The anachronism of moral individualism and the responsibility of extended agency

Recent social theory has departed from methodological individualism’s explanation of action according to the motives and dispositions of human individuals in favor of explanation in terms of broader agencies consisting of both human and nonhuman elements described as cyborgs, actor-networks, extended agencies, or distributed cognition. This paper proposes that moral responsibility for action also be vested in extended agencies. It advances a consequentialist view of responsibility that takes moral responsibility to be a species of causal responsibility, and it answers objections that might be raised on the basis of intentions and deserts.

Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural

There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment. It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow for the possibility of supernatural entities.

Biases in research evaluation: Inflated assessment, oversight, or error-type weighting?

Reviewers of research are more lenient when evaluating studies on important topics [Wilson, T. D., Depaulo, B. M., Mook, D. G., & Klaaren, K. J. (1993). Scientists’ evaluations of research: the biasing effects of the importance of the topic. Psychological Science, 4(5), 323-325]. Three experiments (N = 145, 36, and 91 psychologists) investigated different explanations of leniency, including inflation of assessments (applying a heuristic associating importance with quality), oversight (failing to detect flaws), and error-weighting (prioritizing Type II error avoidance). In Experiment 1, psychologists evaluated the publishability and rigor of studies in a 2 (topic importance) × 2 (accuracy motivation) × 2 (research domain) design. Experiment 2 featured an exact replication of Wilson et al. and suggested that report length moderated the effects of importance on perceived rigor, but not on publishability. In Experiment 3, a manipulation of error-weighting replaced the manipulation of domain (Experiment 1). Results favored error-weighting, rather than inflation or oversight. Perceived seriousness of Type II error (in Experiments 1 and 3) and the error-weighting manipulation (in Experiment 3) predicted study evaluations.     

Ontological individualism reconsidered

The thesis of methodological individualism in social science is commonly divided into two different claims—explanatory individualism and ontological individualism. Ontological individualism is the thesis that facts about individuals exhaustively determine social facts. Initially taken to be a claim about the identity of groups with sets of individuals or their properties, ontological individualism has more recently been understood as a global supervenience claim. While explanatory individualism has remained controversial, ontological individualism thus understood is almost universally accepted. In this paper I argue that ontological individualism is false. Only if the thesis is weakened to the point that it is equivalent to physicalism can it be true, but then it fails to be a thesis about the determination of social facts by facts about individual persons. Even when individualistic facts are expanded to include people’s local environments and practices, I shall argue, those still underdetermine the social facts that obtain. If true, this has implications for explanation as well as ontology. I first consider arguments against the local supervenience of social facts on facts about individuals, correcting some flaws in existing arguments and affirming that local supervenience fails for a broad set of social properties. I subsequently apply a similar approach to defeat a particularly weak form of global supervenience, and consider potential responses. Finally, I explore why it is that people have taken ontological individualism to be true.     

Methodological concerns in moral judgement research: Severity of harm shapes moral decisions

Research on moral judgement traditionally deals with scenarios involving trade-offs between saving lives and causing harm or death. In the field of moral psychology and philosophy, these specific scenarios are regularly used jointly, regardless of the severity of harm. We predicted that the confounding between distinct phrasings involving different degrees of harm will have an impact on the frequency of utilitarian judgements regardless of the mere moral value of the action (as usually investigated in the moral judgement field). In line with this prediction, a first experiment showed that utilitarian responses were less frequent for conflicting moral scenarios that involved death, as compared to scenarios that involved non-lethal harm. A second experiment showed that participants' utilitarian responses decreased as the severity of harm increased. Experimental studies on moral reasoning should take greater care to avoid potential confounds associated with this content factor.     

Is an outgroup member in need a friend indeed? Personal and task‐oriented contact as predictors of intergroup prosocial behavior

Intergroup contact, particularly close personal contact, has been shown to improve intergroup relations, mainly by reducing negative attitudes and emotions toward outgroups. We argue that contact can also increase intergroup prosocial behavior. More specifically, we predict that different forms of contact will differentially impact on prosocial behavior directed at individual outgroup members and outgroups as a whole. Data of two studies (N₁ = 264, N₂ = 185), conducted with workgroups in two organizations, show that personal contact is a better predictor of prosocial behavior directed at individual outgroup members, whereas task‐oriented contact is a better predictor of prosocial behavior directed at an outgroup as a whole. Additionally, Study 2 provides evidence that empathy mediates the path from personal contact to individual‐directed prosocial behavior, whereas reward (but not cost) considerations mediate the path from task‐oriented contact to outgroup‐directed prosocial behavior. Implications for research on intergroup contact and prosocial behavior are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Situating maltreatment in the social context: Challenges for research

This article is a reply to Kagan’s (in press) commentary on our earlier article (Luke & Banerjee, 2013), which presented a meta-analysis and systematic review of research on the links between childhood maltreatment and social understanding. We address Kagan’s comments about the depiction of maltreatment as an isolated independent variable, and consider the specific obstacles faced by researchers in this area when seeking to understand the role played by social–contextual factors. We also consider how Kagan’s extension of our argument about heterogeneity in maltreated samples might usefully be applied to future research with this vulnerable group.     

Sociologizing metaphysics and mind: A pragmatist point of view on the methodology of the social sciences

There are realist philosophers and social scientists who believe in the indispensability of social ontology. However, we argue that certain pragmatist outlines for inquiry open more fruitful roads to empirical research than such ontologizing perspectives. The pragmatist conceptual tools in a Darwinian vein—concepts like action, habit, coping and community—are in a particularly stark contrast with, for instance, the Searlean and Chomskian metaphysics of human being. In particular, we bring Searle’s realist philosophy of society and mind under critical survey in this paper and contrast it with a pragmatist, sociologizing approach. Drawing from Dewey, James, and recent antirepresentationalism, we propose for research work a methodological relationalism of its own kind, altogether detached from the ontologies of society and mind.