Race effects in modifying cognitive impulsivity through self-instruction and modeling.

Seven-year-old children, identified as impulsive on the basis of MFF performance, were given a training program intended to modify their impulsivity through modeling and self-instruction. All the subjects were of comparable intelligence, social class, geographic residence, and were matched on sex. The 40 experimental subjects were paired on the basis of race. Half the pairs were trained by white models and half by black models. While the results do not provide unequivocal support for the effectiveness of such training, they do demonstrate selective changes in impulsivity based upon racial similarities of models and subjects. The construct validity of the MFF as a measure of reflection-impulsivity and the relevance of social class membership is discussed.     

Characteristics of taste-mediated environmental potentiation in rats

When rats drink a novel flavor in a distinctive environment and are injected with lithium, potentiated aversions are established to the environment as evidenced by the animals' unwillingness to consume a familiar, nonaversive flavor in this environment. Experiment 1 demonstrates that this potentiation is due to the presence of both the distinctive taste and the environmental cues on the conditioning trials, not simply aversive conditioning to each element or to generalization between the two elements. This potentiation phenomenon was shown to be sensitive to the novelty of the potentiating flavor in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 demonstrated that second-order conditioning is difficult to establish using these procedures, although Experiment 4 revealed that postconditioning extinction of the aversive flavor interfered substantially with environmental potentiation. These outcomes are discussed in terms of their implications for adaptive adjustments in feeding behavior as well as for more general conceptions of associative learning.     

Imitation as a function of response commonality,serial order,and vicarious punishment

The effects of response commonality, serial order of modeled responses, and vicarious punishment on young boys' recall and acceptance of 20 commodity prefereces of an adult were examined in a 2 (common dimension vs no-common dimension) × 2 (vicarious punishment vs no-vicarious consequences) × 2 (recall or acceptance test) × 5 (response-block) factorial experiment. As predicted, the presence of a common dimension resulted in improved recall of the modeled responses, vicarious punishment was more effective under common dimension than no-common dimension conditions, and a serial order effect for recall of the modeled responses was obtained. The overall pattern of results is discussed in terms of the conceptualization that imitation requires both that the observer (1) has acquired and retained the model's responses and (2) has been placed in circumstances which favor activating this learning into overt performance.     

Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action

Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational permissibility that Smith wants to capture. Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf.     

Intelligent-Design Theory: An Argument for Biotic Laws

A central thesis of intelligent‐design theorists is that physical and chemical laws and chance are insufficient to account for irreducibly complex biological structures and that intelligent design is necessary to account for such phenomena. This assertion, however, still implies a reductionist ontology. We need to recognize that reality displays multiple modes of being beyond simply chemical and physical modes of being, each of which is governed by laws for that mode of being. This essay argues for an alternate framework for understanding life phenomena that is neither philosophical materialism nor intelligent‐design theory.     

THE DISCOVERY OF MEANING THROUGH SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS FORMS OF INDWELLING

Abstract. Because of similarities between some implications of Michael Polanyi's theory of personal knowledge and intelligent design, claims have been made that his theory provides support to the project of intelligent design. This essay contends that, when Polanyi's reflections on a Ideological framework for contextualizing evolutionary biology are properly understood as a heuristic vision, his position contrasts sharply with the empirical claims made on behalf of intelligent design.     

Theism, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Two Theories of Truth

In Michael Ruse's recent publications, such as Taking Darwin Seriously (1998) and Evolutionary Naturalism (1995), he has advocated a certain sort of evolutionary epistemology and has argued that it implies a rejection of metaphysical realism (MR) in favor of a position that he calls "internal realism" (IR). Additionally, he has maintained that, insofar as his evolutionary epistemology implies a rejection of MR in favor of IR, it escapes the kind of argument against naturalism that Alvin Plantinga makes in his Warrant and Proper Function (1993). In this article I explain the relevant views and arguments of Ruse and Plantinga, and I critically engage with Ruse's views, arguing that (1) his case for rejecting MR has no essential connection to evolutionary considerations; (2) his case for rejecting MR depends upon internalist assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are in need of some kind of defense; and (3) given his implicit internalism and his commitment to IR, his argument for rejecting MR can be used against his IR.     

OAKESHOTT ON SCIENCE AS A MODE OF EXPERIENCE

I offer a critical exposition and reconstruction of Michael Oakeshott's views on natural science. The principal aim is to enrich Oakeshott's modal schema by throwing light on it in terms of its internal consistency and by bringing to bear on it recent developments in philosophy in general and the philosophy of science in particular. The discussion brings out the special place reserved for philosophy, the crucial tenet of the separateness of these modes seen as Leibnizian monads as well as the special status allowed to science. It considers the possibility of combining one moment of philosophical thinking, namely ethics, with science in the midst of such modal separateness. I first offer a general introduction of how to approach Oakeshott's views on science. The next section stresses philosophy and its relation to science. This is followed by an elaboration of what the modes of experience are meant to be and how science is placed among them. An examination of Oakeshott's more particular views on science concludes the essay.     

RELIGION AND THE MODE OF PRACTICE IN MICHAEL OAKESHOTT

Michael Oakeshott's religious view of the world stands behind much of his political and philosophical writing. In this essay I first discuss Oakeshott's view of religion and the mode of practice in his own terms. I attempt next to illuminate his idea of religion by describing it in less technical language, drawing upon other thinkers such as Georg Simmel and George Santayana, who share similar views. I then evaluate Oakeshott's view as a whole, considering whether his ideas about religion can stand up to careful scrutiny and whether they have value for present-day reflection on religion.