False recollection in children with reading comprehension difficulties

Children with reading comprehension difficulties display impaired performance on semantic processing tasks. These impairments are assumed to reflect weaker knowledge about abstract semantic associations between words in poor comprehenders [Nation, K., and Snowling, M. (1999). Developmental differences in sensitivity to semantic relations among good and poor comprehenders: evidence from semantic priming. Cognition, 19, B1-B13.]. We examined the performance of poor comprehenders on the Deese/Roediger/McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Children studied spoken words that were semantic associates (e.g., bed, rest, and awake) or phonological associates (e.g., pole, bowl, and hole) followed by free recall and a recognition test containing nonstudied critical words (e.g., sleep and roll). Results showed reduced recall and recognition of critical words in the semantic condition but not in the phonological condition for poor comprehenders. We argue that poor comprehenders are less sensitive to abstract semantic associations between words because of reduced gist memory.     

Flexible spatial mapping of different notations of numbers in Chinese readers

The spatial component of numerical and ordinal information has been explored in previous research. However, how such mapping emerges and how it is affected by the learning experience are issues still under debate. In the current study, we examined the orientation of the mental number line for different numerical notations (e.g., “1”, “—-”, “”) in Chinese readers. Our data demonstrated that Arabic numbers are mentally aligned horizontally with a left-to-right directionality, while Chinese number words are aligned vertically with a top-to-bottom directionality. These findings indicate that different notations of the same concept have flexible mappings within space, which is plausibly shaped by the dominant context in which the numerical notations appear.     

Children's knowledge of the earth: a new methodological and statistical approach

In the field of children’s knowledge of the earth, much debate has concerned the question of whether children’s naive knowledge—that is, their knowledge before they acquire the standard scientific theory—is coherent (i.e., theory-like) or fragmented. We conducted two studies with large samples (N = 328 and N = 381) using a new paper-and-pencil test, denoted the EARTH (EArth Representation Test for cHildren), to discriminate between these two alternatives. We performed latent class analyses on the responses to the EARTH to test mental models associated with these alternatives. The naive mental models, as formulated by Vosniadou and Brewer, were not supported by the results. The results indicated that children’s knowledge of the earth becomes more consistent as children grow older. These findings support the view that children’s naive knowledge is fragmented.     

Classifying emotion: a developmental account

The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for all existing varieties. We argue that we must classify emotions according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions, and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. We suggest four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) which are systematically differentiated into a diversity of more complex emotions during emotional development. The classification distinguishes between basic and non-basic emotions and our multi-factorial account considers cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters as relevant for constituting an emotion. However, each emotion type is constituted by a typical pattern according to which some features may be more significant than others. Emotions differ strongly where these patterns of features are concerned, while their essential functional roles are the same. We argue that emotions form a unified ontological category that is coherent and can be well defined by their characteristic functional roles. Our account of emotions is supported by data from developmental psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and sociology.     

Computer simulation through an error-statistical lens

After showing how Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical philosophy of science might be applied to address important questions about the evidential status of computer simulation results, I argue that an error-statistical perspective offers an interesting new way of thinking about computer simulation models and has the potential to significantly improve the practice of simulation model evaluation. Though intended primarily as a contribution to the epistemology of simulation, the analysis also serves to fill in details of Mayo’s epistemology of experiment.     

Homelessness, Mental Illness, and Criminal Activity: Examining Patterns Over Time

This study examined whether street homelessness, sheltered homelessness, and the severity of psychological symptoms predicted non-violent and violent crime among 207 mentally ill participants who were homeless at baseline. Participants were interviewed at 9 time points over 4 years. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) was used to examine whether changes in homelessness status and symptom severity predicted changes in criminal activity over time. Results indicated that homelessness both on the streets and in shelters and psychological symptom severity predicted increases in non-violent crime. Sheltered homelessness and symptom severity predicted increases in violent crime, although street homelessness did not. A separate mediational analysis with 181 participants showed that the relationship between diagnosis of a psychotic disorder and both non-violent and violent criminal activity was partially mediated through the severity of psychotic symptoms. Implications for research and intervention are discussed.     

Simulating biological and non-biological motion

It is widely accepted that the brain processes biological and non-biological movements in distinct neural circuits. Biological motion, in contrast to non-biological motion, refers to active movements of living beings. Aim of our experiment was to investigate the mechanisms underlying mental simulation of these two movement types. Subjects had to either simulate mentally or to overtly reproduce previously executed or observed movements. Healthy subjects showed a very high timing precision when simulating biological and a strong distortion when simulating non-biological movements. Schizophrenic subjects, however, showed the opposite. Since overt reproduction was precise in any case, this double dissociation shows that processes underlying mental simulation of biological and non-biological movements are separate from each other and from perceptual and motor-control processes.     

Bootstrapping cognition from behavior-a computerized thought experiment

We show that simple perceptual competences can emerge from an internal simulation of action effects and are thus grounded in behavior. A simulated agent learns to distinguish between dead ends and corridors without the necessity to represent these concepts in the sensory domain. Initially, the agent is only endowed with a simple value system and the means to extract low-level features from an image. In the interaction with the environment, it acquires a visuo-tactile forward model that allows the agent to predict how the visual input is changing under its movements, and whether movements will lead to a collision. From short-term predictions based on the forward model, the agent learns an inverse model. The inverse model in turn produces suggestions about which actions should be simulated in long-term predictions, and long-term predictions eventually give rise to the perceptual ability.     

The step to rationality: the efficacy of thought experiments in science, ethics, and free will

Examples from Archimedes, Galileo, Newton, Einstein, and others suggest that fundamental laws of physics were—or, at least, could have been—discovered by experiments performed not in the physical world but only in the mind. Although problematic for a strict empiricist, the evolutionary emergence in humans of deeply internalized implicit knowledge of abstract principles of transformation and symmetry may have been crucial for humankind's step to rationality—including the discovery of universal principles of mathematics, physics, ethics, and an account of free will that is compatible with determinism.