Harm concerns predict moral judgments of suicide: Comment on Rottman,Kelemen and Young (2014)

Two prominent theories offer different perspectives on the role of harm in moral cognition. Dyadic morality suggests that harm-related concerns are pervasive, whereas moral pluralism suggests that these concerns apply only to canonically harmful violations (e.g., murder), and not impure violations (e.g., suicide). Rottman et al. (2014) contrast these two theories by examining moral judgments of suicide. They conclude that suicide wrongness is independent of harm, therefore arguing against dyadic morality and for moral pluralism. However, these conclusions may be overstated; across all these studies, a meta-analysis reveals that harm is a significant predictor of suicide judgments. Moreover, the association between harm and suicide wrongness may be suppressed in individual studies by insufficient power, restrictive exclusion criteria, a single bivariate outlier, and reliance upon the conventional significance threshold of p < .05. In revised analyses harm is robustly associated with suicide wrongness, consistent with dyadic morality.     

Visual asymmetry revisited: Mind wandering preferentially disrupts processing in the left visual field

An emerging theory proposes that visual attention operates in parallel at two distinct time scales – a shorter one (<1 s) associated with moment-to-moment orienting of selective visuospatial attention, and a longer one (>10 s) associated with more global aspects of attention-to-task. Given their parallel nature, here we examined whether these comparatively slower fluctuations in task-related attention show the same visual field asymmetry – namely, a right visual field bias – as often reported for selective visual–spatial attention. Participants performed a target detection task at fixation while event-related potentials (ERP) time-locked to task-irrelevant visual probes presented in the left and right visual fields were recorded. At random intervals, participants were asked to report whether they were “on-task” or “mind wandering”. Our results demonstrated that sensory attenuation during periods of “mind wandering” relative to “on-task”, as measured by the visual P1 ERP component at electrodes sites contralateral to the stimulus, was only observed for probes presented in the left visual field. In contrast, the magnitude of sensory gain in the right visual field was insensitive to whether participants were “on-task” or “mind wandering”. Taken together, our results support the notion that task-related attention at longer time scales and spatial attention at shorter time scales affect the same underlying mechanism in visual cortex.     

Infant shy temperament predicts preschoolers Theory of Mind

The aim of this longitudinal study was to investigate the relation between infant temperament at 18 months and early Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities at 3 years of age. Temperament was assessed with the Early Childhood Behavior Questionnaire (ECBQ) and ToM by assessing children's understanding of divergent desires and beliefs, and of knowledge access. Our results are in line with a social-emotional reactivity perspective postulating more sophisticated ToM abilities for children with less reactive more observant temperament. Children with shy temperament at 18 months and at 3 years were better in reasoning about others’ mental states at age 3. Language, siblings and parental education had no effect on ToM. Findings indicate that temperament is related to ToM earlier in development than previously found, and that this relation is thus not unique to false-belief understanding.     

On the link between mind wandering and task performance over time

Here we test the hypothesis that fluctuations in subjective reports of mind wandering over time-on-task are associated with fluctuations in performance over time-on-task. In Study 1, we employed a singleton search task and found that performance did not differ prior to on- and off-task reports, nor did individual differences in mind wandering predict differences in performance (so-called standard analytic methods). Importantly however, we find that fluctuations in mind wandering over time are strongly associated with fluctuations in behavior. In Study 2, we provide a replication of the relation between mind wandering and performance over time found in Study 1, using a Flanker interference task. These data indicate (1) a tight coupling between mind wandering and performance over time and (2) that a temporal-analytic approach can reveal effects of mind wandering on performance in tasks where standard analyses fail to do so. The theoretical and methodological implications of these findings are discussed.     

External control of the stream of consciousness: Stimulus-based effects on involuntary thought sequences

The stream of consciousness often appears whimsical and free from external control. Recent advances, however, reveal that the stream is more susceptible to external influence than previously assumed. Thoughts can be triggered by external stimuli in a manner that is involuntary, systematic, and nontrivial. Based on these advances, our experimental manipulation systematically triggered a sequence of, not one, but two involuntary thoughts. Participants were instructed to (a) not subvocalize the name of visual objects and (b) not count the number of letters comprising object names. On a substantial proportion of trials, participants experienced both kinds of involuntary thoughts. Each thought arose from distinct, high-level processes (naming versus counting). This is the first demonstration of the induction of two involuntary thoughts into the stream of consciousness. Stimulus word length influenced dependent measures systematically. Our findings are relevant to many fields associated with the study of consciousness, including attention, imagery, and action control.     

More dead than dead? Attributing mentality to vegetative state patients

In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner (2011) present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott (forthcoming Gomes, A., &; Parrott, M. (forthcoming). Epicurean aspects of mental state attributions. Philosophical Psychology. [Google Scholar]), we provide evidence to show that participants' responses in the initial experiments are an artifact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the dead than to PVS patients. There is no reason to think that people perceive PVS patients as more dead than dead.     

阅读中的“心不在焉”:理论假设和影响因素

人们在阅读时,思维有时会游离到所读内容之外,此时人们的目光虽然还在沿着所读材料移动,但认知加工却游离到一些与任务无关的内容上,这就是所谓阅读中的"心不在焉"。本文总结归纳了阅读中"心不在焉"的三个主要理论假设:执行控制理论、控制失败假说和注意解离假说。分析了阅读中"心不在焉"的三种影响因素:第一,阅读方式,即被试采取朗读或默读的阅读方式以及阅读时是否有时间限制等;第二,阅读材料,即材料难度、阅读兴趣与词汇特征;第三,被试的年龄、元觉察能力和工作记忆容量。最后提出了一些目前阅读中的"心不在焉"研究中存在的问题和未来可能的研究方向,为后续的研究提供一定的启发和借鉴。     

Efficient versus flexible mentalizing in complex social settings: Exploring signature limits

Wu, Sheppard, and Mitchell (Br. J. Psychol., 2016; 107, 1–22) investigate in a fascinating study the fact that adults can detect empathic traits in others after only briefly watching or listening to a person. In this commentary, we highlight how the processes of an efficient, implicit, but inflexible mentalizing system are likely to operate in such situations. Further, we specify how testing signature limits over time‐, attribute‐, and protagonist‐restrictions can help distinguish whether an efficient‐implicit or flexible‐explicit mentalizing system is of relevance when processing complex social settings.     

贝叶斯推理的三重加工心智模型

自二十世纪60年代Edwards首次用实验研究人类推理是否遵循贝叶斯规则以来,国内外贝叶斯推理研究取得了长足的发展,但也出现了一些困境:对影响贝叶斯推理的客体因素和主体因素研究未成体系,解释理论莫衷一是。未来的研究应该重新审视客体与主体的关系,系统整合和多角度分析影响贝叶斯推理的因素,尝试以三重加工心智模型解释人类贝叶斯推理行为,并对以往的解释理论进行融合,从而更好地揭示人类不确定性决策的本质。     

Seeing the mind of robots: Harm augments mind perception but benevolent intentions reduce dehumanisation of artificial entities in visual vignettes

According to moral typecasting theory, good- and evil-doers (agents) interact with the recipients of their actions (patients) in a moral dyad. When this dyad is completed, mind attribution towards intentionally harmed liminal minds is enhanced. However, from a dehumanisation view, malevolent actions may instead result in a denial of humanness. To contrast both accounts, a visual vignette experiment (N = 253) depicted either malevolent or benevolent intentions towards robotic or human avatars. Additionally, we examined the role of harm-salience by showing patients as either harmed, or still unharmed. The results revealed significantly increased mind attribution towards visibly harmed patients, mediated by perceived pain and expressed empathy. Benevolent and malevolent intentions were evaluated respectively as morally right or wrong, but their impact on the patient was diminished for the robotic avatar. Contrary to dehumanisation predictions, our manipulation of intentions failed to affect mind perception. Nonetheless, benevolent intentions reduced dehumanisation of the patients. Moreover, when pain and empathy were statistically controlled, the effect of intentions on mind perception was mediated by dehumanisation. These findings suggest that perceived intentions might only be indirectly tied to mind perception, and that their role may be better understood when additionally accounting for empathy and dehumanisation.