Against the new Cartesian Circle

In two recent papers, Michael Della Rocca accuses Descartes of reasoning circularly in the Fourth Meditation. This alleged new circle is distinct from, and more vicious than, the traditional Cartesian Circle arising in the Third Meditation. We explain Della Rocca’s reasons for this accusation, showing that his argument is invalid.     

NATURAL DOUBTS

Abstract: Many philosophers now argue that the doubts of the philosophical sceptic are unnatural ones, in that they are not forced on us by considerations that any reasonable person would have to accept as compelling but only arise if one has already accepted certain controversial theoretical commitments. In this article I defend the naturalness of philosophical scepticism against such criticisms. After defining “global ontological scepticism,” I examine the work of a number of anti‐sceptical philosophers—Michael Huemer, Michael Williams, and John McDowell. Although McDowell does move the debate to a deeper level by interpreting scepticism as a challenge to the very possibility of the mind's apprehending reality by being in a rational rather than a merely causal relation to it, none of them succeeds in showing that global ontological scepticism is, in the relevant sense, unnatural. This is not to say that the sceptic is correct; simply that it has not been shown that we can reasonably dismiss the sceptical questions and thereby evade the need to engage seriously with the sceptical arguments.     

Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation

In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses.     

End notes: two unpublished presentations by Michael Fordham

Following the publication in this journal of two of Fordham's unpublished papers selected by James Astor (2010, 55, 5), the editors have asked me to select a further two. I have chosen two clinical pieces, one clinical notes and the other notes that refine his previous thinking, which Fordham wrote at the end of his life. Both are examples of the way Fordham continued throughout his analytic work to turn to patients as his primary source of learning. Fordham presented the first piece, ‘A case study’, to Parkside Clinic in 1988. Its subject is his last child patient, a nine‐year‐old boy with behaviour problems that destroyed the analytic frame. The second is clearly for an SAP (Society of Analytical Psychology) audience and written probably around 1992–93. It is titled ‘Some comments on transference and countertransference’ and contains material from the patient who has become known through papers in this journal as ‘K’. The two pieces are presented together within a commentary rather than separately with footnotes, in order to provide some context for Fordham's thinking in his late years.     

The German Reformation and the Mathematization of the Created World

This article explores the emergence of mathematics and mathematical method as a means of defining authoritative truth in the thought of some scholars in the German Reformation. Against the background of Martin Luther's critique of Aristotelian philosophy, Philip Melanchthon presented mathematics as an ideal discipline for preparing the mind to understand God. His approach drew on the work of humanist mathematicians such as Regiomontanus. It finds resonances in the work of the Basel humanist Simon Grynaeus, and (in a less mathematically informed way) in the thought of Peter Ramus. These discussions about the divine nature and certainty of mathematical truth formed the context within which Johannes Kepler's Platonist astronomy emerged.     

THE SEMANTIC STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST INTELLIGENT DESIGN

Abstract. This paper examines the impact of two formalizations of evolutionary biology on the antiselectionist critiques of the Intelligent Design (ID) movement. It looks first at attempts to apply the syntactic framework of the physical sciences to biology in the twentieth century, and to their effect upon the ID movement. It then examines the more heuristic account of biological‐theory structure, namely, the semantic model. Finally, it concludes by advocating the semantic conception and emphasizing the problems that the semantic model creates for ID's negative and positive theses.     

Listening to Dialogue

In accordance with Progressivism, Matthew Lipman, introduced an educational model for renewal and change by means of the child. With his Philosophy for Children programme he wished to offer an alternative for the intellectualistic oriented education which silenced children. The answer to the search for freedom and change, Lipman finds in the symbioses between ‘Philosophy’ and ‘Children’. Philosophy expressed in critical thinking and communication, was the basis to emancipate the child from the oppression of the adult and to cause change. According to Lipman the main purpose of philosophy is to free every individual from determination. This plea is being elaborated by dialogue. The main issue of our paper concerns the question whether Lipman’s alternative ‘Philosophy for Children’ can fulfil the promise of change and freedom. To answer this question we will investigate thoroughly where dialogue and change in Philosophy for Children stand for. Finally we will propose another perspective of dialogue. A dialogue stressed on listening. Listening to how the world appears to us and how we appear to ourselves. Nancy Vansieleghem is working on a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Education at the Department of Education at the University of Gent, Belgium. Her main area of research is philosophy of dialogue and public space.     

HOW ACTS OF DISCOVERY TRANSFORM OUR TACIT KNOWING POWERS IN BOTH SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS INQUIRY

Abstract. In this essay I take Michael Polanyi's analysis of scientific discovery and extend it to encompass fresh encounters with the living God. Given the embodied character of all human knowing, Polanyi challenged objectivism and positivism as untenable. In its place, Polanyi noted that the tacit skills established when a physicist learns to detect radio waves has its counterpart in a Christian's being trained to find God. Once trained, stubborn organismic habits constrain both physicist and believer within a socially approved heuristic circle that can be broken only by the act of discovery. The puzzlement that erupts at the onset of an inquiry ultimately finds relief only in an expanded encounter with the realities that one has been trained to serve. Thus, the act of discovery not only serves to disrupt the tradition as it has been received but also reveals that the realities being served make themselves known in novel ways. The lifelong pursuit of God and the lifelong pursuit of novel manifestations of radio waves thus share a common epistemological and phenomenological underpinning.