Ratio Bias and Policy Preferences: How Equivalency Framing of Numbers Can Affect Attitudes

Numbers permeate modern political communication. While current scholarship on framing effects has focused on the persuasive effects of words and arguments, this article shows that framing of numbers can also substantially affect policy preferences. Such effects are caused by ratio bias, which is a general tendency to focus on numerators and pay insufficient attention to denominators in ratios. Using a population‐based survey experiment, I demonstrate how differently framed but logically equivalent representations of the exact same numerical value can have large effects on citizens' preferences regarding salient political issues such as education and taxes. Furthermore, the effects of numerical framing are found across most groups of the population, largely regardless of their political predisposition and their general ability to understand and use numerical information. These findings have significant implications for our understanding of framing effects and the role played by numbers in public opinion formation.     

劝捐策略和框架效应对个体捐赠决策的影响

采用两个3×2完全随机实验设计,考察劝捐策略和目标框架效应对个体捐赠决策的影响,结果表明：（1）劝捐策略和目标框架效应的主效应显著,信用劝捐被试捐赠更多,决策时间更短,损失目标框架比收益目标框架的被试决策时间更短,捐赠更多,被试在信用X损失框架情境中捐赠最多,反应时最短;（2）劝捐策略和框架效应的交互效应均显著,情感策略受框架效应影响较大,在损失框架下被试反应时更短,捐赠更多。     

Reflections of the self: how self‐esteem determines decision framing and increases risk taking

Historically, research examining the influence of individual personality factors on decision processing has been sparse. In this paper we investigate how one important individual aspect, self‐esteem, influences imposition and subsequent processing of ambiguously, negatively or positively framed decision tasks. We hypothesized that low self‐esteem individuals would impose a negative frame onto ambiguous decision problems and would be especially sensitive to negatively framed decision tasks. In Study 1 we utilized a self‐framing procedure and demonstrated that HSE participants were evenly divided in the hedonic valence they self‐imposed whereas LSE participants were more likely to self‐impose a negative frame. When these differences were accounted for, HSE and LSE participants were equivalent in risk seeking/avoiding choices. Study 2 used a risky‐choice framing task and found that LSE individuals were especially sensitive to the negative frame. Study 3, provided converging evidence and generalization of these findings to a reflection tasks involving money. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

决策中的框架效应再探

框架效应是指对相同决策任务不同方式的描述会影响决策者对备择选项的认知．大量研究已证实了框架效应的存在。本研究采用经典的“海难”问题,进一步探讨了决策任务中的框架效应。结果发现,在生命问题和财产问题中均没有发现框架效应的存在。在面对生命问题时,总体上人们倾向于冒险;在面对财产问题时,总体上倾向于保守。另外在面对生命问题时,女生比男生更倾向于冒险。     

Cheating: One common morality for gains and losses but two components of morality itself

Previous studies show that decision makers (DMs) lie more to avoid a loss than achieve a gain. Two compelling mechanisms might explain this observation. One assumes that lying is a risky activity and relates to the shape of the monetary value function described by prospect theory, which assumes (a) increased risk taking for loss frames and (b) an asymmetry between the perceived values of losses and gains. The other relates to the importance of self-esteem functions as expressed in self-concept maintenance models, self-esteem issues being weighed against monetary issues. This alternative explanation assumes that a loss frame serves as a factor lowering moral considerations. We report an experimental study presenting sets of lotteries to DMs, once in a moral context and once in a traditional probabilistic context. The results show that DMs take less risk when lotteries are presented in a moral context. It is also shown that DMs take more risk for losses than gains, this holding for both the moral and probabilistic contexts. This latter result suggests that loss/gain asymmetry can be completely explained by prospect theory factors, and framing makes no difference to the valuing of moral considerations.     

Temporal framing and the hidden‐zero effect: rate‐dependent outcomes on delay discounting

Recent research suggests that presenting time intervals as units (e.g., days) or as specific dates, can modulate the degree to which humans discount delayed outcomes. Another framing effect involves explicitly stating that choosing a smaller–sooner reward is mutually exclusive to receiving a larger–later reward, thus presenting choices as an extended sequence. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 201) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed the Monetary Choice Questionnaire in a 2 (delay framing) by 2 (zero framing) design. Regression suggested a main effect of delay, but not zero, framing after accounting for other demographic variables and manipulations. We observed a rate‐dependent effect for the date‐framing group, such that those with initially steep discounting exhibited greater sensitivity to the manipulation than those with initially shallow discounting. Subsequent analyses suggest these effects cannot be explained by regression to the mean. Experiment 2 addressed the possibility that the null effect of zero framing was due to within‐subject exposure to the hidden‐ and explicit‐zero conditions. A new Amazon Mechanical Turk sample completed the Monetary Choice Questionnaire in either hidden‐ or explicit‐zero formats. Analyses revealed a main effect of reward magnitude, but not zero framing, suggesting potential limitations to the generality of the hidden‐zero effect.     

Are Two Reasons Better Than One? The Role of Appeal Type in Consumer Responses to Sustainable Products

In the face of the growing prevalence of multiple appeals to sustainable consumption in marketers’ sustainable product communications, we examine the efficacy, in terms of consumer reactions, of adding an extrinsic appeal (e.g., “Purchase this green product to save money!”) to an intrinsic appeal (e.g., “Purchase this green product to save the environment!”) based communication for a sustainable product. Three studies provide support for our basic assertion that, compared to an intrinsic appeal, joint appeals (i.e., an intrinsic and extrinsic appeal together) reduce consumer preference for sustainable products. As well, these studies demonstrate that this adverse effect of joint appeals is based on a lowering of consumers’ attributions of the company's sustainability efforts to intrinsic motives (e.g., to the company's genuine concern for the environment). Finally, not all consumers react adversely to joint appeals; relative to intrinsic appeals, such appeals increase, rather than decrease, the intrinsic attributions and sustainable product preferences for consumers with lower involvement with sustainable consumption.     

Cognition in moral space: A minimal model

We describe moral cognition as a process occurring in a distinctive cognitive space, wherein moral relationships are defined along several morally relevant dimensions. After identifying candidate dimensions, we show how moral judgments can emerge in this space directly from object perception, without any appeal to moral rules or abstract values. Our reductive “minimal model” (Batterman & Rice, 2014) elaborates Beal’s (2020) claim that moral cognition is determined, at the most basic level, by “ontological frames” defining subjects, objects, and the proper relation between them. We expand this claim into a set of formal hypotheses that predict moral judgments based on how objects are “framed” in the relevant dimensions of “moral space.”