未成年人归因的内隐特征与攻击行为

本研究使用投射法这一内隐社会认知的研究方法,考察了朱成年人罪犯群体与正常群体的攻击行为内隐社会认知过程的特征,结果表明：整体上而言,未成年人罪犯群体与正常群体的内隐归因方式存在显著差异,罪犯的内控程度要低于常人的内控程度。从而得出罪犯产生攻击性犯罪行为的原因之一是他们的归因存在偏差,支持了攻击行为成因的归因模型。未成年人男女两性在内隐的内外控方面不存在显著差异,且结果提示归因方式与女性罪犯的攻击行为没有必然联系。     

The Body in Religion: The Spatial Mapping of Valence in Tibetan Practitioners of Bön

According to the Body‐Specificity Hypothesis (BSH), people implicitly associate positive ideas with the side of space on which they are able to act more fluently with their dominant hand. Though this hypothesis has been rigorously tested across a variety of populations and tasks, the studies thus far have only been conducted in linguistic and cultural communities which favor the right over the left. Here, we tested the effect of handedness on implicit space‐valence mappings in Tibetan practitioners of Bön who show a strong religious preference for the left, in comparison to an English group. Results showed that Bön right‐handers tended to implicitly associate positive valence more strongly with their dominant side of space despite strong explicit associations between the left and goodness in their religion. This pattern of results found in Bön participants was indistinguishable from that found in English speakers. The findings of the present study support the BSH, demonstrating that space‐valence mappings in people's minds are shaped by their bodily experience, which appears to be independent of space‐valence mappings enshrined in cultural conventions.     

The brain mechanism that reduces the vividness of negative imagery

The present study attempts to locate brain regions that are related to vividness control, a hypothesized mechanism that reduces the vividness of negative imagery by controlling memory retrieval and emotion processing. The results showed that BOLD response in the left posterior cingulate gyrus in the negative imagery condition, in which activation of vividness control mechanisms was considered to be strong, was greater than that in the positive imagery condition, in which the activation of control mechanisms was considered to be weak. Moreover, the activation of this region negatively correlated with the subjective vividness of negative imagery. These results support the idea that the posterior cingulate gyrus may be involved in the suppression of imagery generation. Several previous studies have suggested that the posterior cingulate cortex is involved in both memory and emotion processing. Therefore, the current results indicate that the posterior cingulate gyrus may function as the vividness control mechanism.     

Surviving the 2015 Mount Everest disaster: A phenomenological exploration into lived experience and the role of mental toughness

ObjectivesThe 2015 Nepal earthquake and subsequent avalanche at Mount Everest Base Camp is the deadliest mountaineering disaster to date. This study is novel in exploring the lived experiences of survivors and the role of mental toughness in their psychological responses to the disaster.DesignPhenomenological study.MethodTen mountaineers, who were on expeditions during the earthquake, participated in phenomenological interviews. Data were analysed inductively and thematically, while strategies to enhance trustworthiness were also employed.ResultsSeven dimensions emerged from the data, which captured climbers' psychological responses to the disaster, ranging from the moments the earthquake hit to reflections on the disaster after returning home. Contrasting emotional responses were described, and suggested to depend on experience and mental toughness. Negative emotional and behavioural responses were reported in the aftermath. Some climbers reported post-traumatic stress, but also a strong desire to return to Mount Everest and continue mountaineering.ConclusionsThese findings provide detailed insights into the lived experiences of climbers who survived the 2015 Nepal earthquake and Base Camp avalanche. Findings also shed light on the role of mental toughness in coping with and responding to a major natural disaster.     

Can infants use video to update mental representations of absent objects?

Before their second birthday, infants can update their knowledge based on what someone tells them, but can they do so based on what a video shows them? The current study explored whether infants can update their representation of an absent object’s properties after seeing a video of something happening to it, following seminal work showing that they can update their representation after being told about something happening to it (Ganea et al., 2007). It thus adapted an existing paradigm for testing infants’ understanding of references to absent objects (using language) to investigate a different symbolic medium (video). Twenty-two-month-olds first played with a toy and later saw on video that the toy underwent a change in state while they were out of the room. Infants in the current study did not subsequently identify the toy based on this new information, whereas those in previous research did. Infants this age thus appear less likely to update their representation of an absent object’s properties using video than using language. This result is consistent with the possibility that infants may understand the representational function of symbolic objects later in development than they understand the representational function of language. It also aligns with evidence of the video deficit in which infants learn less effectively from video than from firsthand experience.     

Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.     

The relationship between mental toughness and subjective mental illness recovery

Recently there has been an increasing interest in subjective mental illness recovery, and it has been recognised that there is an important role for characteristics such as self-efficacy and locus of control. Mental toughness describes a set of characteristics important for dealing with stress and pressure, and is comprised of challenge, commitment, control of emotion, control of life, confidence in abilities, and interpersonal confidence. The current study explored relationships between mental toughness and subjective mental illness recovery. Seventy-seven participants (nineteen males and fifty-eight females, the majority of which were young adults aged 18–21 years) who had previously recovered from, or were currently recovering from a mental illness (self-reported) completed questionnaire measures of mental toughness and subjective mental illness recovery. Mental toughness had a positive significant relationship to recovery, with particular roles for commitment and confidence in abilities. The findings are discussed in terms of implications for recovery-oriented practice, intervention, and measurement. Further research should examine the role of mental toughness in different aspects of subjective recovery, and also explore relationships with objective measures of recovery.