External control of the stream of consciousness: Stimulus-based effects on involuntary thought sequences

The stream of consciousness often appears whimsical and free from external control. Recent advances, however, reveal that the stream is more susceptible to external influence than previously assumed. Thoughts can be triggered by external stimuli in a manner that is involuntary, systematic, and nontrivial. Based on these advances, our experimental manipulation systematically triggered a sequence of, not one, but two involuntary thoughts. Participants were instructed to (a) not subvocalize the name of visual objects and (b) not count the number of letters comprising object names. On a substantial proportion of trials, participants experienced both kinds of involuntary thoughts. Each thought arose from distinct, high-level processes (naming versus counting). This is the first demonstration of the induction of two involuntary thoughts into the stream of consciousness. Stimulus word length influenced dependent measures systematically. Our findings are relevant to many fields associated with the study of consciousness, including attention, imagery, and action control.     

The impact of state and dispositional mindfulness on prospective memory: A virtual reality study

Prospective memory (PM) consists of remembering to perform an action that was previously planned. The recovery and execution of these actions require attentional resources. Mindfulness, as a state or a dispositional trait, has been associated with better attentional abilities while mind wandering is linked with attentional failures. In this study, we investigated the impact of mindfulness on PM. Eighty participants learned 15 cue-action associations. They were, then, asked to recall the actions at certain moments (time-based items) or places (event-based items) during a walk in a virtual town. Before the PM task, participants were randomly assigned to a mindfulness or mind wandering (control condition) session. Dispositional mindfulness was measured via the Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ). Although considered as two opposite states, we did not report any difference between the two groups on PM abilities. Nevertheless, the natural tendency to describe one's own sensations (the Describing facet of the FFMQ) predicted time-based performance in both groups. We discuss different hypotheses to explain this finding in light of recent findings on the impact of mind wandering on future oriented cognition. Our main observation is a positive link between the Describing facet and time-based PM performances. We propose that this link could be due to the common association of this mindfulness facets and PM with attentional and interoceptive abilities. Additional studies are needed to explore this hypothesis.     

More dead than dead? Attributing mentality to vegetative state patients

In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner (2011) present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott (forthcoming Gomes, A., &; Parrott, M. (forthcoming). Epicurean aspects of mental state attributions. Philosophical Psychology. [Google Scholar]), we provide evidence to show that participants' responses in the initial experiments are an artifact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the dead than to PVS patients. There is no reason to think that people perceive PVS patients as more dead than dead.     

阅读中的“心不在焉”:理论假设和影响因素

人们在阅读时,思维有时会游离到所读内容之外,此时人们的目光虽然还在沿着所读材料移动,但认知加工却游离到一些与任务无关的内容上,这就是所谓阅读中的"心不在焉"。本文总结归纳了阅读中"心不在焉"的三个主要理论假设:执行控制理论、控制失败假说和注意解离假说。分析了阅读中"心不在焉"的三种影响因素:第一,阅读方式,即被试采取朗读或默读的阅读方式以及阅读时是否有时间限制等;第二,阅读材料,即材料难度、阅读兴趣与词汇特征;第三,被试的年龄、元觉察能力和工作记忆容量。最后提出了一些目前阅读中的"心不在焉"研究中存在的问题和未来可能的研究方向,为后续的研究提供一定的启发和借鉴。     

Efficient versus flexible mentalizing in complex social settings: Exploring signature limits

Wu, Sheppard, and Mitchell (Br. J. Psychol., 2016; 107, 1–22) investigate in a fascinating study the fact that adults can detect empathic traits in others after only briefly watching or listening to a person. In this commentary, we highlight how the processes of an efficient, implicit, but inflexible mentalizing system are likely to operate in such situations. Further, we specify how testing signature limits over time‐, attribute‐, and protagonist‐restrictions can help distinguish whether an efficient‐implicit or flexible‐explicit mentalizing system is of relevance when processing complex social settings.     

Seeing the mind of robots: Harm augments mind perception but benevolent intentions reduce dehumanisation of artificial entities in visual vignettes

According to moral typecasting theory, good- and evil-doers (agents) interact with the recipients of their actions (patients) in a moral dyad. When this dyad is completed, mind attribution towards intentionally harmed liminal minds is enhanced. However, from a dehumanisation view, malevolent actions may instead result in a denial of humanness. To contrast both accounts, a visual vignette experiment (N = 253) depicted either malevolent or benevolent intentions towards robotic or human avatars. Additionally, we examined the role of harm-salience by showing patients as either harmed, or still unharmed. The results revealed significantly increased mind attribution towards visibly harmed patients, mediated by perceived pain and expressed empathy. Benevolent and malevolent intentions were evaluated respectively as morally right or wrong, but their impact on the patient was diminished for the robotic avatar. Contrary to dehumanisation predictions, our manipulation of intentions failed to affect mind perception. Nonetheless, benevolent intentions reduced dehumanisation of the patients. Moreover, when pain and empathy were statistically controlled, the effect of intentions on mind perception was mediated by dehumanisation. These findings suggest that perceived intentions might only be indirectly tied to mind perception, and that their role may be better understood when additionally accounting for empathy and dehumanisation.     

Cryptic Emotions and the Emergence of a Metatheory of Mind in Popular Filmmaking

Hollywood movies can be deeply engaging and easy to understand. To succeed in this manner, feature‐length movies employ many editing techniques with strong psychological underpinnings. We explore the origins and development of one of these, the reaction shot. This shot typically shows a single, unspeaking character with modest facial expression in response to an event or to the behavior or speech of another character. In a sample of movies from 1940 to 2010, we show that the prevalence of one type of these shots—which we call the cryptic reaction shot—has grown dramatically. These shots are designed to enhance viewers’ emotional involvement with characters. They depict a facial gesture that reflects a slightly negative and slightly aroused emotional state. Their use at the end of conversations, and typically at the end of scenes, helps to leave viewers in a state of speculation about what the character is thinking and what her thoughts may mean for the ongoing narrative.     

Islam,HIV/AIDS and activism: a critical analysis of some themes in Positive Muslims' ‘theology of compassion’

The present article is a critical analysis of the South African organization Positive Muslims' ‘theology of compassion’, put forward by its proponents as a Muslim religious initiative to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS and the stigmatization of those affected by the disease. The article addresses the hermeneutics applied and the results reached in relation to a wider contemporary Muslim religious discourse on HIV/AIDS. It also connects the ‘theology of compassion’ to a broader transnational movement of progressive Islam, of which the ‘theology of compassion’ is a practical, grass-roots application. The main analytical focus, however, is on the way in which certain features in this theology are shaped by basic assumptions on the part of its producers concerning the beliefs, emotions and background knowledge of its main stated consumers: believing Muslims.     

Love and Power,and the Development of the Brain,Mind, and Agency

In drawing on my own research and collaborative work with Karl Pribram, I show that love (affective attachment) and power (social control) play a central role in psychosocial evolution. When these relations are coupled in a self-regulating system of cooperative interactions, brain growth is stimulated, mind and agency develop, and stable forms of collective social organization are generated. Focusing on the endogenous dynamics of social collectives, the article is organized in four parts. (A "social collective" is defined as a durable arrangement of relations among two or more individuals that is distinguished by shared membership and collaboration in relation to a common function or goal.) Part I summarizes evidence from developmental neuropsychology and social science to show that stable psychosocial organization, across the human life span, is associated with social interaction organized along two dimensions. One dimension involves love, positive affective attachment, and the second involves power, social regulation of the aroused affective energy. Part II draws on Piaget's theory of cooperation and Bradley and Pribrams' theory of communication to describe how mind and agency are generated, and how stable organization is produced, respectively, from the relations involved in the arousal and regulation of affective energy. Combining elements of the two theories, Part III presents a sketch of a holographic model of collective organization in which goal-directed behavior is generated by a feed-forward process involving imaging and information processing of interaction along the two dimensions. Part IV shows how the model accounts for the emergence of human agency within the context of a more general evolutionary theory, such as Laszlo's. The article concludes with a discussion of my approach for building a "fully human theory of evolution."     

The understanding and self-reported use of emotional display rules in children with autism spectrum disorders

Two studies examined the understanding and self-reported use of rules for the expressive display of emotions in children with high functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASD) and in typically developing children. In Study 1, children from the two groups reported display rules equally often when presented with hypothetical situations that provided clear motives for using display rules, although emotion-masking displays were more commonly identified for vignettes with prosocial rather than self-protective motives. In Study 2, children were interviewed about display rule use in real life. Children with HFASD reported display rules less often, included more prototypical examples, and referred less often to prosocial motives than typically developing children. Children with HFASD appear to be aware of display rules, but are less adept at identifying the interpersonal functions of such rules than their typically developing peers.