The effects of divided attention on encoding processes under incidental and intentional learning instructions: Underlying mechanisms?

Divided attention (DA) at encoding has been shown to significantly disrupt later memory for the studied information. However, what type of processing gets disrupted during DA remains unresolved. In this study, we assessed the degree to which strategic effortful processes are affected under DA by comparing the effects of DA at encoding under intentional and pure incidental learning instructions. In three experiments, participants studied list of words or word pairs under either full or divided attention. Results of three experiments, which used different methodologies, converged to show that the effects of DA at encoding reduce memory performance to the same degree under incidental and intentional learning. Secondary task performance indicated that encoding under intentional learning instructions was more effortful than under incidental learning instructions. In addition, the results indicated enhanced attention to the initial appearance of the words under both types of learning instructions. Results are interpreted to imply that other processes, rather than only strategic effortful ones, might be affected by DA at encoding.     

Eichberg’s ‘Phenomenology’ of Sport: A Phenomenal Confusion

This paper defends philosophical phenomenology against a hostile review in the previous issue of this journal. It tries to explain what philosophical phenomenology is, and the possibilities for its empirical application; whilst also showing that Eichberg’s method is idiosyncratic, problematic and not interested in philosophical phenomenology at all. It presents the phenomenological concept of phenomenon, which is neither concrete nor abstract, and contrasts it to Eichberg’s understanding of empirical concrete phenomena. Finally, the paper scrutinises Eichberg’s empirical method, which has deep problems of its own, and in any case, finds unsuitable its characterisation as ‘phenomenology’     

Debiasing by instruction: The case of belief bias

Abstract

The study is concerned with the question of whether robust biases in reasoning can be reduced or eliminated by verbal instruction in principles of reasoning. Three experiments are reported in which the effect of instructions upon the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning is investigated. Belief bias is most clearly marked by a tendency for subjects to accept invalid conclusions which are a priori believable. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate and extend an experiment reported by Newstead, Pollard, Evans and Allen (1992). In contrast with their experiment, it was found that belief bias was maintained despite the use of augmented instructions which emphasised the principle of logical necessity. Experiment 2 provided an exact replication of the augmented instructions condition of Newstead et al., including the presence of problems with belief-neutral conclusions. Once again, significant effects of conclusion believability were found. A third experiment examined the use of elaborated instructions which lacked specific reference to the notion of logical necessity. The use of these instructions significantly reduced the effects of belief on the reasoning observed.

Taking the current findings together with the experiment of Newstead et al., the overall conclusion is that elaborated instructions can reduce the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, but not eliminate it. This conclusion is discussed with reference to (1) the practical implications for improving thinking and reasoning via verbal instruction and (2) the nature of the belief bias phenomenon.     

Memory encoding of stimulus features in human perceptual learning

Two experiments analysed memory encoding in human perceptual learning. Both experiments started with preexposure without feedback to four checkerboards composed by a unique feature each and sharing a common feature (AX, BX, CX, and DX). Elements of one pair were presented intermixed and elements of the other pair were presented in separate blocks. Immediately after preexposure participants completed a memory recognition task in which the characteristics of the distractors were manipulated. Experiment 1 showed that only intermixed presentation results in good encoding of the unique features of the stimuli. Experiment 2 demonstrated that intermixed preexposure results in different encoding of unique versus common features of the stimuli: Participants are able to remember A and B better than they remember X, whereas for the blocked condition memory for C, D, and X does not differ. Overall, the results presented here support the proposal that intermixing stimuli results in differential memory traces for unique versus common features and that this contributes to the intermixed/blocked effect.     

Examining Autobiographical Memory Content in Patients with Depression and Anxiety Disorders

The purpose of this study was to move beyond the traditional specificity model of autobiographical memory (ABM) and to examine the content of memories with a focus on disorder and schema-relevant content. The sample (N = 82) included 25 patients with major depressive disorder (MDD), 24 with social phobia (SP), and 33 with panic disorder with agoraphobia (PDA) who were referred to a large outpatient clinic for group treatment of depression or anxiety. Participants completed the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) and Beck Depression Inventory–II as part of the clinical intake process. Responses to the AMT were coded for disorder-specific content based on diagnostic criteria for each disorder as well as for schema-relevant (sociotropy vs. autonomy) content. A repeated measures multiple analysis of variance demonstrated significant differences in disorder-specific content, with patients in the MDD group reporting more depressotypic ABMs than those in the PDA group but not the SP group. Similarly, in the analysis of schema-relevant content, significant differences were found between MDD and PDA regarding the presence of autonomy-based ABM ratings. Study results provide partial support for the cognitive specificity hypothesis with ABM content. The results are discussed in relation to the cognitive models of depression and anxiety.     

The effects of peer ostracism on children's cognitive processes

In adults, experiences of social exclusion have been shown to not only adversely affect mood and threaten primary needs, but also to disrupt cognitive processes. The aim of this study was to provide an initial test of the effects of social exclusion on cognitive processes in children (N = 55; aged 8–12 years). Ostracism was simulated experimentally using the Cyberball paradigm—a computer-based ball-throwing game that participants believed they were playing with two peers over the internet. Following this, participants were administered subtests from the Working Memory Test Battery for Children. Girls who were ostensibly ignored during the game demonstrated poorer cognitive performance than those who were included by their co-players, while boys did not. Findings are discussed in relation to those previously reported in adult research and evidence of gender-specific correlates of relational aggression in children and adolescents.     

Task-switching abilities in children with autism spectrum disorder

Task-switching performance is often used as a measure of executive control functions. Various task-switching studies in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) found, in contrast to expectations, no impairments in cognitive flexibility. Here, we studied whether the role of memory for arbitrary task rules can explain these findings, and how studying rule memory can help to generally better understand executive control. We designed a novel task-switching paradigm to separate cognitive flexibility from demand on memory for arbitrary rules, and we compared 19 children with ASD (9 to 16 years old) with an age- and IQ-matched control group. Children with ASD had increased difficulty with task switching only when memorizing arbitrary rules was required. When no arbitrary rules needed to be memorized, they performed accurately and quickly. Nevertheless, they showed less distraction from task-irrelevant stimulus features, suggesting that they represented tasks differently from the children in the comparison group. We conclude that children with ASD have a weaker capacity of forming rule representations, which only leads to performance impairment when they need to memorize arbitrary rules. Further, executive control impairments in ASD seem more complex than hitherto hypothesized due to mutual interactions between memory demand and task representations.     

Do updating tasks involve updating? Evidence from comparisons with immediate serial recall

Updating tasks require participants to process a sequence of items, varying in length, and afterwards to remember only a fixed number of the elements of the sequence; the assumption being that participants actively update the to-be-recalled list as presentation progresses. However recent evidence has cast doubt on this assumption, and the present study examined the strategies that participants employ in such tasks by comparing the serial position curves found in verbal and visuo-spatial updating tasks with those seen in standard serial recall tasks. These comparisons showed that even when the same number of items are presented or recalled, participants perform less well in an updating than a serial recall context. In addition, while standard serial position effects were observed for serial recall, marked recency and reduced or absent primacy effects were seen in updating conditions. These findings suggest that participants do not typically adopt a strategy of actively updating the memory list in updating tasks, but instead tend to wait passively until the list ends before trying to recall the most recently presented items.     

Coding strategies in number space: Memory requirements influence spatial–numerical associations

The tendency to respond faster with the left hand to relatively small numbers and faster with the right hand to relatively large numbers (spatial numerical association of response codes, SNARC effect) has been interpreted as an automatic association of spatial and numerical information. We investigated in two experiments the impact of task-irrelevant memory representations on this effect. Participants memorized three Arabic digits describing a left-to-right ascending number sequence (e.g., 3–4–5), a descending sequence (e.g., 5–4–3), or a disordered sequence (e.g., 5–3–4) and indicated afterwards the parity status of a centrally presented digit (i.e., 1, 2, 8, or 9) with a left/right keypress response. As indicated by the reaction times, the SNARC effect in the parity task was mediated by the coding requirements of the memory tasks. That is, a SNARC effect was only present after memorizing ascending or disordered number sequences but disappeared after processing descending sequences. Interestingly, the effects of the second task were only present if all sequences within one experimental block had the same type of order. Taken together, our findings are inconsistent with the idea that spatial–numerical associations are the result of an automatic and obligatory cognitive process but do suggest that coding strategies might be responsible for the cognitive link between numbers and space.