实体和初级关系（FOR）匹配的分离与结合对故事类比通达的影响

采用移动窗口阅读技术深入探讨实体和初级关系（FOR）匹配的分离与结合对故事类比通达的影响,对表面特征和结构特征在类比通达中的作用进行检验。实验1探讨系统变化目标故事和线索故事之间实体匹配数目与实体和初级关系（FOR）匹配的分离与结合是否影响读线索故事时对目标故事的回想。实验2探讨系统变化目标故事和线索故事之间初级关系（FOR）匹配的数目与实体和初级关系（FOR）匹配的分离与结合是否影响读线索故事时对目标故事的回想。实验3探讨实体和初级关系（FOR）匹配的分离与结合对目标故事的通达是否与高级关系（HOR）的匹配有关。结果表明,实体匹配独立影响通达,实体和初级关系（FOR）分离与结合影响故事类比通达,高级的结构关系（HOR）是实体和初级关系（FOR）影响故事类比通达的必要条件。     

A CRITIQUE OF BOROWITZ'S POSTMODERN JEWISH THEOLOGY

Abstract. Borowitz's book is primarily a systematic response by a liberal Jewish theologian to his perceived challenges from rationalism on one hand and postmodernism on the other. It is within this context that Borowitz discusses issues of the relationship between modern science and Judaism. The first part of this essay is a summary of Borowitz's book. Here I locate Borowitz's place in the general discipline of Jewish philosophy and theology. The second part of the paper is a critique of Borowitz's discussion of postmodernism and liberalism. It is in this concluding section that the issues raised by contemporary science for Jewish religious thought are discussed.     

内群偏私：自我锚定还是社会认同？

以往关于内群偏私的研究大多采用社会认同理论（social identityt heory）做解释。近期,自我锚定（self-anchoring principle）原理被证实可用于解释内群偏私的原因。基于中国人及美国人在内群偏私的目的、方法上的不同,我们采用最小群体范式,验证这两种理论在中国大学生上的适用性。410名大学生（其中前测94名）在互联网上完成以认知能力评估为名的实验,实验控制反馈类型,要求参与者对自身、内群及外群在不同维度上评分。实验证明内群偏私存在;分化理论成立;采用演绎策略时,个体评价与内群评价的差异显著小于个体采用归纳策略时两者的差异,符合社会认同理论的假设。     

Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural

There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment. It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow for the possibility of supernatural entities.

Adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy are $$\Pi^1_1$$ -complex

In this article complexity results for adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy are presented. It is proven here that the consequence set of some recursive premise sets is -complete. So, the complexity results in (Horsten and Welch, Synthese 158:41–60, 2007) are mistaken for adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy.     

Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright’s Antirealist

Crispin Wright champions the notion of superassertibility as providing a truth predicate that is congenial to antirealists in many debates in that it satisfies relevant platitudes concerning truth and does so in a very minimal way. He motivates such a claim by arguing that superassertibility can satisfy the equivalence schema: it is superassertible that P if and only if P. I argue that Wright’s attempted proof that superassertibility can satisfy this schema is unsuccessful, because it requires a premise that has not been properly motivated and is prima facie implausible. I further argue that, even if the dubious premise is accepted, the resulting proof is intuitionistically invalid. This is problematic, because a proponent of superassertibility as a truth predicate has independent reasons to affect a logical revision in the direction of intuitionism. The resulting dilemma suggests that superassertibility may not be an adequate truth candidate for any significant ranges of discourse. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992     

Cognition in moral space: A minimal model

We describe moral cognition as a process occurring in a distinctive cognitive space, wherein moral relationships are defined along several morally relevant dimensions. After identifying candidate dimensions, we show how moral judgments can emerge in this space directly from object perception, without any appeal to moral rules or abstract values. Our reductive “minimal model” (Batterman & Rice, 2014) elaborates Beal’s (2020) claim that moral cognition is determined, at the most basic level, by “ontological frames” defining subjects, objects, and the proper relation between them. We expand this claim into a set of formal hypotheses that predict moral judgments based on how objects are “framed” in the relevant dimensions of “moral space.”     

Monster character profiling and Chinese classifier cognition: linguistic and conceptual perspectives

In this research, we explored the construal of mythical creatures created out of ordinary animals by approaching the selection of Chinese classifiers zhi and ge. Monster figures as such are viewed ambiguously as an animal or as a novel entity. From the lexico-semantic perspective, we surveyed the co-occurrences of these two classifiers with two Chinese labels commonly used for monsters: guaishou and guaiwu, which provide lexical cues for the finely nuanced difference in (non-)/animate readings respectively. From the conceptual perspective, we examined the acceptability as to the uses of these two classifiers for the monster figures, the structures of which incurred different effects of novelty. We found that the (non-)/animal-like interpretation is encoded by zhi and ge at both the linguistic and conceptual layers. The findings of our work have implications for the relation of language and thought, our understanding of fictional world entities, and our understanding of classifier cognition.     

The ontological status of minimal entities

Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.

Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.