Do military decision makers behave as predicted by prospect theory?

Four experiments were conducted to explore the robustness of risky choice framing among military decision makers. In the first experiment the original version of the Asian disease problem was administered. In contrast to Tversky and Kahneman's ( 1981 ) original findings, military decision makers were not influenced by the gain and loss framing. They demonstrated risk‐seeking behavior in both domains. In the second experiment, we administered a military version of the Asian disease problem. We found a significant framing effect, but it was unidirectional: The decision makers were risk seeking in both domains, but significantly more risk seeking in the loss domain. To explore the strength of this risk‐seeking preference, we altered the problem in a third experiment, making the risky alternative 12.5% less attractive than the certain one. Again, we found risk‐seeking behavior in both domains. Finally, we explored reasons for these deviations from prospect theory by comparing the responses of business students and military officers. In this analysis, we observed significantly higher levels of self‐efficacy in the military sample, as compared to the civil sample, and that the self‐efficacy influenced risk seeking only in the military sample. In a post hoc analysis we also found that years of education reduced risk‐seeking preference. Implications and directions for future research are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Media framing of proposed nuclear reactors: An analysis of print media

Nuclear energy has received substantial recent attention, marketed as a ‘green’ solution to global climate change (GCC) with calls for new reactors. However, considerable debate exists about whether it represents a viable solution to GCC. Given the complexity and urgency of the issue, a full and balanced debate is desirable. Since media play an important role in shaping public perception, we examined print media coverage of proposed reactors in Georgia—one site in the southeastern United States, which has been the focus of such proposals. We analysed the content of editorials and news articles from two local newspapers—the Augusta Chronicle and Atlanta Journal‐Constitution. The former exclusively published pro‐nuclear opinion pieces whereas the latter published a mix of pro‐ and anti‐nuclear opinions. The majority of news articles in both newspapers generally presented balanced arguments. Pro‐ and anti‐nuclear arguments most often reflected economic and environmental benefits and risks, whereas informational text primarily detailed regulatory processes and financing. Findings suggested that informational text was not necessarily ‘neutral’, sometimes masking covert pro‐ and anti‐nuclear content. Implications for how findings might shape public opinion and strategies for shaping media and extending public deliberation are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do-no-harm in coalition formation: Why losses inhibit exclusion and promote fairness cognitions

Previous research on coalition formation has established that people will not hesitate to exclude others in order to maximize their payoff. The authors propose that this view is too narrow and that the decision to exclude depends on the valence of the payoff. Consistent with a “do-no-harm” hypothesis, Experiment 1 showed that participants were more reluctant to exclude in order to minimize their losses than to maximize their gains. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and showed that participants were most affected by payoff valence when they were disposed to consider the viewpoint of others. Additional analyses revealed that participants were more motivated by fairness (Experiment 1) and that fairness was more cognitively accessible (Experiment 2) when payoffs were negative rather than positive.     

Looking back versus looking ahead: framing of time and work at different stages of a project

Progress on a well‐defined project can be described along a task dimension in terms of amount done, or as amount of work still to be completed. Time‐limited projects can also be described on a temporal dimension in terms of time spent versus time left. Five experiments are reported showing that such frames have predictable implications for speakers as well as for listeners: Statements by a team leader about time spent and work left are perceived as suggestions to “hurry up,” whereas complementary statements about work done and time left indicate that the team can take it more easy. The first set of statements further implies that the team is behind schedule, whereas the last two statements suggest that the team is ahead of the plan. In line with this, speakers preferred work done and time left statements when they were ahead of schedule, but not when they were behind. “Hurry up” and “behind schedule” interpretations were also shown to be dependent upon stage, being more prominent in the final stages than during the initial stages of a project. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of the Media's Framing of Supreme Court Procedures on Perceptions of Fairness

The tendency of the media to depict the Supreme Court as inherently apolitical, some scholars argue, is part of the reason that many believe in the "myth of legality" in which the Court is perceived to operate above the ideological skirmishes of everyday politics. Our experimental analyses show that citizens react more negatively to press reports of a politically motivated Court than they do to coverage portraying a Court that strictly follows legal guidelines. Interestingly, our results also suggest that it is not so much the perceived absence of political wrangling among justices but rather it is the presence of legal guidelines driving the outcome that is the source of the perception of fairness.     

Persuading young car drivers to take part in a driving skills test: The influence of regulatory fit on informational-assessment value and persuasion

Two studies were conducted to examine the relative effectiveness of differently framed messages advising young car drivers to take part in a driving skills test. It was hypothesized that messages promoting such detection behaviour should be more persuasive when the message frame was compatible versus incompatible with the recipient’s level of perceived risk. It was also hypothesized that such effects would occur because the “feeling right” experience resulting from the compatibility effects based on regulatory fit could be transferred to the informational-assessment value of the proposed feedback. Consistently, moderate perceived driving skills (Experiment 1) and high perceived risk drivers (Experiment 2) found the driving skills test more valuable for assessment purposes after having read a loss versus gain framed message and consequently, were more interested in taking part in the test. Furthermore, low perceived risk drivers (Experiment 2) showed a reversed pattern of responses. Implications for message framing in the road safety area are discussed.     

Framing experts' (dis)agreements about uncertain environmental events

Agreements and disagreements between expert statements influence lay people's beliefs. But few studies have examined what is perceived as a disagreement. We report six experiments where people rated agreement between pairs of probabilistic statements about environmental events, attributed to two different experts or to the same expert at two different points in time. The statements differed in frame, by focusing on complementary outcomes (45% probability that smog will have negative health effects vs. 55% probability that it will not have such effects), in probability level (45% vs. 55% probability of negative effects), or in both respects. Opposite frames strengthened disagreement when combined with different probability levels. Approximate probabilities can be “framed” in yet another way by indicating reference values they are “over” or “under”. Statements that use different directional verbal terms (over vs. under 50%) indicated greater disagreement than statements with the same directional term but different probability levels (over 50% vs. over 70%). Framing and directional terms similarly affected consistency judgments when both statements were issued by the same expert at different occasions. The effect of framing on perceived agreement was significant for medium (10 and 20 percentage points) differences between probabilities, whereas the effect of directional term was stable for numerical differences up to 40 percentage points. To emphasize agreement between different estimates, they should be framed in the same way. To accentuate disagreements or changes of opinion, opposite framings should be used.     

What shapes the probability weighting function? Influence of affect,numeric competencies,and information formats

Research suggests that people are less sensitive to variations in probability in affect‐rich compared with affect‐poor risky choices. This effect is modeled by a more curved probability weighting function (PWF). We investigated the role of different numeric competencies and the effectiveness of several intervention strategies to decrease this affect‐laden probability distortion. In two experiments, we manipulated the affect‐richness of a risky prospect. In Experiment 1 (N = 467), we measured numeracy and symbolic‐number mapping (i.e., the ability to accurately map numbers onto their underlying magnitudes). The affect‐based manipulations showed the expected effects only in participants with more accurate symbolic‐number mapping, who also reported more differentiated emotional reactions to the various probabilities and displayed more linear PWFs. Instructions to focus on the probability information decreased probability distortion and revealed differences in the use of probability information on the basis of symbolic‐number mapping ability. In Experiment 2 (N = 417), we manipulated the format in which the probability information was presented: using visual aids versus no visual aids and a positive frame (e.g., one person wins) versus combined frame (e.g., one person wins and 99 persons do not win). The affect‐based manipulations had no effect but both the visual aids and combined frame decreased probability distortion. Whereas affect‐richness manipulations require further research, results suggest that probability weighting is at least partially driven by the inability to translate numerical information into meaningful and well‐calibrated affective intuitions. Visual aids and simple framing manipulations designed to calibrate these intuitions can help decision makers extract the gist and increase sensitivity to probabilities.     

Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision.

In the companion paper (Towards a “sophisticated” model of belief dynamics. Part I), a general framework for realistic modelling of instantaneous states of belief and of the operations involving them was presented and motivated. In this paper, the framework is applied to the case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall be obtained which, firstly, recovers the Gärdenfors postulates in a well-specified, natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated revisions, recovering several proposed revision operators for iterated revision as special cases; and finally, offers an analysis of Rott’s recent counterexample to several Gärdenfors postulates [32], elucidating in what sense it fails to be one of the special cases to which these postulates apply.