Mental Health Utilization Among Diverse Parenting Young Couples

Mental health issues often become apparent as adolescents emerge into young adulthood. The use of mental health services is low among adolescents and young adults, and use is particularly low among minorities. In this study, we examine mental health utilization among diverse young parenting couples. The sample consisted of 296 couples. We used the social–personal framework to examine personal, family, partner relationship, and environmental predictors for using mental health services. We used the Actor–Partner Interdependence Model to assess actor and partner effects on mental health utilization. We also examined moderator effects for gender and internalizing and externalizing behaviors. We found that being female, being White, higher income, more conduct problems, and less anxious romantic attachment predicted mental health utilization. Significant moderator effects included depression × gender, depression × medical insurance, and stress × Latino. Implications for community mental health practice include conducting mental health assessments during medical visits and systematic mental health follow‐up for individuals and couples with identified mental health and support needs. Future research should include married couples and the spouse’s influence on mental health use and examine relevant parenting factors that may also predict mental health utilization among couples.     

Predicting Political Biases Against the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party Movements

Accusations of hypocrisy have flown against both supporters and opponents of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Tea Party movements. Integrating the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), a newly devised model of political judgment, with political tolerance research, we find that how the political activities of OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are described determines whether or not biases against these groups emerge among people low and high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). Specifically, people low in RWA were more biased against the Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against OWS than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. These findings further support the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness, not right‐wing orientation, determines biases in political judgment.     

The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections

How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along.     

Judging the Goring Ox: Retribution Directed Toward Animals

Prior research on the psychology of retribution is complicated by the difficulty of separating retributive and general deterrence motives when studying human offenders (Study 1). We isolate retribution by investigating judgments about punishing animals, which allows us to remove general deterrence from consideration. Studies 2 and 3 document a “victim identity” effect, such that the greater the perceived loss from a violent animal attack, the greater the belief that the culprit deserves to be killed. Study 3 documents a “targeted punishment” effect, such that the responsive killing of the actual “guilty” culprit is seen as more deserved than the killing of an almost identical yet “innocent” animal from the same species. Studies 4 and 5 extend both effects to participants' acceptance of inflicting pain and suffering on the offending animal at the time of its death, and show that both effects are mediated by measures of retributive sentiment, and not by consequentialist concerns.     

Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).     

Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.     

A threatening exchange: Gender and life history strategy predict perceptions and reasoning about sexual harassment

Sexual harassment is a serious societal issue, with extensive economic and psychological consequences, yet it is also an ill-defined construct fundamentally defined in terms of subjective perception. The current work was designed to examine the ways in which individual differences between people are systematically related to different perceptions of sexual harassment scenarios, as well as reasoning about those harassment situations. Participants (N = 460) read several possible harassment scenarios and rated how uncomfortable they would find them. They then also evaluated a quid pro quo sexual harassment situation in terms of their interpretation of it as a threat or a social exchange and completed a deductive reasoning task about the same situation. Females and individuals with slow life history strategies were more uncomfortable with potential harassment situations and were more likely to interpret the quid pro quo scenario as a threat. Further, interpreting the scenario as a threat was associated with poorer performance on the deductive logic task, compared to those who interpreted the scenario as a social exchange.     

The German TEIQue-SF: Factorial structure and relations to agentic and communal traits and mental health

Recent research illuminated the links between Agency, Communion, trait emotional intelligence (TEI), and internalizing mental health difficulties (IMHDs). However, for a more complete picture, unmitigated Agency and Communion have also to be considered. Drawing on a sample of N = 405 female occupational therapists, the present study examined (a) the factorial validity of the German TEI Questionnaire Short Form, (b) the relations of TEI to Agency, Communion, and their unmitigated variants, and (c) a multiple predictor-TEI-IMHDs mediation model. The factor structure suggested by TEI theory fitted approximately to the data. Agency and Communion related positively and both unmitigated traits related negatively to TEI. Indirect effects via TEI on IMHDs emerged for all four traits. The results help to integrate TEI within the Agency–Communion framework and suggest that TEI is an important intervening variable that helps to clarify the links of agentic and communal traits to mental health.     

Motor imagery ability and internal representation of movement in children with probable developmental coordination disorder

It has been hypothesised that deficits in the functioning of the mirror neuron system (MNS) and internal modelling may contribute to the motor impairments associated with DCD. These processes can be explored behaviourally through motor imagery paradigms. Motor imagery proficiency of children with and without probable DCD (pDCD) was examined using a complex hand rotation task to explore whether motor imagery strategies could be used during more complex tasks. Forty-four boys aged 7–13 years participated, 22 with pDCD (mean = 9.90 years ± 1.57) and 22 controls (mean = 9.68 years ± 1.53). Participants completed the task twice: with and without motor imagery instructions. Stimuli were presented in two rotational axes – palm/back, and eight 45° rotational steps. Both groups showed evidence of following the biomechanical and postural constraints of actual movements. Responses of children with pDCD were slower and less accurate than controls, with group differences increasing alongside task complexity. A greater impact of biomechanical constraints for accuracy was observed in the DCD group. The response characteristics of children with pDCD likely reflects a reduced capacity to mentally manipulate a body schema and reduced visuo-motor processing capabilities. Behaviourally, these processes are linked to MNS and internal modelling function, suggesting deficits in these systems may contribute to the movement difficulties characteristic of DCD.     

Understanding intentions from actions: Direct perception,inference, and the roles of mirror and mentalizing systems

This review asks whether observers can obtain information about others’ intentions from observation of their actions; and if so, whether this process is performed using direct perceptual or inferential processes (prominent examples of each being the intention understanding theory of mirror neuron function, and mentalizing accounts of intention understanding, respectively). I propose four conditions that should be fulfilled in order to support a direct perception account, and suggest that only two of these conditions are supported by the existing data. I then propose and review three further sources of evidence which have the potential to inform this debate, concluding that the data do not support the direct perception account. In particular, mirror neurons may be involved in lower-level processes of action perception, but there is no evidence to support their involvement in the type of higher-level intention understanding that is proposed by the direct perception account.