The social behavior of preschool children at different developmental levels: Effects of group composition

The social participation, constructiveness of play, and communicative interactions of 4- to 6-year-old developmentally delayed and nondelayed preschool children were compared under conditions in which children interacted in play groups homogeneous with respect to developmental level and in heterogeneous play groups. A within-subjects design was utilized to assess the relatively immediate effects of group composition. Data for both children and teachers were analyzed separately for each of four developmental level groups and across two time periods. Although numerous differences were obtained as a function of developmental level and time, the only significant effect of group composition on children was reduced inappropriate play by severely delayed youngsters while interacting in heterogeneous play groups. No detrimental effects of heterogeneous grouping were observed for children at any developmental level. These results were discussed in terms of their importance in evaluating the impact of programs that mainstream young children.     

Toward a reconceptualization of the reciprocal imitation phenomenon: Two experiments

This paper reports two experiments which consider the increased imitation exhibited by models who have been imitated. Experiment 1 was concerned with whether the reciprocal imitation effect is really reciprocal or if the subsequent imitation will generalize to someone else. It was found that adult subjects who were previously imitated at the 75% rate on a perceptual judgments task subsequently imitated their partner more, rated their partner more attractive, and felt more confidence when imitated than did subjects imitated at the 25% rate. These results were obtained regardless of which confederate the subjects imitated, thus indicating that reciprocal imitation is not necessarily reciprocal, but is generalizable. Experiment 2 assessed whether the subsequent imitation is the product of the effects of being imitated or is the result of the subject observing the imitator's imitation. The results indicated that after having observed imitation at a 75% rate, adult onlookers are more likely to subsequently imitate and be attracted to the imitator, the imitated person, and a person new to the situation than are onlookers who observed a 25% imitation rate. A theoretical modification is advanced which holds that subsequent imitation effects, whether from observing others imitate or from being the target of the imitation, result from a process of imitation of imitativeness. The results of these two experiments have implications for theory in imitation and social learning.     

Higher Pantheism

Romantic sensibility and political necessity led Humphry Davy, Britain's most prominent scientist in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, to pantheism: nature worship, involving for him a fervent belief in the immortality of the soul. Rapt with a vision of sublimity, from mountain tops or balloons, men of science in succeeding generations also found in pantheism a reason for their vocation and a way of making sense of their world. It should be seen as an alternative both to active participation in church life (like Faraday's) and to a gritty agnosticism (like Huxley's), indicating again how subtle and complex relationships were between science and religion in the nineteenth century.     

Do Patriotic Ties Limit Global Justice Duties?

Some theorists who accept the existence of global justice duties to alleviate the condition of distant needy strangers hold that these duties are significantly constrained by special ties to fellow countrymen. The patriotic priority thesis holds that morality requires the members of each nation-state to give priority to helping needy fellow compatriots over more needy distant strangers. Three arguments for constraint and patriotic priority are examined in this essay: an argument from fair play, one from coercion, another from coercion and autonomy. Under scrutiny, none of these arguments qualifies as successful.     

Kant on International Relations

This paper explores some of the problems which arise from Immanuel Kant’s commitment to both human rights and the rights of states. Michael Doyle believed it was contradictory for Kant to defend both human rights and non-intervention by states in the affairs of other states, but I argue that for Kant there was no such contradiction, and I explore Kant’s claim that the state is “a moral personality.” I also discuss Kant’s belief that “Nature guarantees” that perpetual peace will obtain, and I consider Kant as a teleologist.     

Skeptical theism and the problem of moral <Emphasis Type="Italic">aporia</Emphasis>

Skeptical theism seeks to defend theism against the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning human epistemic limitations in order to establish that we have no epistemological basis from which to judge that apparently gratuitous evils are not in fact justified by morally sufficient reasons beyond our ken. This paper contributes to the set of distinctively practical criticisms of skeptical theism by arguing that religious believers who accept skeptical theism and take its practical implications seriously will be forced into a position of paralysis or aporia when faced with a wide set of morally significant situations. It is argued that this consequence speaks strongly against the acceptance of skeptical theism insofar as such moral aporia is inconsistent with religious moral teaching and practice. In addition, a variety of arguments designed to show that accepting skeptical theism does not lead to this consequence are considered, and shown to be deficient.     

Fordham, feeling, and countertransference: reflections on defences of the self

This is a paper about the difficulties we as analysts get into when we find that a patient has activated something in our unconscious which we cannot resolve in our work with them. Fordham described at the end of his life, in a number of papers, his difficulties and discomfort at not being able to resolve an impasse with one of his patients. From the conversations we had about this situation I knew this caused them both a lot of pain. After Fordham's death his former patient consulted me. Arising from these consultations I describe how I have understood the impasse to have arisen between Fordham and his patient. This paper links character and clinical interests, personality and impasse, developmental failures and defences of the self. It is a personal statement in which I have struggled to represent the meaning in the pain these two men suffered during their analytic engagement, which lasted more than ten years. The theme of fathers and sons was central to the problem.     

Finite Reasons Without Foundations

This article develops a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein's infinitism. The view it develops, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein's principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the “reason for” relation is constrained by PAA and that PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the “reason for” relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is false by the maintaining that there is more to epistemic justification than can be expressed in any reasoning session. One crucial argument for Framework Reasons is that justification depends on a background of plausibility considerations. The final section of the article applies this view of reasons to Michael Bergmann's argument that any nonskeptical epistemology must embrace epistemic circularity.     

The Epistemic Criterion: A Response to Michael Hand

This article is a response to Michael Hand’s critique in this issue of my response to his use of the epistemic criterion as the sole means for identifying whether or not an issue should be identified as controversial. I argue that he has misunderstood my intention in suggesting that I was seeking to replace the epistemic criterion. Rather my purpose was to challenge his over-confidence in the decisiveness of reason and to temper his use of the epistemic criterion by suggesting it needed to embrace ethical concerns.