-162
Changes in the social, political, and intellectual climate worldwide portend radical changes in how humans view themselves and their world. This essay argues that the twenty-first century will usher in apost-postmodern age. The new epoch will be one in which argument practices more closely resemble their modernist forbears. The given of achievement will overcome the postmodern reluctance to assent. Argument will be practiced against the backdrop of realist philosophical frameworks and will be viewed as contributing to the accretion of knowledge.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Speech Communication Association Annual Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, November 1991.To assert that moral, aesthetic, and factual arguments are statistically derived, is not to argue that there is no such thing as absolute goodness, beauty, or truth. It is to declare that these ultimate values have little relevance in practical argument.- Daniel McDonald 相似文献
65.
Thomas A. Russman 《Argumentation》1995,9(1):123-135
Argument, in any full sense of the word, needs resources and assumptions that postmodernism does not provide. Postmodernism is not a phenomenon that emerged after modernism, as it were, to replace it; postmodernism is just an ultimate expression of the nihilistic tendencies of modernism, tendencies which were present from its beginning and have continued to the present. A radical critique of modernism undercuts postmodernism as well and clears the way for a revival of realist foundations for argument and rhetoric. 相似文献
66.
Polly Young-Eisendrath 《The Journal of analytical psychology》1997,42(1):157-166
This paper develops a theoretical and clinical approach to the self which is non-essentialist and post-modem. Briefly, it offers a framework for theorizing Self based on hermeneutics and psychological constructivism. It then develops a critique of the essentialist Jungian theory of Self in which the Self is frequently described as a human subject with views, intentions and desires of its own. With this is background, a post-modern Jungian framework for Self is advanced, with a brief clinical account of the self in analysis. 相似文献
67.
Thomas F. Torrance 《Zygon》1988,23(2):159-169
Abstract. Intrinsic to rigorous knowledge of God is the recognition that positive theological concepts and statements about God arising under the compelling claims of God's reality upon the human mind must have an open revisable structure. A similar combination of critical realism and ontological openness is apparent in the profound change that has taken place in the rational structure of rigorous science from the radical dualism and closed causal system of classical mechanics to the unifying world view and open dynamic field-theories of modern physics. It is argued that the intersection of theological and natural science in their epis-temological foundations can enhance their ontological commitment and heuristic thrust. 相似文献
68.
Paul Allen 《Zygon》2020,55(3):772-781
This article combines an appreciation of several themes in Josh Reeves's Against Methodology in Science and Religion: Recent Debates on Rationality and Theology while arguing in favor of critical realism. The author holds that critical realism manages to combine the objective truth reached through inference and especially cognitive acts of judgment as well as the various, contingent historical contexts that also define where science is practiced. Reeves advocates a historical perspective, but this article claims that in order for critical realism to be credible, a philosophical perspective must be maintained. 相似文献
69.
J. Wesley Robbins 《Zygon》1999,34(4):655-666
Pragmatism and critical realism are different vocabularies for talking about the cognitive value of religion and science. Each can be, and has been, used to make the case for cognitive parity between religious and scientific discourse. Critical realism presupposes a particular form of cognitive psychology that entails general skepticism about the external world and forecloses scientific inquiry in the name of a preconceived idea of what the nature of human cognition must be. Thus, of the two, pragmatism is the better vocabulary for fostering mutual understanding between religion and science. 相似文献
70.
Jürgen Dümont 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):341-364
Two of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism are examined in detail. One of them is developed
as an extension of a model-theoretic argument against mathematical realism based on considerations concerning the so-called
Skolem-Paradox in set theory. This argument against mathematical realism is also treated explicitly. The article concentrates
on the fine structure of the arguments because most commentators have concentrated on the major premisses of Putnam's argument
and especially on his treatment of metaphysical realism. It is shown that the validity of Putnam's arguments is doubtful and
that realists are by no means forced to accept the theses Putnam ascribes to them. It is concluded that Putnam fails to give
convincing arguments for rejecting mathematical or metaphysical realism. Furthermore, Putnam's internal realism is discussed
critically.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献