Critical Realism—A Sustainable Bridge Between Science and Religion?

Since Barbour's introduction of the term in 1966, “critical realism” bridges the gulf between science and religion. Yet, like the Golden Gate Bridge, this bridge must be supported by pillars to carry its weight. These pillars are the social and the human sciences, which are still designed too small within critical realism to make a really sustainable construct. Critical realism should be modified to “constructive-critical realism” to allow for more weight of these disciplines in the dialog, which actually should become a trialog.     

From Conceptual Analysis to Serious Metaphysics

Abstract

Habermas’s recent work in epistemology has been marked by a decisive rejection of his earlier epistemic conception of truth in which he understood truth as ‘what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions’. Arguing that no ‘idealization of justificatory conditions’ can do justice to both human fallibility and the unconditional nature of truth, he has attempted to develop a realistic conception of truth that severs any conceptual link between truth and justification while respecting the epistemic relevance of justification for ascertaining the truth. But realizing this second goal has proved elusive for Habermas because he veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism in his epistemology. By contrast, Hilary Putnam’s recent turn to what he calls ‘natural realism’ is more successful in articulating a form of realism that, in taking its leave of an epistemic conception of truth, still manages to keep its distance from metaphysical realism.     

An Ultra‐Realist Theory of Perception

In this paper I argue for a theory of perception distinct both from classical sense‐datum theories and from intentionalist theories, that is theories according to which one perceives external objects by dint of a relation with a propositional content. The alternative I propose completely rejects any representational element in perception. When one sees that an object has a property, the situation or state of affairs of its having that property is one's perception, so that the object and property are literally part of one's mind. The most obvious objection to this view is that it embodies a rampant form of idealism. It is argued to the contrary, via consideration of the metaphysics of situations, that the theory is entirely consistent with a robustly realist view of the world.     

Ostrich Nominalism and Peacock Realism: A Hegelian Critique of Quine

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to offer a Hegelian critique of Quine’s predicate nominalism. I argue that at the core of Hegel’s idealism is not a supernaturalist spirit monism, but a realism about universals, and that while this may contrast to the nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of philosophical naturalism. I argue that there is no good reason to think Quine is right to make this nominalism definitive of naturalism in this way – where in fact Hegel (along with Peirce) offers a reasonably compelling case that science itself requires some commitment to realism about universals, kinds, etc. Furthermore, even if Hegel is wrong about that, at least his case for realism is still a naturalistic one, as it is based on his views on concrete universality, which is an innovative form of in rebus realism about universals.     

KAGAWA'S COSMIC PURPOSE AND MODERNIZATION IN JAPAN

Kagawa Tyohiko (1888–1960), who was a well known Christian leader and social reformer, is re‐evaluated from the perspective of a public philosophy, and as an example of the possibilities for collaboration and conflict between science and the religious humanities in East Asia. His last book, Cosmic Purpose, which appears to be a kind of natural theology, is analyzed from the perspective of the hidden topic of human evil. By considering Kagawa's deep religious sensibility and conscience, the book can be interpreted to reflect on the wrong directionality selected by modern Japan's leaders that resulted in the tragic war.     

消极偏差还是积极缺乏:抑郁的积极心理学解释

抑郁的认知理论被认为是当代最具影响的抑郁理论之一,其中贝克抑郁理论与无望抑郁理论是两大主要的认知理论。认知理论主张消极认知偏差是导致抑郁的易感因素。然而,\"抑郁现实主义\"及\"积极错觉\"等研究却证实抑郁个体并不存在消极认知偏差。以往研究的矛盾实际上反映了当代心理学过分关注消极的病理化倾向。新兴的积极心理学则试图从全新视角解释抑郁,导致抑郁的原因不是个体身上积极因素的缺位,而是积极力量未被充分发挥。     

Über zwei Formen von Realismus in der Quantentheorie

On Two Types of Realism in Quantum Theory. Current realist approaches to the foundations of quantum theory emphasize the dichotomy between (Copenhagen) positivism and ‘beable’-realism. Recently it was even attempted to turn this picture into two (equally possible) histories in order to legitimate Bohmian Mechanics as a viable alternative. This paper argues that this dichotomy is philosophically inadequate and historically questionable by embedding it into the philosophical discussion on positivism and realism that has taken place since the 1920s. Logical Empiricists back then advocated empirical realism and contrasted it to absolutistic metaphysical realism. From this viewpoint David Bohm's ‘beable’-realism combines elements of Mach's sensualism with a pre-Kantian metaphysics. As Wesley Salmon's position shows, empirical realism can become quite pronounced without relapsing into Bohmian philosophy. Instead it arrives close to the GRWP-interpretation. Hence, when Bernard d'Espagnat binds both together as ‘ontological interpretations’, he blurs the borderline between empirical and metaphysical realism that his Veiled Reality has set out to draw, quite in concordance with Logical Empiricism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Recurrent transient underdetermination and the glass half full

Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.

Models and fictions in science

Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in the philosophy of mathematics.

Perilous thoughts: comment on van Fraassen

Bas van Fraassen’s empiricist reading of Perrin’s achievement invites the question: whose doubts about atoms did Perrin put to rest? This comment recontextualizes the argument and applies the notion of empirical grounding to some contemporary work in behavioral biology.