The affective costs of overconfidence

Positive illusions, though often beneficial (Taylor & Brown, 1988 ), can diminish the pleasure of outcomes. This prediction follows from decision affect theory. We investigated this prediction by measuring the confidence that recreational basketball players felt while making shots and the pleasure they felt with subsequent outcomes. Results showed that most players were overconfident. Those who were more overconfident tended to experience less enjoyment with their outcomes. Using individual parameter estimates from decision affect theory, we estimated how each player would have felt if their self assessments had been accurate. For the vast majority, better calibration would have led to greater pleasure. In a second study, we randomly assigned players to a debiasing treatment condition or a control condition. Relative to the control players, debiased players were better calibrated and derived greater average pleasure from the task. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

跨通道信源检测错觉的实验研究

本研究探讨跨通道信源检测错觉的特点。实验中将简单、无关且易产生视觉和听觉想像的事件随机以看、听、想像看和想像听的一种或两种组合方式让被试感受 ,2天后以视检测、听检测和全检测三种方式判断信源 ,结果均发现跨通道信源检测错觉 ,且信源判断受检测方式影响 ,知觉信息在源检测中具有更大的抗干扰性。研究结果支持信源检测理论。本文最后讨论了信源检测错觉的机制     

Consciously monitored grasping is vulnerable to perceptual intrusions

The idea of functional differentiation between vision-for-action and vision-for-perception has been supported by evidence from different domains. According to this account, perception is based on consciously accessible, relative representations, whereas vision-for-action is performed in an analytic, automatic manner. Support for this idea comes from studies that showed that unlike perception, grasping movements are refractory to illusions and to Weber’s law. Yet, interactions between the systems may occur when an action is performed in a less automated fashion. To test this idea, we asked participants to monitor their fingers apertures in flight and to halt their movement for a short duration when they felt that their aperture reached a maximum amount. The results showed that movements in the monitored condition were biased by the Ponzo illusion and showed atypical adherence to Weber's law. These results show that action and perception are more likely to interact when movements are performed in a controlled manner.     

Examining the robustness of the relationship between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias

We recently found a positive relationship between estimates of metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. However, this relationship was only examined on a within-subject level and required binarizing the confidence scale, a technique that introduces methodological difficulties. Here we examined the robustness of the positive relationship between estimates of metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias by conducting two different types of analyses. First, we developed a new within-subject analysis technique where the original n-point confidence scale is transformed into two different (n-1)-point scales in a way that mimics a naturalistic change in confidence. Second, we examined the across-subject correlation between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. Importantly, for both types of analyses, we not only established the direction of the effect but also computed effect sizes. We applied both techniques to the data from three tasks from the Confidence Database (N > 400 in each). We found that both approaches revealed a small to medium positive relationship between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. These results demonstrate that the positive relationship between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias is robust across several analysis techniques and datasets, and have important implications for future research.     

In defense of the one-factor doxastic account: A phenomenal account of delusions

According to the doxastic model, delusions are beliefs. In the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings mistaken for beliefs. I argue that endorsement of false second-order beliefs could also create unpleasant dissonance, that mentally healthy people often endorse irrational or conflicting beliefs, and that the lack of delusion-motivated action can be explained by the influence of nonbelief factors on action. The two-factor doxastic model posits irrationality as necessary, and one metric of rationality many scholars employ is whether a response is easily understood by folk psychology. A precedent for folk-psychological acceptance of contextually bizarre beliefs as a result of personal experience can already be found in the lack of imaginative resistance encountered not in response to the impossibilities portrayed in speculative fiction, but in response to the characters’ ability to incorporate these occurrences into their mental frameworks, despite them often being at odds with these characters’ bedrock understanding of the world.     

Epistemic emotions: Cognitive underpinnings and relations with metacognitive feelings

The aim of this paper is to review research on epistemic emotions in learning. The emphasis is not only on the cognitive states that give rise to epistemic emotions but also on the dynamics of epistemic emotions in complex learning situations. The interrelations between epistemic emotions and their interactions with affective states and metacognitive experiences are also explored. The position put forth is that epistemic emotions are triggered by cognitive states involving discrepancy, or conflict, between active schemas and incoming information, or gap in one's knowledge. However, each of the epistemic emotions has its specific triggering conditions that differentiate it from the others. Changing conditions during a cognitive endeavor impact the intensity as well as the interrelations between epistemic emotions. Also, there are relations between epistemic emotions and metacognitive experiences such as feeling of difficulty or confidence, albeit not so strong. The implications for future research are discussed.