Another look at the theoretical assumptions of adolescent egocentrism

We attempt in this paper to reevaluate the theoretical assumptions of D. Elkind's theory of adolescent egocentrism Child Development, 38, 1025–1034). We argue that the construct is not well placed in the ontogenetic context of Piagetian logical development, and that the theory cannot account for stage transition or the appearance of the imaginary audience (IA) and personal fable (PF) components. We argue that the IA and PF constructions are better understood as problems in interpersonal understanding. These components are reinterpreted in terms of stage sequence that describes the ontogenesis of interpersonal understanding. The advantages of this model are highlighted.     

Hypnosis and sociogenetic influences in human development

This paper revisits the too-long-overlooked relation between hypnosis and human development, aiming to understand hidden, yet powerful sociogenetic processes in development that are exposed in hypnosis. Hypnosis, as a process of interpersonal exchange, not only provides empirical evidence that such factors can dramatically influence intramental functioning, it also affords a glimpse of how such influences occur. Hypnosis results from common sociopsychological and interpersonal processes organized in ways that mimic key, essential features of child-caregiver involvements: interpersonal, asymmetric relationships of shared mentation for common purposes. Within these relationships of organic attunement, in both hypnosis and development, authoritative procedural directives become internalized without awareness. Hypnotic transformations of perceptions, memory, beliefs, anticipations, and behavior reveal just how powerful these relationships can be. And while the effects of hypnosis may startle, the magnitude and reach of the effects are precisely what development requires: organizing body and mind within the web of sociocultural meanings, values, and expectations.     

Cultures of teaching in childhood: Formal schooling and Maya sibling teaching at home

Culture can be thought of a set of shared practices, beliefs, and values that are transmitted across generations through language [Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. Teaching is one way that culture is transmitted, but forms of teaching vary across cultures and across activity settings within cultures. This article explores the impact of culture on styles of teaching in a place where more than one cultural model of teaching is found: the Zinacantec Maya of Chiapas, Mexico. Zinacantecs have an indigenous model of teaching that applies to the learning of informal tasks, such as making tortillas and weaving. When children go to school, the indigenous model interacts with the model found at school, and this mixed model is transferred back home to sibling interactions. Videotaped ethnographic observations and quantitative discourse analyses reveal cultural patterns in the development of children's teaching.     

Quantifying variability in phase portraits: application to gait ontogeny

We describe new Fourier- and shape-based methods for quantifying variation in phase-portraits, and re-analyze previously-published ontogenetic and adult data [Clark, J. E., & Phillips, S. J. (1993). A longitudinal study of intralimb coordination in the first year of independent walking: A dynamical systems approach. Child Development, 64, 1143–1157]. Results show considerable variation between individuals and through development, but after 6 months of walking some gait patterns stabilize.     

Children's understanding of the relationship between addition and subtraction

In learning mathematics, children must master fundamental logical relationships, including the inverse relationship between addition and subtraction. At the start of elementary school, children lack generalized understanding of this relationship in the context of exact arithmetic problems: they fail to judge, for example, that 12 + 9 − 9 yields 12. Here, we investigate whether preschool children’s approximate number knowledge nevertheless supports understanding of this relationship. Five-year-old children were more accurate on approximate large-number arithmetic problems that involved an inverse transformation than those that did not, when problems were presented in either non-symbolic or symbolic form. In contrast they showed no advantage for problems involving an inverse transformation when exact arithmetic was involved. Prior to formal schooling, children therefore show generalized understanding of at least one logical principle of arithmetic. The teaching of mathematics may be enhanced by building on this understanding.     

Sample diversity and premise typicality in inductive reasoning: evidence for developmental change

Evaluating whether a limited sample of evidence provides a good basis for induction is a critical cognitive task. We hypothesized that whereas adults evaluate the inductive strength of samples containing multiple pieces of evidence by attending to the relations among the exemplars (e.g., sample diversity), six-year-olds would attend to the degree to which each individual exemplar in a sample independently appears informative (e.g., premise typicality). To test these hypotheses, participants were asked to select between diverse and non-diverse samples to help them learn about basic-level animal categories. Across various between-subject conditions (N=133), we varied the typicality present in the diverse and non-diverse samples. We found that adults reliably selected to examine diverse over non-diverse samples, regardless of exemplar typicality, six-year-olds preferred to examine samples containing typical exemplars, regardless of sample diversity, and nine-year-olds were somewhat in the midst of this developmental transition.     

Influences of grasp selection in typically developing children

When reaching towards an object, adults favour grasps which, following the intended action, end in a comfortable position even when this requires them to start in an uncomfortable position (the end-state-comfort effect). However, this strategy is not consistently used by children who instead seem to favour a minimal pre-contact rotation of the hand, even when this results in an uncomfortable end position. In terms of multiple movements, the strategies used for grip selection are unclear; adults may still grasp for end-state-comfort given their propensity to plan to the end of a movement; however, children who are less able to concatenate movement may tend to start-state-comfort movements. The current study considered grip selection in children ranging from 4 to 12 years and in a group of adults. Participants were asked to rotate a disc so that an arrow pointed towards a specific target(s), the number of sequences in a movement was increased from one to three. Planning for end-state-comfort was seen in all participants and a clear developmental trajectory was identified whereby the relative comfort of an end position could be directly predicted by age in months. Adults and 10–12-year-olds favoured an end-state-comfort strategy whereas the younger children gave equal weighting to end-state-comfort, start-state-comfort and no initial rotation strategies. All groups were able to end a movement comfortably when it was composed of three steps; however, the proportion of movements relying on an end-state-comfort strategy decreased as sequence length increase whereas the proportion of start-state-comfort and no initial rotation strategies increased. The current data support the concept that a mechanism for planning grasps may be based on motor experience.     

More than words: A reply to Malt and Sloman

In four experiments, Malt and Sloman [Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator’s intention in naming and what’s really what. Cognition, 105, 615-648] show that the naming of artifacts is affected by discourse context. They see this phenomenon as posing a problem for the intentional-history theory of artifact categorization (e.g., [Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, history, and artifact concepts. Cognition, 60, 1-29]), and as supporting instead their alternative theory that naming is determined by communicative goals. This response begins by distinguishing the problem of artifact categorization (determining the categories that artifacts belong to) from the problem of artifact naming (deciding how to talk about members of these categories). In light of this distinction, it turns out that Malt and Sloman’s findings are fully consistent with all theories of artifact categorization, including the intentional-historical one. Moreover, contrary to what they argue, there are actually many cases where the relative contributions of categorization and pragmatics can be clearly distinguished. Finally, it is argued that Malt and Sloman’s own account of artifact naming presupposes a capacity for artifact categorization; it cannot work without one.     

Clericalism,Religious Duress and its Psychological Impact on Victims of Clergy Sexual Abuse

Religious duress is a unique kind of threat and constraint involuntarily experienced by some members of the Roman Catholic Church as a result of religious indoctrination and training. Fear, awe and respect for the clergy foster the development and actualization of religious duress. This phenomenon can seriously impede a person’s capacity to accurately perceive and evaluate abusive actions perpetrated on them by clergy. This constraint poses an impediment to emotional and spiritual development. Internalized religious duress confuses and psychologically overwhelms such individuals and renders them incapable of absorbing their sexual trauma. The consequent feelings of numbness and immobility distort the perception of reality. It then becomes impossible for the individual to act in a manner that would protect and promote emotional growth and spiritual well being.     

Heuristic and analytic processes in mental models for conditionals: An integrative developmental theory

This article presents a developmental dual-process theory of the understanding of conditionals that integrates Evans’ heuristic–analytic theory within the revised mental model theory of conditional proposed by Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas (2008). According to this theory, the interpretation of a conditional sentence is driven by unconscious and implicit heuristic processes that provide individuals with an initial representation that captures its meaning by representing the cases that make it true. This initial model can be enriched with additional models (a process named fleshing out within the mental model theory) through the intervention of conscious and demanding analytic processes. Being optional, these processes construct representations of cases that are only compatible with the conditional, leaving its truth-value indeterminate when they occur. Because heuristic processes are relatively immune to developmental changes, while analytic processes strongly develop with age, the initial model remains stable through development whereas the number of additional models that can be constructed increases steadily. Thus, the dual-process mental model theory predicts in which cases conditionals will be deemed true, indeterminate, or false and how these cases evolve with age. These predictions were verified in children, adolescents and adults who were asked to evaluate the truth value and the probability of several types of conditionals. The results reveal a variety of developmental trajectories in the way different conditionals are interpreted, which can all be accounted for by our revised mental model theory.