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121.
Charles EP 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2009,43(1):53-66
As Ecological Psychology pushes into new areas, success will be made easier by a rediscovery its theoretical history, in particular
the “New Realism”, lead in part by E. B. Holt. Three New Realists tenants seem particularly relevant: (1) we experience reality,
(2) relations are real, and (3) things are what you see when you see those things. Though the two groups differ in terms of
their conception of perception, and what can be perceived, their conceptions are related in very insightful ways. Further,
the comparison reemphasizes the extent of unique empirical claims ecological psychologists make, and grounds those claims
within a larger framework for psychology as a whole. This makes obvious the need for further work on the mathematics of invariants,
the physiological mechanisms of information extraction, and the behaviors of perception.
Eric P. Charles is an assistant professor of Psychology in Pennsylvania State University, Altoona. He has done mathematical, empirical and theoretical work revolving around the Ecological Psychology of James J. Gibson. This lead to study of the history of psychology, philosophy of science, and evolutionary psychology. His empirical work currently focus on researching active looking, particularly its development in infancy. 相似文献
Eric P. CharlesEmail: |
Eric P. Charles is an assistant professor of Psychology in Pennsylvania State University, Altoona. He has done mathematical, empirical and theoretical work revolving around the Ecological Psychology of James J. Gibson. This lead to study of the history of psychology, philosophy of science, and evolutionary psychology. His empirical work currently focus on researching active looking, particularly its development in infancy. 相似文献
122.
123.
Michael Stöltzner 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):289-316
On Two Types of Realism in Quantum Theory. Current realist approaches to the foundations of quantum theory emphasize the dichotomy
between (Copenhagen) positivism and ‘beable’-realism. Recently it was even attempted to turn this picture into two (equally
possible) histories in order to legitimate Bohmian Mechanics as a viable alternative. This paper argues that this dichotomy
is philosophically inadequate and historically questionable by embedding it into the philosophical discussion on positivism
and realism that has taken place since the 1920s. Logical Empiricists back then advocated empirical realism and contrasted
it to absolutistic metaphysical realism. From this viewpoint David Bohm's ‘beable’-realism combines elements of Mach's sensualism
with a pre-Kantian metaphysics. As Wesley Salmon's position shows, empirical realism can become quite pronounced without relapsing
into Bohmian philosophy. Instead it arrives close to the GRWP-interpretation. Hence, when Bernard d'Espagnat binds both together
as ‘ontological interpretations’, he blurs the borderline between empirical and metaphysical realism that his Veiled Reality
has set out to draw, quite in concordance with Logical Empiricism.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
124.
Mary Gerhart 《Zygon》1988,23(3):281-285
Abstract. I read Robbins's essay as a hermeneutics of suspicion against the claims of critical realism, especially the tendency of critical realism to achieve correspondence with the world rather than participation in changing it. I read van Huyssteen's essay as an application of critical realism which tends toward correspondence in spite of his correct statement of the theory. I read Hefner's paper as an exposition of both claims and methods capable of conveying truth and genuine knowledge. As such, Hefner's paper illustrates an adequate application of the theory of critical realism and overcomes the suspicion suggested by Robbins. 相似文献
125.
Nancey Murphy 《Zygon》1996,31(1):11-20
Abstract. Two aspects of Ian Barbour's position on the relation between religion and science are considered. First is his preference for comparing religions as a whole to scientific paradigms. It is suggested that the concept of a tradition as defined by Alasdair MacIntyre is more useful than Thomas Kuhn's paradigm. Thus, the Christian tradition could be compared to the Aristotelian or Newtonian scientific traditions. Within traditions, both religious and scientific, we find schools with enough agreement on fundamentals to be designated research programs, as defined by Imre Lakatos; here fruitful comparisons between theology and science are possible. Barbour's critical realism is intended as a compromise between highly rationalistic and sociological accounts of science. However, rationalism and sociology of science are answers to two different sets of questions rather than extremes on a spectrum of answers to the same question. Thus, there is no middle position between them, and no compromise need be found. 相似文献
126.
Takuya Niikawa 《Metaphilosophy》2020,51(4):593-610
This paper aims to reveal the source of the dispute between naive realism and intentionalism. To accomplish this task, it examines Adam Pautz’s challenge to naive realism, according to which a naive intuition about visual phenomenology, which is the only workable case for naive realism, is problematic. It argues that naive realists can address the challenge from Pautz by rejecting his assumption that naive realists and intentionalists agree on the nominal definition of visual phenomenology. The paper then argues that the reason naive realists want to preserve the naive intuition is its irresistibility rather than its reliability. Given this, it concludes that the disagreement between naive realism and intentionalism is rooted in what philosophical projects they tackle. Naive realists are engaged in the philosophical project of delineating a coherent view of the actual world in which the irresistible naive intuition can be true; the intentionalist philosophical project differs from it. 相似文献
127.
Christopher C. Knight 《Zygon》2016,51(3):573-591
On the basis of both philosophical arguments and the theological perspectives of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, a critique of two beliefs that are common within the mainstream science–theology dialogue is outlined. These relate to critical realism in understanding language usage and to naturalistic perspectives in relation to divine action. While the naturalistic perspectives on the history of the cosmos that are predominant within the dialogue are seen as generally acceptable from an Orthodox perspective, it is argued that they require theological expansion. This expansion suggests an understanding other than the “causal joint” model commonly adopted in relation to “special” divine action. This alternative model renders the distinction between “special” and “general” divine action redundant, and is based on what has been called a “teleological‐Christological” understanding of the cosmos, rooted in the fourth gospel's notion of the divine Logos. The relevance of this critique to scholars outside of the Orthodox community is urged. 相似文献
128.
Tebes JK 《American journal of community psychology》2005,35(3-4):213-230
Embedded in community science are implicit theories on the nature of reality (ontology), the justification of knowledge claims (epistemology), and how knowledge is constructed (methodology). These implicit theories influence the conceptualization and practice of research, and open up or constrain its possibilities. The purpose of this paper is to make some of these theories explicit, trace their intellectual history, and propose a shift in the way research in the social and behavioral sciences, and community science in particular, is conceptualized and practiced. After describing the influence and decline of logical empiricism, the underlying philosophical framework for science for the past century, I summarize contemporary views in the philosophy of science that are alternatives to logical empiricism. These include contextualism, normative naturalism, and scientific realism, and propose that a modified version of contextualism, known as perspectivism, affords the philosophical framework for an emerging community science. I then discuss the implications of perspectivism for community science in the form of four propositions to guide the practice of research.Portions of this paper are based on an invited paper presented at the May 1997 Pre-Conference Workshop of the Biennial Conference of the Society for Community Research and Action, Columbia, South Carolina. 相似文献
129.
Tiffany?Fu Wilma?KoutstaalEmail author Cynthia?H.?Y.?Fu Lucia?Poon Anthony?J.?Cleare 《Journal of psychopathology and behavioral assessment》2005,27(4):243-252
This research examined how retrospective self-assessments of performance are affected by major depression. To test the validity of the depressive realism versus the selective processing hypotheses, aggregate posttest performance estimates (PTPEs) were obtained from clinically depressed patients and an age-matched comparison group across 4 decision tasks (object recognition, general knowledge, social judgment, and line-length judgment). As expected on the basis of previous findings, both groups were underconfident in their PTPEs, consistently underestimating the percentage of questions they had answered correctly. Contrary to depressive realism, and in partial support of the selective processing account, this underconfidence effect was not reduced but modestly exacerbated in the depressed patients. Further, whereas the PTPEs of the comparison group exceeded that expected on the basis of chance alone those of the depressed individuals did not. The results provide no support for the depressive realism account and suggest that negative biases contribute to metacognitive information processing in major depression.The results reported in this paper are based on an extension of the MSc dissertation of Tiffany Fu, conducted in partial fulfillment of the degree of MSc in Research Methods in Psychology, University of Reading, 2003 相似文献
130.
Summary This paper discusses an argument for scientific realism put forward by Anthony Quinton in The Nature of Things. The argument – here called the controlled continuity argument – seems to have received no attention in the literature, apparently because it may easily be mistaken for a better-known argument, Grover Maxwell’s “argument from the continuum”. It is argued here that, in point of fact, the two are quite distinct and that Quinton’s argument has several advantages over Maxwell’s. The controlled continuity argument is also compared to Ian Hacking’s “argument from coincidence”. It is pointed out that both arguments are to a large extent independent from considerations about high-level scientific theories, and that both are abductive arguments at the core. But these similarities do not dilute an important difference related to the fact that Quinton’s argument cleverly seeks to anchor belief in unobservable entities in realism about ordinary objects, which is a position shared by most contemporary scientific anti-realists. 相似文献