Recall of details never experienced: Effects of age,repetition, and semantic cues

To test theoretical predictions about the role of meaning connections in false memory, the effects of semantic cues and list repetition on children's false memories were evaluated across early childhood to mid-adolescence using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. True recall and false recall increased from 7 to 13 years. Study list repetition increased true recall of list words with the magnitude of this effect largest in the older children and adolescents. Repetition reduced false recall of critical lures in all age groups. Consistent with theoretical predictions, false recall of critical lures increased when children were informed of the thematic gist of each list prior to study.     

The public's probabilistic numeracy: How tasks,education and exposure to games of chance shape it

As we navigate a world full of uncertainties and risks, dominated by statistics, we need to be able to think statistically. Very few studies investigating people's ability to understand simple concepts and rules from probability theory have drawn representative samples from the public. For this reason we investigated a representative sample of 1000 Swiss citizens, using six probabilistic problems. Most reasoned appropriately in problems representing pure applications of probability theory, but failed to do so in approximations of real‐world scenarios – a disparity we replicated in a sample of first‐year psychology students. Additionally, education is associated with probabilistic numeracy in the former but not the latter type of problems. We discuss possible reasons for these task disparities and suggest that gaining a comprehensive picture of citizens' probabilistic competence and its determinants requires using both types of tasks. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness

A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.     

The roles of thought suppression and metacognitive beliefs in proneness to auditory verbal hallucinations in a non-clinical sample

In a non-clinical sample (N = 751), we investigated relations among two subscales (self-reported intrusiveness of unwanted thoughts and thought suppression) of the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI), metacognitive beliefs, and proneness to auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs). Both subscales of the WBSI were found to be related to AVH-proneness and strongly positively related to metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts. Regression analyses were used to test models of the relations among AVH-proneness and a range of metacognitive beliefs. When the WBSI subscale relating to the self-reported intrusiveness of unwanted thoughts was controlled for, the metacognitive style that was the strongest predictor of AVH-proneness was cognitive self-consciousness. Cognitive confidence and beliefs about the uncontrollability of thoughts were also significant predictors of AVH-proneness. These findings are used to revise existing models of the relations between metacognitive beliefs and AVHs. Implications for the management of AVHs are discussed.     

Not so above average after all: When people believe they are worse than average and its implications for theories of bias in social comparison

Recent research calls into question the generally accepted conclusion that people believe themselves to be better than average. This paper reviews the new theories that have been proposed to explain the fact that better-than-average effects are isolated to common behaviors and abilities, and that people believe themselves to be below average with respect to rare behaviors and uncommon abilities. These new theories are then used to revisit prior findings of better-than-average effects. When viewed in light of recent work, the evidence suggests that prior findings overstated the degree to which people engage in self-enhancement by believing that they are better than others when in fact they are not. Prior studies have often confounded desirability with commonness and have used subjective measures of comparative judgment that capitalize on people’s tendency to conflate relative with absolute self-evaluation.     

How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunctive statement B‐and‐A to be more probable than a constituent B, in contrast to the law of probability that P(B ∧ A) cannot exceed P(B) or P(A). Researchers see this fallacy as demonstrating that people do not follow probability theory when judging conjunctive probability. This paper shows that the conjunction fallacy can be explained by the standard probability theory equation for conjunction if we assume random variation in the constituent probabilities used in that equation. The mathematical structure of this equation is such that random variation will be most likely to produce the fallacy when one constituent has high probability and the other low, when there is positive conditional support between the constituents, when there are two rather than three constituents, and when people rank probabilities rather than give numerical estimates. The conjunction fallacy has been found to occur most frequently in exactly these situations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

记忆研究的新取向

传统的记忆心理学实验研究,其理念是数量取向的,将记忆隐喻为储藏室;而在近期,记忆研究的理念正朝着准确取向转变,关注记忆是否与实际对应符合。文章对准确取向记忆研究的基本特征予以归纳和分析,并对其涉及的现象、问题和理论进行了介绍。     

A multidimensional scaling model for the size-weight illusion

The kinds of individual differences in perceptions permitted by the weighted euclidean model for multidimensional scaling (e.g., INDSCAL) are much more restricted than those allowed by Tucker's Three-mode Multidimensional Scaling (TMMDS) model or Carroll's Idiosyncratic Scaling (IDIOSCAL) model. Although, in some situations the more general models would seem desirable, investigators have been reluctant to use them because they are subject to transformational indeterminacies which complicate interpretation. In this article, we show how these indeterminacies can be removed by constructing specific models of the phenomenon under investigation. As an example of this approach, a model of the size-weight illusion is developed and applied to data from two experiments, with highly meaningful results. The same data are also analyzed using INDSCAL. Of the two solutions, only the one obtained by using the size-weight model allows examination of individual differences in the strength of the illusion; INDSCAL can not represent such differences. In this sample, however, individual differences in illusion strength turn out to be minor. Hence the INDSCAL solution, while less informative than the size-weight solution, is nonetheless easily interpretable.This paper is based on the first author's doctoral dissertation at the Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The aid of Professor Ledyard R Tucker is gratefully acknowledged.     

The Analytic Truth and Falsity of Disjunctions

Disjunctive inferences are difficult. According to the theory of mental models, it is because of the alternative possibilities to which disjunctions refer. Three experiments corroborated further predictions of the mental model theory. Participants judged that disjunctions, such as Either this year is a leap year or it is a common year are true. Given a disjunction such as Either A or B, they tended to evaluate the four cases in its ‘partition’: A and B, A and not‐B, not‐A and B, not‐A and not‐B, as ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’ in ways that bore out the difference between inclusive disjunctions (‘or both’) and exclusive disjunctions (‘but not both’). Knowledge usually concerns what is true, and so when participants judge that a disjunction is false, or contingent, and evaluate the cases in its partition, they depend on inferences that yield predictable errors. They tended to judge that disjunctions, such as follows: Either the food is cold or else it is tepid, but not both, are true, though in fact they could be false. They tended to infer ‘mirror‐image’ evaluations that yield the same possibilities for false disjunctions as those for true disjunctions. The article considers the implications of these results for alternative theories based on classical logic or on the probability calculus.