Anxiety, learning, and memory: A reconceptualization

A new theoretical framework for work on anxiety and memory is proposed. Anxious subjects engage in task-irrelevant processing which preempts processing resources and some of the available capacity of working memory. They typically attempt to compensate for the adverse effects of this task-irrelevent processing on task performance by increased effort. It follows from these theoretical assumptions that anxiety will have differential effects on performance efficiency (i.e., the quality of performance) and on processing effectiveness (i.e., performance efficiency/effort). Anxiety will always reduce processing effectiveness, but will not impair performance efficiency if there is sufficient effort expenditure. Consequently, reliance on measures of performance efficiency will often obscure the detrimental effects of anxiety on processing effectiveness.     

Peer and parent-child interaction before and after enrollment in nursery school

Forty-five three-year-olds and their parents participated in the research. Twenty-four of the children were observed two months and one week before, as well as two months after, enrollment in a nursery school. The others were observed at comparable intervals, but remained at home in the fulltime care of their parents. On all occasions, the children who were about to enter or had entered nursery school engaged in more positive interaction with and sought more proximity to their parents than the home care children did. These tendencies were unaffected by enrollment in nursery school. There were no differences between nursery school and home care children on measures of peer interaction eithe before or after nursery school began. The need to consider differences between nursery school and home care children that antedate enrollment is emphasized.     

The transferential chimera: a clinical approach

The author presents four quite different clinical situations which he believes show the development of an aspect of the transference as a genuinely autonomous psychical neo-reality of the transferential inter-space, which, in the words of Michel de M'Uzan, he calls the transferential chimera. Basing himself on a reading of 'The psychology of the transference', he goes on to propose a more general application of this particular transferential dynamic whose origin lies in matriarchal incest and which develops around the alchemical quaternio of the cross-projective space of the transference-counter transference and in the analytic setting. Finally, he examines the four clinical situations in the light of this application of the transference in order to propound an understanding of his reading, and proposes a hypothesis for the constitution of the transferential chimera out of the intermingling of the de-integrated parts of the self of the analyst and those of the analysand.     

Normative Naturalism and the Relativised <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Priori</Emphasis>

Summary  In this paper I address some shortcomings in Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism. I make it clear that Laudan’s rejection of the “meta-methodology thesis”, or MMT is unnecessary, and that a reformulated version MMT can be sustained. I contend that a major difficulty that attends Laudan’s account is his contention that a naturalistic philosophy of science cannot accommodate any a priori justification of methodological rules, and consider what sort of naturalism might best replace Laudan’s. To do this, I discuss Michael Friedman’s account of a relativised a priori and show that it is consistent with naturalistic philosophy of science and that it can help form the basis of a plausible normative naturalism. In particular, this discussion shows that Laudan’s rejection of any a priori justification of methodological rules is unjustified and inconsistent with scientific practice. Finally, I point the way to a version of normative naturalism that includes MMT and accounts for the role of constitutive a priori principles within science.     

IF OUR GENES ARE FOR US,WHO CAN BE AGAINST US? THOUGHTS OF A PRAGMATIST ON SCIENCE AND MORALITY

Abstract. The philosopher Michael Ruse accounts for the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, and thus the origin of distinctively moral obligations like that of altruism, in genetic terms. This is part of an attempt to develop a philosophy that takes Darwin seriously by substituting respectable scientific entities, specifically those of evolutionary biology, for suspect theological or philosophical ones, like God or the transcendental ego, as a basis for addressing philosophical questions. Pragmatists take Darwin seriously, but in a very different way from that proposed by Ruse. Darwin introduced a “logic” into the study of living things—including human beings, the human mind, and culture— that leads philosophers to ask new and different questions about morality rather than trying to supply new answers to the same old questions. This essay contrasts these two different ways of taking Darwin seriously for purposes of philosophy and claims certain advantages for the pragmatist way over Ruse's.     

Characteristics of taste-mediated environmental potentiation in rats

When rats drink a novel flavor in a distinctive environment and are injected with lithium, potentiated aversions are established to the environment as evidenced by the animals' unwillingness to consume a familiar, nonaversive flavor in this environment. Experiment 1 demonstrates that this potentiation is due to the presence of both the distinctive taste and the environmental cues on the conditioning trials, not simply aversive conditioning to each element or to generalization between the two elements. This potentiation phenomenon was shown to be sensitive to the novelty of the potentiating flavor in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 demonstrated that second-order conditioning is difficult to establish using these procedures, although Experiment 4 revealed that postconditioning extinction of the aversive flavor interfered substantially with environmental potentiation. These outcomes are discussed in terms of their implications for adaptive adjustments in feeding behavior as well as for more general conceptions of associative learning.     

Traits,processes, and the purpose of templates

The template method proposed by D. J. Bem and D. C. Funder 1978, Psychological Review, 85, 485–501) can have two separate purposes. First, template-behavior pairs can be used as a type of explanation in which situational influences are incorporated within a trait theory. Second, template matching can be used as a method for evaluating process theories. Recent discussion (D. J. Bem, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 390–393; D. C. Funder, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 283–289; W. Mischel & P. K. Peake, 1982, Psychological Review, 89, 730–755) confuses these two purposes. If used as a type of explanation, then templates can be criticized on the grounds of blunt empiricism; but if templates are used as a method for evaluating process theories, then process theorists should welcome this new technique.