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101.
Elizabeth Urban 《The Journal of analytical psychology》2013,58(4):510-529
Over three decades ago, John Bowlby argued for psychoanalysis to seek beyond its own parameters if it was to maintain its claim to be a science. Since then there has been a wealth of relevant research from various fields. While this has been instrumental in the development of my own work, this paper concerns learning from the patient. The paper begins with a premise: interpretative analytic work requires three‐dimensionality (self, other and object). Although interpretative work may be ingrained in our professional identity, this triangulation may or may not exist in our patients in any stable way. The paper continues with a brief developmental account of how early archetypally‐shaped shifts in the infant's field of interest establish the experiential components of three‐dimensionality. From there, observational and clinical material with a toddler and a young boy describe how early relational deficits hindered their capacities for three‐dimensionality. Yet both were able to engage with the therapist and to become active in the creation of three‐dimensionality within their own minds. Implied in this work are considerations for working with patients for whom interpretations do not work. Michael Fordham's comments on ‘working out of the self’ are linked with the art of what we do. 相似文献
102.
103.
Joshua Gert 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(1):1-23
Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral
philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored
by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear
that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with
his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least
some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the
normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational
permissibility that Smith wants to capture.
Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to
make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf. 相似文献
104.
Uko Zylstra 《Zygon》2004,39(1):175-191
A central thesis of intelligent‐design theorists is that physical and chemical laws and chance are insufficient to account for irreducibly complex biological structures and that intelligent design is necessary to account for such phenomena. This assertion, however, still implies a reductionist ontology. We need to recognize that reality displays multiple modes of being beyond simply chemical and physical modes of being, each of which is governed by laws for that mode of being. This essay argues for an alternate framework for understanding life phenomena that is neither philosophical materialism nor intelligent‐design theory. 相似文献
105.
John V. Apczynski 《Zygon》2005,40(1):77-88
Abstract. Because of similarities between some implications of Michael Polanyi's theory of personal knowledge and intelligent design, claims have been made that his theory provides support to the project of intelligent design. This essay contends that, when Polanyi's reflections on a Ideological framework for contextualizing evolutionary biology are properly understood as a heuristic vision, his position contrasts sharply with the empirical claims made on behalf of intelligent design. 相似文献
106.
John Lemos 《Zygon》2002,37(4):789-801
In Michael Ruse's recent publications, such as Taking Darwin Seriously (1998) and Evolutionary Naturalism (1995), he has advocated a certain sort of evolutionary epistemology and has argued that it implies a rejection of metaphysical realism (MR) in favor of a position that he calls "internal realism" (IR). Additionally, he has maintained that, insofar as his evolutionary epistemology implies a rejection of MR in favor of IR, it escapes the kind of argument against naturalism that Alvin Plantinga makes in his Warrant and Proper Function (1993). In this article I explain the relevant views and arguments of Ruse and Plantinga, and I critically engage with Ruse's views, arguing that (1) his case for rejecting MR has no essential connection to evolutionary considerations; (2) his case for rejecting MR depends upon internalist assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are in need of some kind of defense; and (3) given his implicit internalism and his commitment to IR, his argument for rejecting MR can be used against his IR. 相似文献
107.
John J. Davenport 《The Journal of Ethics》2002,6(3):235-259
This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza'smature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of``moral sanity.' This theory, presented in Responsibility andControl, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weakreasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication thatagents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can beresponsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still facesseveral problems. It does not allow sufficiently for non-psychoticagents (who are largely reasons-responsive) with localized beliefsand desires incompatible with full responsibility. Nor does it take intoaccount that practical ``fragmentation of the self' over time may alsoreduce competence, since moral sanity requires some minimum level ofnarrative unity in our plans and projects. Finally, I argue that actual-sequenceaccounts cannot adequately explain sane but weak-willed agency. This isbecause without libertarian freedom, such accounts have no way to modelthe perverse agent's determination to be irrational or weak. 相似文献
108.
109.
by Byron Kaldis 《Zygon》2009,44(1):169-196
I offer a critical exposition and reconstruction of Michael Oakeshott's views on natural science. The principal aim is to enrich Oakeshott's modal schema by throwing light on it in terms of its internal consistency and by bringing to bear on it recent developments in philosophy in general and the philosophy of science in particular. The discussion brings out the special place reserved for philosophy, the crucial tenet of the separateness of these modes seen as Leibnizian monads as well as the special status allowed to science. It considers the possibility of combining one moment of philosophical thinking, namely ethics, with science in the midst of such modal separateness. I first offer a general introduction of how to approach Oakeshott's views on science. The next section stresses philosophy and its relation to science. This is followed by an elaboration of what the modes of experience are meant to be and how science is placed among them. An examination of Oakeshott's more particular views on science concludes the essay. 相似文献
110.
by Elizabeth Corey 《Zygon》2009,44(1):139-151
Michael Oakeshott's religious view of the world stands behind much of his political and philosophical writing. In this essay I first discuss Oakeshott's view of religion and the mode of practice in his own terms. I attempt next to illuminate his idea of religion by describing it in less technical language, drawing upon other thinkers such as Georg Simmel and George Santayana, who share similar views. I then evaluate Oakeshott's view as a whole, considering whether his ideas about religion can stand up to careful scrutiny and whether they have value for present-day reflection on religion. 相似文献