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41.
Jeroen Hopster 《Ratio》2019,32(4):260-274
Many metaethicists assume that our normative judgments are both by and large true, and the product of causal forces. In other words, many metaethicists assume that the set of normative judgments that causal forces have led us to make largely coincides with the set of true normative judgments. How should we explain this coincidence? This is what Sharon Street (2006) calls the practical/theoretical puzzle. Some metaethicists can easily solve this puzzle, but not all of them can, Street argues; she takes the puzzle to constitute a specific challenge for normative realism. In this article I elucidate Street’s puzzle and outline possible solutions to it, framed in terms of a general strategy for reasoning about coincidences. I argue that the success of Street’s challenge crucially depends on how we set the ‘reference class’ of normative judgments that we could have endorsed, assuming realism. I conclude that while the practical/theoretical puzzle falls short of posing a general challenge for normative realism, it can be successful as a selective challenge for specific realist views. 相似文献
42.
43.
Kevin Schilbrack 《Religion》2017,47(2):161-178
Jonathan Z. Smith famously pointed out that the concept of ‘religion’ is not universal but emerged only in the modern West. Several scholars have drawn from Smith the non-realist implication that the existence of religion apart from that concept is an illusion. The word ‘religion,’ they say, does not refer to something out there in the world. In this article, the author argues that Smith’s point is open to a realist interpretation according to which religion exists in the world, as a transhistorical and transcultural reality, even apart from the concept. To make this case, the author outlines and responds to non-realist positions that draw on genealogical, deconstructive, and linguistic arguments, as well as to the alternative proposal that ‘religion’ is simply a heuristic device. In short, the goal of this article is to argue that a realist social ontology provides the better understanding of the central theoretical term in our field. 相似文献
44.
Aaron Preston 《Axiomathes》2005,15(2):267-292
In this paper, I examine a puzzle that emerges from what J. P. Moreland has called the traditional realist view of quality instances. Briefly put, the puzzle is to figure out how quality instances fit into the overall structure of a concrete particular, given that the traditional realist view of quality instances prima facie seems incompatible with what might be called the traditional realist view of concrete particulars. After having discussed the traditional realist views involved and the puzzle that emerges from their juxtaposition, I propose an alternative realist view of quality instances which resolves the puzzle. In short, the puzzle is solved by treating the distinction between a concrete particular and its quality instances as a distinction of reason, and by adopting the view that the individuating element of a concrete particular must also serve as its unifying element – a view which Moreland, one of traditional realism’s most stalwart contemporary defenders, rejects. 相似文献
45.
Cord Friebe 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2004,35(2):261-281
Dividing, Separating and Unifying. EPR Without Holism. In the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics parts of composed systems are correlated in a non-causal way, they are
ontologically dependent on each other. In this paper I try to defend traditional realism giving a non-holistic interpretation
of the EPR-paradox. An analysis of events in the macroscopic world shows that dividing and unifying objects is quite dif-ferent
from changing (modifying) objects. In application to quantum mechanics I argue that a measurement at a given single-system
changes (modifies) this object, but the EPR-measurement divides the given object. Therefore this given object is an undivided
and dividable One and not a composed system. If parts are produced (by EPR-measurement) correlations do not occur.
Teilen, Trennen und Vereinen: EPR ohne Holismus相似文献
46.
Gregory R. Peterson 《Zygon》2004,39(3):605-614
Abstract. Michael Spezio and Dennis Bielfeldt have each raised important issues with regard to my positions in Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences. In this article I respond to several of their criticisms, including issues of the nature of theology, my stance on epistemology and realism, and issues of physicalism, freedom, and determinism. 相似文献
47.
科学实在主义认为科学理论应该超越数据去假设不可观察的实体的存在,它为现代心理学提供了本体论支持。该文以科学实在主义为基本框架,从发展历程与发展趋势等方面重新思考了它对现代心理学的影响,为心理学研究带来了新的方法论意义。 相似文献
48.
Richard Woodward 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):273-288
Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other
than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of
a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock–Rosen
objection. I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions
that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences. I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism
is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence ‘there is a plurality of worlds’ is true without thereby committing
her to the existence of a plurality of worlds. I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic
contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist. Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism and
argue that Daniel Nolan and John O’Leary-Hawthorne [1996 Reflexive fictionalisms. Analysis, 56, 26–32] are wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism.
相似文献
Richard WoodwardEmail: |
49.
Mark Colyvan 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):115-123
In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects. 相似文献
50.
Dale Jacquette 《Studia Logica》2006,82(3):337-343
If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist
mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics
of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically
possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as
maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite
in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then
whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or
characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that
the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally
consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all
nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal.
I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy
of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006. 相似文献