Interference with ingestional aversion learning produced by preexposure to the unconditioned stimulus: Associative and nonassociative aspects

Preconditioning exposure to a lithium chloride unconditioned stimulus (US) interferes with the subsequent conditioning of a taste aversion. Multiple US preexposures produce a long-lasting or durable interference with aversion learning, whereas a single US exposure produces a transient interference effect. The present experiments demonstrate that the durable US preexposure effect is substantially reduced if the method of drug treatment (infusion versus injection of the drug into the peritoneal cavity) or the spatial cues present during drug treatment (home cage versus a distinctive environment) are changed between the preexposure and taste conditioning phases of the experiment. In contrast, these manipulations do not attenuate the proximal/transient US preexposure effect. These findings indicate that different mechanisms are responsible for the two US preexposure effects. The results are consistent with previous suggestions that the durable effects of lithium preexposure are due to associative interference produced by the exteroceptive stimuli that accompany drug administrations and indicate that the proximal/transient US preexposure effect is mediated by nonassociative mechanisms.     

Cross-modal transfer and intermediate-size transposition

Kindergarten and third grade boys learned an intermediate-size problem either visually or tactually. They were then tested either visually or tactually. The test sets were separated from the training set by either 1, 2, or 4 steps. The data supported predictions derived from the D. M. Lane and F. M. Rabinowitz (Child Development 1977,48, 412–426) transposition theory on choice and consistency measures. Of greatest interest were the markedly different transposition gradients exhibited by the boys in the visual-visual and visual-tactual groups.     

Hope of success and fear of failure components of Mehrabian's scales of resultant achievement motivation

This report is concerned with the factor structure and psychometric properties of the nonprojective Male and Female scales of Resultant Achievement Motivation (RAM) developed by Mehrabian (Educational and Psychological Measurement, 1968, 28, 493–503). The 26-item self-report scales along with Mandler and Sarason's (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1952, 47, 166–173) Test Anxiety Questionnaire (TAQ) were administered to 237 males and 225 females in Experiment 1. Unrestricted maximum likelihood factor analyses of the RAM scales revealed four primary factors for each version. Since the first two factors from both analyses resembled measures of Hope of Success and Fear of Failure, two strategies for improving the scales were adopted, both of which eliminated the items loading on factors III and IV. One strategy involved adding the indexes of Hope of Success and Fear of Failure, while the other involved finding their difference. Construct validity coefficients were computed for the 26-item full scales, and the RAM measures formed using the above strategies with student grade point average and TAQ scores as the criterion variables. In Experiment 2, the appropriate RAM scale and the TAQ were administered to 30 males and 38 females. Construct validity coefficients were computed in this cross validation sample with the three RAM measures as predictors and with TAQ scores and student achievement in a course in Social/Personality Psychology as the criterion variables. The three RAM measures were used to predict the performance of 16 males who worked at a common laboratory task (anagrams) in Experiment 3. The results of all three experiments indicate the Hope of Success minus Fear of Failure measure to be the best measure of RAM from a theoretical, psychometric, and pragmatic point of view.     

The theoretical diagnosis of skepticism

Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion). Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show that all of the rival theories of justification, skeptical and non-skeptical alike, are mistaken. Fourth, explain why skeptical doubts are sometimes (or sometimes merely seem) intuitive, and thereby accommodate skeptical doubts without capitulation. Michael Williams has pioneered the very idea of a theoretical reply. A theoretical diagnosis consists in just the first two stages. An adequate reply, which is correct at each stage, would rebut the skeptic entirely. Williams’ own reply, I argue, is inadequate. I offer in its place an exhaustive and accurate diagnosis of skepticism. I distinguish four kinds of skepticism and five theories of justification. I then show which theories do, and which theories do not, support which kinds of skepticism.     

Recognizing Terrorism

It has been claimed that most of the world’s preventable suffering and death are caused not by terrorism but by poverty. That claim, if true, could be hard to substantiate. For most terrorism is not publicly recognized as such, and it is far commoner than paradigms of the usual suspects suggest. Everyday lives under oppressive regimes, in racist environments, and of women, children, and elders everywhere who suffer violence in their homes offer instances of terrorisms that seldom capture public attention. Or so this essay argues, through exploring two models of terrorism and the points of view highlighted by each.     

Smith’s practicality requirement meets dual-process models of moral judgment

In The Moral Problem, Michael Smith argues that only motivational internalists can offer an adequate explanation of why changes in moral judgment tend to be accompanied by changes in motivation in morally virtuous people. Smith argues that the failure of motivational externalism to account for this phenomenon amounts to a reductio of the view. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models of moral judgment to develop an externalist response to Smith’s argument. The key to my proposal is that motivationally efficacious states are often the source of our moral judgments, and changes in judgment are typically the result of changes in these states. However, moral judgments can also be formed via an alternative pathway that does not necessarily affect motivation, and so motivation and judgment can come apart. This response not only defuses Smith’s objections to externalism, but challenges Smith to square his internalist proposal with the empirical details of moral judgment.     

Natural Theology Reconsidered (Again)

Neither the “traditional” nor the “revisionist” accounts of the nature and fate of natural theology are adequate to the task of explaining the peculiar trajectory of its history and, in particular, the consensus view of its apparent terminal decline. Contrary to the accepted narrative, natural theology was not fatally undermined by the scientific revolution. Even if temporarily marginalized by disciplines such as systematics and dogmatics, natural theology never went away. It is still with us, and it provides a healthy grasp of the divine presence in the natural world.     

The role of affect in narratives

Affect states and reactions commonly occur in narratives. This paper discusses the importance of affect knowledge and processing in the context of BORIS, a computer program which reads and answers questions about narratives involving multiple sources of knowledge. There are several reasons why affects are important in a process model of narrative comprehension: For one thing, affects describe goal situations and signal the occurrence of expectation failures. Affective reactions also serve as an indication of the status of interpersonal relationships. Finally, affects influence the kinds of thematic structures which become instantiated in episodic memory.