UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SHARED POLITICAL IDENTITY IMPOSSIBLE? NECESSARY? SUFFICIENT?

Abstract: Would a global commitment to international human rights norms provide enough of a sense of community to sustain a legitimate and sufficiently democratic global order? Sceptics worry that human rights cannot help maintain the mutual trust among citizens required for a legitimate political order, since such rights are now too broadly shared. Thus prominent contributors to democratic theory insist that the members of the citizenry must share some features unique to them, to the exclusion of others—be it a European identity ( Habermas and Derrida 2003 ) or a national public culture generally shared only by the members ( Miller 1995, 2000 ). This essay considers and rejects these arguments. While stable, democratic redistributive arrangements do require trust and institutionalised means of trustworthiness; they need not rely on norms or values that distinguish members from non-members: such exclusion is not required. Thus human rights may be part of a common political identity.     

Believing in Miracles

Classical Christian definitions of miracle speak of events transcending the natural powers of objects. A personal creator, I argue, might well cause such events in order to achieve a supernatural purpose—bringing creatures to eternal life. Miracles—events transcending natural powers, disclosing and realizing the divine purpose—would then be integral to the rational order of nature. David Hume' arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak. Laws of nature, I suggest, are best seen not as exceptionless rules but as context–dependent realizations of natural powers. In that context miracles transcend the natural order not as "violations" but as intelligible realizations of a divine supernatural purpose. Miracles are not parts of scientific theory but can be parts of a web of rational belief fully consistent with science.     

Hobbes's Theory of Rights – A Modern Interest Theory

The received view in Thomas Hobbes scholarship is that theindividual rights described by Hobbes in his political writings andspecifically in Leviathan are simple freedoms or libertyrights, that is, rights that are not correlated with duties orobligations on the part of others. In other words, it is usually arguedthat there are no claim rights for individuals in Hobbes's politicaltheory. This paper argues, against that view, that Hobbes does describeclaim rights, that they come into being when individuals conform to thesecond law of nature and that they are genuine moral claim rights, thatis, rights that are the ground of the obligations of others to forebearfrom interfering with their exercise. This argument is defended againstboth Jean Hampton's and Howard Warrender's interpretations of rights inHobbes's theory. The paper concludes that the theory of rightsunderlying Hobbes's writing is not taken from Natural Law but isprobably closer to a modern interest theory of rights.     

成人与中学生科学概念形成过程的四个对比实验

以一组非人工的、自然的科学概念(“反作用力”、“机械能守恒”、“熵”和“场”)为学习内容,分别以成人和中学生为被试,实验研究成人和中学生科学概念形成过程的异同。结论如下：(1)成人与中学生科学概念形成过程均分为振荡渐进期、高原期和突变期。(2)成人的振荡渐进期较长;中学生的振荡渐进期较短且振荡特征比较明显。(3)成人的高原期出现较晚,但持续较长;中学生的高原期出现较早,但持续较短。(4)中学生的突变期的跨度随概念的抽象程度提高而越来越大。     

KINDS AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE: IS THERE ANYTHING THAT IT IS LIKE TO BE SOMETHING?

Abstract: In this article I distinguish the notion of there being something it is like to be a certain kind of creature from that of there being something it is like to have a certain kind of experience. Work on consciousness has typically dealt with the latter while employing the language of the former. I propose several ways of analyzing what it is like to be a certain kind of creature and find problems with them all. The upshot is that even if there is something it is like to have certain kinds of experience, it does not follow that there is anything it is like to be a certain kind of creature. Skepticism about the existence of something that it is like to be an F is recommended.     

Parameters, Predictions, and Evidence in Computational Modeling: A Statistical View Informed by ACT-R

Model validation in computational cognitive psychology often relies on methods drawn from the testing of theories in experimental physics. However, applications of these methods to computational models in typical cognitive experiments can hide multiple, plausible sources of variation arising from human participants and from stochastic cognitive theories, encouraging a "model fixed, data variable" paradigm that makes it difficult to interpret model predictions and to account for individual differences. This article proposes a likelihood-based, "data fixed, model variable" paradigm in which models are treated as stochastic processes in experiments with participant-to-participant variation that can be applied to a broad range of mechanistic cognitive architectures. This article discusses the implementation and implications of this view in model validation, with a concrete focus on a simple class of ACT-R models of cognition. This article is not intended as a recipe for broad application of these preliminary, proof-of-concept methods, but as a framework for communication between statisticians searching for interesting problems in the cognitive modeling sphere, and cognitive modelers interested in generalizing from deterministic to stochastic model validation, in the face of random variation in human experimental data.     

Influence of suggestion in the DRM paradigm: what state of consciousness is associated with false memory?

We assessed the effect of suggestion on the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm and associated it with the Remember–Know–Guess paradigm. Undergraduate students were given either lists of semantically related words or texts containing these words. After the recall task, if participants did not produce the critical lure, the experimenter suggested that the word had been present, using either a question (moderate suggestion) or an assertion (strong suggestion); these conditions were compared to a condition without suggestion. Afterwards, participants took a recognition test. The results showed that strong suggestions lead to more false recognitions than other conditions and the state of consciousness associated with false recognitions tends to be a feeling of knowing rather than remembering, regardless of the verbal version (list or text). Therefore moderate suggestions did not lead to more false recognitions compare to no suggestion. We discuss the impact of suggestion on consciousness associated with false memories.     

Multidimensional Cross-Recurrence Quantification Analysis (MdCRQA) – A Method for Quantifying Correlation between Multivariate Time-Series

In this paper, Multidimensional Cross-Recurrence Quantification Analysis (MdCRQA) is introduced. It is an extension of Multidimensional Recurrence Quantification Analysis (MdRQA), which allows to quantify the (auto-)recurrence properties of a single multidimensional time-series. MdCRQA extends MdRQA to bi-variate cases to allow for the quantification of the co-evolution of two multidimensional time-series. Moreover, it is shown how a Diagonal Cross-Recurrence Profile (DCRP) can be computed from the MdCRQA output that allows to capture time-lagged coupling between two multidimensional time-series. The core concepts of these analyses are described, as well as practical aspects of their application. In the supplementary materials to this paper, implementations of MdCRQA and the DCRP as MatLab- and R-functions are provided.     

The illuminative function of the agent intellect

Thomas Aquinas argues that the agent intellect's function is to abstract an intelligible species from a phantasm. However, insofar as he claims that the intelligible species is not present in the phantasm, it is unclear how the agent intellect accomplishes this task. In this paper I explore two models of abstraction – the extraction model and the production model – suggesting that each fails to capture Aquinas’ understanding of abstraction. I then offer my own interpretation of the function of the agent intellect – the illumination model – by employing Aquinas’ comparison of the agent intellect to light. I argue that the agent intellect neither extracts nor produces an intelligible species, but rather makes the nature that is already present in the object intelligible by actualizing its passive power of intelligibility. This involves the co-actualization of partner powers in the intellect and in the intelligible object, and ultimately makes it possible to cognize a particular, material object in a universal way.