Psychological essentialism and cultural variation: children's beliefs about aggression in the United States and South Africa

The present study compared indigenous South African versus African‐American schoolchildren's beliefs about aggression. Eighty 7–9 year olds (40 from each country) participated in interviews in which they were asked to make inferences about the stability, malleability, and causal origins of aggressive behaviour. Although a minority of participants from both countries endorsed essentialist beliefs about aggression, South African children were more likely than American children to do so. Results also revealed some degree of coherence in children's patterns of beliefs about aggression, such that children responded across superficially different measures in ways that appear theoretically consistent. The authors consider these findings in light of debates concerning the role of cultural forces in shaping person perception. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adult modelling facilitates young children's generation of novel pretend acts

The present work investigated the effect of modelling on children's pretend play behaviour. Thirty‐seven children aged between 27 and 41 months were given 4 min of free play with a dollhouse and associated toy props (pre‐modelling phase). Using dolls, an experimenter then acted out a series of vignettes involving object substitutions, imaginary play and attribution of properties. Children were subsequently provided with an additional 4 min free play (post‐modelling phase). Consistent with past research, more pretence was exhibited after modelling than before. Furthermore, in the post‐modelling phase, children were as likely to generate their own novel pretence as they were to copy the actions demonstrated by the experimenter. They also increased the number of novel symbolic acts involving imaginary play from the pre‐ to the post‐modelling phase. This study highlights how young children will not only imitate a model's demonstration of pretend acts but also use this demonstration to catalyze the creation of their own pretence. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Informant Discrepancies in Assessing Child Dysfunction Relate to Dysfunction Within Mother-Child Interactions

We examined whether mother-child discrepancies in perceived child behavior problems relate to dysfunctional interactions between mother and child and stress in the mother. Participants included 239 children (6–16 years old; 58 girls, 181 boys) referred for oppositional, aggressive, and antisocial behavior, and their mothers. Mother-child discrepancies in perceived child behavior problems were related to mother-child conflict. Moreover, maternal stress mediated this relationship. The findings suggest that discrepancies among mother and child evaluations of child functioning are not merely reflections of different perspectives or artifacts of the assessment process, but can form components of conceptual models that can be developed and tested to examine the interrelations among critical domains of child, parent, and family functioning.     

Responses to organizational harm: Mechanism of blaming managers as proxies for a culpable organization

Recent research has shown that perceivers who are culturally oriented to focus on the causal influence of groups tend to assign blame to an organization and extend the blame to an individual representing it (i.e. proxy blaming). The present research investigates the mechanism of this blame extension. Results show that it occurs when punishing the organization is impossible rather than possible (Study 1) and that this blaming is brought about by the perception that the target individual is in the role to represent the organization, not by the perception that he/she is the typical member of the culpable organization (Study 2). Implications of these findings in the responsibility literature are discussed.     

Spirituality and education; inner and outer realities

There is a persisting tendency in attempts to define spirituality, to adopt a dualistic point of view which sees the spirit as somehow impenetrably inner, innate and introspectively perceived, interacting with the outer world through the body. As well as a strong intuitive sense of the correctness of this philosophical point of view, it also is supported by psychotherapeutic perspectives that speak of the private inner being. In this paper I will argue that this view is logically, epistemologically, morally, and psychologically problematic. It will be argued that the concept of an inwardness to our mental life can be distinguished from the view of that life as interior. The perspective that we have of our inward selves is learned and conditional upon a sense of an outer self, functioning and communicating in the public world. Rather than an ego centric conceptualization of spirituality based on the idea of the spirit as inner and logically inaccessible, I we might adopt a sociocentric perspective in which the supremacy of the ego is dissolved in favour of an understanding in which we see ourselves as part of the social and natural outer world in which we exist.     

工作应激与个体归因特点关系的研究

工作应激一直是组织行为中的热点问题,但综观前人研究,很少有研究者从归因的视角揭示其产生过程。本研究从个体的应激源感受性出发,探讨了个体归因特点与其工作应激的关系,建构了相应的模型,并结合压力管理问题,对研究进行了有益展望。     

Some comments on the distinction between intention and intentionality

The topic of intention has recently received attention from behavior analysts (Hineline, 2003; Neuman, 2004). From a behavior-analytic perspective, it is important to identify the circumstances in which people utter such terms, and to identify the potential circumstances that maintain such utterances. It follows that from a behavior-analytic perspective, the focus is primarily on those who observe behavior and attribute intentions to that behavior. However, there has not been a distinction between intention and intentionality. The current analysis stresses the distinction between the two terms, both from a traditional point of view (psychologist and layperson) and from a behavior-analytic point of view. From a behavior analyst's perspective, the distinction is important because observers may be responding to distinct functional relations when they attribute intention or intentionality to behavior.     

“This way!”, “No! That way!”—3-year olds know that two people can have mutually incompatible desires

In theory of mind research, there is a long standing dispute about whether children come to understand the subjectivity of both desires and beliefs at the same time (around age 4), or whether there is an asymmetry such that desires are understood earlier. To address this issue, 3-year olds’ understanding of situations in which two persons have mutually incompatible desires was tested in two studies. Results revealed that (i) children were quite proficient at ascribing incompatible desires to two persons, and in simpler scenarios even incompatible desire-dependent emotions; (ii) children showed this proficiency even though they mostly failed the false belief task. Overall, these results suggest that there is an asymmetry such that young children come to understand the subjective nature of desires before they understand the corresponding subjectivity of beliefs. Possible explanations for this asymmetry are discussed in light of conceptual change and information-processing accounts of theory of mind development.     

Detecting Design: Fast and Frugal or All Things Considered?

Within the Cognitive Science of Religion, Justin Barrett has proposed that humans possess a hyperactive agency detection device that was selected for in our evolutionary past because ‘over detecting’ (as opposed to ‘under detecting’) the existence of a predator conferred a survival advantage. Within the Intelligent Design debate, William Dembski has proposed the law of small probability, which states that specified events of small probability do not occur by chance. Within the Fine-Tuning debate, John Leslie has asserted a tidiness principle such that, if we can think of a good explanation for some state of affairs, then an explanation is needed for that state of affairs. In this paper I examine similarities between these three proposals and suggest that they can all be explained with reference to the existence of an explanation attribution module in the human mind. The forgoing analysis is considered with reference to a contrast between classical rationality and what Gerd Gigerenzer and others have called ecological rationality.