The embodied mind

Abstract :  This paper considers Fonagy et al's concept of mentalization and contrasts aspects of this with aspects of Bion's model of the mind. The author argues that although mentalization adds to our understanding of mind it has limitations; that it may tend to over-emphasize certain types of external interaction between infant and carer and under-emphasize internal psychobiological processes. What is at issue here is the way in which an infant's carers facilitate the development of meaning out of experience. Bion's concept supposes a relatively 'interior' model in which, in important ways, the carer enables the infant to derive the meaning of his or her experience, whilst on the other hand Fonagy et al tend to talk more in terms of the ways in which the carer endows the infant's experience with meaning. Reference is made to Fordham's concept of states of 'Identity'. Fordham has pointed out that Freud's model is one in which mind is conceived of as evolving out of an infant's complex identifications with his or her carer(s); Jung's model envisages developmentally early states of identity as the means by which inherent capacities are realized.     

The theoretical diagnosis of skepticism

Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion). Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show that all of the rival theories of justification, skeptical and non-skeptical alike, are mistaken. Fourth, explain why skeptical doubts are sometimes (or sometimes merely seem) intuitive, and thereby accommodate skeptical doubts without capitulation. Michael Williams has pioneered the very idea of a theoretical reply. A theoretical diagnosis consists in just the first two stages. An adequate reply, which is correct at each stage, would rebut the skeptic entirely. Williams’ own reply, I argue, is inadequate. I offer in its place an exhaustive and accurate diagnosis of skepticism. I distinguish four kinds of skepticism and five theories of justification. I then show which theories do, and which theories do not, support which kinds of skepticism.     

Recognizing Terrorism

It has been claimed that most of the world’s preventable suffering and death are caused not by terrorism but by poverty. That claim, if true, could be hard to substantiate. For most terrorism is not publicly recognized as such, and it is far commoner than paradigms of the usual suspects suggest. Everyday lives under oppressive regimes, in racist environments, and of women, children, and elders everywhere who suffer violence in their homes offer instances of terrorisms that seldom capture public attention. Or so this essay argues, through exploring two models of terrorism and the points of view highlighted by each.     

The German Reformation and the Mathematization of the Created World

This article explores the emergence of mathematics and mathematical method as a means of defining authoritative truth in the thought of some scholars in the German Reformation. Against the background of Martin Luther's critique of Aristotelian philosophy, Philip Melanchthon presented mathematics as an ideal discipline for preparing the mind to understand God. His approach drew on the work of humanist mathematicians such as Regiomontanus. It finds resonances in the work of the Basel humanist Simon Grynaeus, and (in a less mathematically informed way) in the thought of Peter Ramus. These discussions about the divine nature and certainty of mathematical truth formed the context within which Johannes Kepler's Platonist astronomy emerged.     

End notes: two unpublished presentations by Michael Fordham

Following the publication in this journal of two of Fordham's unpublished papers selected by James Astor (2010, 55, 5), the editors have asked me to select a further two. I have chosen two clinical pieces, one clinical notes and the other notes that refine his previous thinking, which Fordham wrote at the end of his life. Both are examples of the way Fordham continued throughout his analytic work to turn to patients as his primary source of learning. Fordham presented the first piece, ‘A case study’, to Parkside Clinic in 1988. Its subject is his last child patient, a nine‐year‐old boy with behaviour problems that destroyed the analytic frame. The second is clearly for an SAP (Society of Analytical Psychology) audience and written probably around 1992–93. It is titled ‘Some comments on transference and countertransference’ and contains material from the patient who has become known through papers in this journal as ‘K’. The two pieces are presented together within a commentary rather than separately with footnotes, in order to provide some context for Fordham's thinking in his late years.     

THE SEMANTIC STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST INTELLIGENT DESIGN

Abstract. This paper examines the impact of two formalizations of evolutionary biology on the antiselectionist critiques of the Intelligent Design (ID) movement. It looks first at attempts to apply the syntactic framework of the physical sciences to biology in the twentieth century, and to their effect upon the ID movement. It then examines the more heuristic account of biological‐theory structure, namely, the semantic model. Finally, it concludes by advocating the semantic conception and emphasizing the problems that the semantic model creates for ID's negative and positive theses.     

The role of affect in narratives

Affect states and reactions commonly occur in narratives. This paper discusses the importance of affect knowledge and processing in the context of BORIS, a computer program which reads and answers questions about narratives involving multiple sources of knowledge. There are several reasons why affects are important in a process model of narrative comprehension: For one thing, affects describe goal situations and signal the occurrence of expectation failures. Affective reactions also serve as an indication of the status of interpersonal relationships. Finally, affects influence the kinds of thematic structures which become instantiated in episodic memory.