Race effects in modifying cognitive impulsivity through self-instruction and modeling.

Seven-year-old children, identified as impulsive on the basis of MFF performance, were given a training program intended to modify their impulsivity through modeling and self-instruction. All the subjects were of comparable intelligence, social class, geographic residence, and were matched on sex. The 40 experimental subjects were paired on the basis of race. Half the pairs were trained by white models and half by black models. While the results do not provide unequivocal support for the effectiveness of such training, they do demonstrate selective changes in impulsivity based upon racial similarities of models and subjects. The construct validity of the MFF as a measure of reflection-impulsivity and the relevance of social class membership is discussed.     

Characteristics of taste-mediated environmental potentiation in rats

When rats drink a novel flavor in a distinctive environment and are injected with lithium, potentiated aversions are established to the environment as evidenced by the animals' unwillingness to consume a familiar, nonaversive flavor in this environment. Experiment 1 demonstrates that this potentiation is due to the presence of both the distinctive taste and the environmental cues on the conditioning trials, not simply aversive conditioning to each element or to generalization between the two elements. This potentiation phenomenon was shown to be sensitive to the novelty of the potentiating flavor in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 demonstrated that second-order conditioning is difficult to establish using these procedures, although Experiment 4 revealed that postconditioning extinction of the aversive flavor interfered substantially with environmental potentiation. These outcomes are discussed in terms of their implications for adaptive adjustments in feeding behavior as well as for more general conceptions of associative learning.     

Imitation as a function of response commonality,serial order,and vicarious punishment

The effects of response commonality, serial order of modeled responses, and vicarious punishment on young boys' recall and acceptance of 20 commodity prefereces of an adult were examined in a 2 (common dimension vs no-common dimension) × 2 (vicarious punishment vs no-vicarious consequences) × 2 (recall or acceptance test) × 5 (response-block) factorial experiment. As predicted, the presence of a common dimension resulted in improved recall of the modeled responses, vicarious punishment was more effective under common dimension than no-common dimension conditions, and a serial order effect for recall of the modeled responses was obtained. The overall pattern of results is discussed in terms of the conceptualization that imitation requires both that the observer (1) has acquired and retained the model's responses and (2) has been placed in circumstances which favor activating this learning into overt performance.     

The transferential chimera II: some theoretical considerations

The author develops here a theoretical model to account for the different levels of organization and functioning of the transference chimera of which he gave a clinical presentation in an earlier article. From his reading of Jung's 'Psychology of the transference' he derives a dynamic model of the chimera and links it to quantum mechanics and chaos theory not so much to describe the reality of the phenomenon, but to offer a model of representation as a conceptual and meditative tool for analysts to use in their practice. The main hypothesis of this work is that the chimera arises from the intimate interplay of the respective de-integrates of the analyst and of the patient, thus constituting a genuine self in the transference. The author concludes with some implications for the analyst's own internal position.     

Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action

Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational permissibility that Smith wants to capture. Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf.     

Intelligent-Design Theory: An Argument for Biotic Laws

A central thesis of intelligent‐design theorists is that physical and chemical laws and chance are insufficient to account for irreducibly complex biological structures and that intelligent design is necessary to account for such phenomena. This assertion, however, still implies a reductionist ontology. We need to recognize that reality displays multiple modes of being beyond simply chemical and physical modes of being, each of which is governed by laws for that mode of being. This essay argues for an alternate framework for understanding life phenomena that is neither philosophical materialism nor intelligent‐design theory.     

THE DISCOVERY OF MEANING THROUGH SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS FORMS OF INDWELLING

Abstract. Because of similarities between some implications of Michael Polanyi's theory of personal knowledge and intelligent design, claims have been made that his theory provides support to the project of intelligent design. This essay contends that, when Polanyi's reflections on a Ideological framework for contextualizing evolutionary biology are properly understood as a heuristic vision, his position contrasts sharply with the empirical claims made on behalf of intelligent design.     

An interview with Murray Jackson by Jan Wiener

Murray Jackson was among the early trainees at the Society of Analytical Psychology (SAP) drawn to Jungian ideas during the 1950s when the training was still relatively informal. He was born in Australia where he became a doctor and came to London to study psychiatry with a particular interest in psychosis. He was influenced by Michael Fordham with whom he had an analysis and his four papers, published in the Journal of Analytical Psychology in the early 1960s, contributed significantly to the growing interest in clinical technique, particularly transference, that developed in the Society at that time. Later, he retrained at the British Institute of Psychoanalysis in the Kleinian tradition and was the first consultant at the Maudsley Hospital to run a 10-bed unit for severely mentally ill patients applying psychoanalytic principles. In April 2010, Jan Wiener interviewed Murray Jackson in France, where he now lives in retirement, about his interest and subsequent disappointment in Jungian ideas as well as his involvement with the Society of Analytical Psychology at a particular point in its history. After a brief introduction, the interview is reproduced in full.     

Theism, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Two Theories of Truth

In Michael Ruse's recent publications, such as Taking Darwin Seriously (1998) and Evolutionary Naturalism (1995), he has advocated a certain sort of evolutionary epistemology and has argued that it implies a rejection of metaphysical realism (MR) in favor of a position that he calls "internal realism" (IR). Additionally, he has maintained that, insofar as his evolutionary epistemology implies a rejection of MR in favor of IR, it escapes the kind of argument against naturalism that Alvin Plantinga makes in his Warrant and Proper Function (1993). In this article I explain the relevant views and arguments of Ruse and Plantinga, and I critically engage with Ruse's views, arguing that (1) his case for rejecting MR has no essential connection to evolutionary considerations; (2) his case for rejecting MR depends upon internalist assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are in need of some kind of defense; and (3) given his implicit internalism and his commitment to IR, his argument for rejecting MR can be used against his IR.     

'Oh Rose, thou art sick!' Anti-individuation forces in the film American Beauty

The film American Beauty is used as a vehicle to explore difficulties in the individuation process, to look at a particular aspect of couple relationships in which mourning is avoided, and to make a general comment about the relationship between film and psychological experience. The thesis of the paper is that the individuation process is both an intra-psychic experience and an inter-psychic one which relies on relationships with external figures to enable development. The adult couple relationship is taken as one of the key areas of emotional life for the individuation process and as an area that can best show up false starts, successes, or even retreats in psychological development. Using the poetry of William Blake and the work of Michael Fordham, I show a process of anti-individuation going on in the relationship between the characters of Lester and Carolyn Burnham in the film.