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31.
Michael G. Efran 《Journal of research in personality》1974,8(1):45-54
Both an opinion survey and an experimental study were conducted. The survey revealed that substantial majorities of those polled believed (a) that a defendant's character and previous history should influence jurors' decision (79%) and (b) that the defendant's physical appearance should not bias these decisions (93%). The hypothesis, derived from a reinforcement model of interpersonal attraction and previous research on physical appearance, was that attractive defendants would be more positively evaluated than unattractive ones despite the seeming irrelevance of appearance to judicial decisions. The results of a simulated jury task were that physically attractive defendants were evaluated with less certainty of guilt (p < .05), less severe recommended punishment (p < .005), and greater attraction (p < .005), than were unattractive defendants. The importance of independent affective and cognitive components of the attraction process were emphasized. 相似文献
32.
Edwin C. Laurenson 《Zygon》2000,35(4):907-918
This article responds to Stanley J. Grenz's Templeton Lecture, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?” published in the June 2000 issue of Zygon (Grenz 2000). In the first part I outline my reasons for finding the kind of theological reflections in which Grenz engages worthy of attention by noting my disagreement with the view that a sufficient response to theological issues can be formulated on the basis of an examination of our biological nature. I assert, in that connection, the autonomy of reason as a way of investigating and understanding the world. In the second part I respond directly to Grenz by explaining my disagreement with the postmodern critique of science upon which he relies and his adherence to Christian eschatology as an answer to the conundrums into which, he posits, we are drawn as a result of that critique. I note that I agree with Grenz, however, that the activity of valuing is necessarily a forward‐looking Godlike endeavor that is not derivable from science. In the third part I suggest that we must be open to the investigation of the possible existence of an objective realm of value and that, in any case, rejection of the postmodern critique of science in many cases pro‐vides a sound basis for the disciplined resolution of factual questions that frequently lie at the base of disagreements about values. 相似文献
33.
Dale Jacquette 《Studia Logica》2006,82(3):337-343
If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist
mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics
of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically
possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as
maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite
in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then
whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or
characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that
the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally
consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all
nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal.
I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy
of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006. 相似文献
34.
35.
Walter B. Gulick 《Zygon》2005,40(1):89-96
Abstract. Michael Polanyi criticized the neo‐Darwinian synthesis on two grounds: that accidental hereditary changes bringing adaptive advantages cannot account for the rise of discontinuous new species, and that a Ideological ordering principle is needed to explain evolutionary advance. I commend the previous articles by John Apczynski and Richard Gelwick and also argue, more strongly than they, that Polanyi's critique of evolutionary theory is flawed. It relies on an inappropriate notion of progress and untenable analogies from the human process of scientific discovery and the fact that in physical systems minimal potential energy is most stable. Yet within a life of commitment to transcendent values humans can directly experience purpose and meaning, and in developing this notion Polanyi makes his greatest contribution to teleology. 相似文献
36.
Craig Scandrett‐Leatherman 《Zygon》2008,43(4):909-923
The 1904 World's Fair in St. Louis sponsored both an International Congress of Arts and Sciences aimed at unity of knowledge and an anthropology exhibit of diverse peoples. Jointly these represented a quest for unifying knowledge in a diverse world that was fractured by isolated specializations and segregated peoples. In historical perspective, the Congress's quest for knowledge is overshadowed by Ota Benga who was part of the anthropology exhibit. The 1904 World's Fair can be viewed as a Euro‐American ritual, a global pilgrimage, which sought to celebrate the advances and resolve the challenges of modernity and human diversity. Three years later Afropentecostalism dealt with these same issues with different methods and rituals. This ritual system became the most culturally diverse and fastest growing religious movement of the twentieth century. I suggest that the anthropological method of Frank Hamilton Cushing, the postcritical epistemology of Michael Polanyi, and the Afropente‐costal ritual movement initiated by William J. Seymour are all attempts to develop a postmodern epistemology that is simultaneously constructive, focused on discerning reality, and broad enough to allow for human consciousness and diverse human communities. I explore this confluence of scientific and participatory epistemology through six theses. 相似文献
37.
Margaret Gilbert 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):167-187
This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman. 相似文献
38.
Stephen Maitzen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(2):93-103
Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such
a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical
theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus
our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics object that skeptical theism
implies a degree of moral skepticism that even skeptical theists will find objectionable and that it undermines moral obligations
that even skeptical theists will want to preserve. I discuss a version of the first objection and defend a version of the
second. 相似文献
39.
In a recent article in this journal, Hellige (Brain and Cognition, 2, 199-203, 1983) presented a critique of the chimeric-face technique that was used by us to validate a hand preference questionnaire. Data were presented by Hellige to show that the left visual field (LVF) bias that occurs on this task is due primarily to differences in detail in the features of the two faces and not because of right hemisphere dominance for face perception. In our rebuttal, we acknowledge that the two faces are not mirror-image duplicates of each other, but contend that this fact does not explain why differences between left-handers and right-handers have been observed on this task. Further data on the role of handedness as well as other variables impacting on this task are presented. A possible explanation is also offered for the rather small extent of LVF bias that Hellige obtained when he used corrected (i.e., true mirror-image) versions of Jaynes' chimeric faces. 相似文献
40.