When choices give in to temptations: Explaining the disagreement among importance measures

Respondents’ overt statements of relative importance rarely correspond to weights derived from a regression analysis of their decisions. This paper conjectures that differential effects of high-level goals on importance beliefs and choices can explain these discrepancies. It is argued that the goal to justify decisions influences importance beliefs more than choices whereas the goal to assess preferences accurately affects choices more than importance beliefs. It is also argued that differential effects of high-level goals on importance statements and choices vary as a function of whether decision-maker controls the information flow and the extent of prior knowledge and experiences with choice options. These predictions were tested within the context of a contraceptive decision-making task. Choices among contraceptives made the justification goal salient to subjects by requiring tradeoffs between attributes that are either considered rational or tempting in making such decisions (e.g., health risks vs. pleasure/convenience). As predicted, subjects assigned larger importance weights to rational attributes in their subjective evaluations than in their choices whereas the impact of tempting attributes was stronger for choices than for subjective importance evaluations. Moreover, these observed discrepancies between importance measures were reduced in favor of rational attributes when subjects controlled the information flow and could not access their prior experiences. Overall, the results suggest that, although tempting attributes affect choices, decision makers appear to be unwilling to acknowledge the impact of tempting attributes on their decisions in judging attribute importance.     

Memories of Punishment for Cursing

Researchers do not know how parents respond to children’s cursing or what effect parents’ responses have on children later in life. We conducted two studies with college students: a content analysis of 47 personal narratives of childhood cursing and an item analysis of a 70-item questionnaire administered to 211 students. Contrary to gender differences found in previous narrative and cursing research, men’s narratives were as emotional as women’s narratives, and women used as many curse words as men. The two studies confirm that cursing is a common childhood problem and that mothers play a more prominent disciplinary role than fathers do. Parents respond with physical forms of punishment (e.g., spanking) but not as frequently as verbal reprimands. Our data are the first to document the prevalence of washing children’s mouths with soap. College students have vivid memories of punishment; however 94% reported that they continue to curse.     

Training Children to Make Accurate Self-Evaluations: Effects on Behavior and the Quality of Self-Ratings

Research has shown that self-evaluation can have positive effects on children's behavior and academic performance. Components of self-evaluation that have not been fully examined include the accuracy and sensitivity of students' ratings before and after training, as well as the effects of accuracy training on performance. Four students exhibiting behavior consistent with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) participated in the study. The students' behavior during academic activities and accuracy of self-evaluations were examined before and after accuracy training in comparison to direct observations of behavior. None of the students accurately rated his behavior prior to training. Self-evaluation alone decreased disruptive behavior for only one student, whereas self-evaluation plus accuracy training decreased the disruptive behavior of all four students. Once accuracy training was withdrawn, the level of disruptive behavior increased for three of the four students. Implications of these results for the quality and utility of self-evaluation measures and the role of accuracy training in self-evaluation effects are discussed.     

Accuracy,Verisimilitude, and Scoring Rules

Suppose that beliefs come in degrees. How should we then measure the accuracy of these degrees of belief? Scoring rules are usually thought to be the mathematical tool appropriate for this job. But there are many scoring rules, which lead to different ordinal accuracy rankings. Recently, Fallis and Lewis [2016] have given an argument that, if sound, rules out many popular scoring rules, including the Brier score, as genuine measures of accuracy. I respond to this argument, in part by noting that the argument fails to account for verisimilitude—that certain false hypotheses might be closer to the truth than other false hypotheses are. Oddie [forthcoming], however, has argued that no member of a very wide class of scoring rules (the so-called proper scores) can appropriately handle verisimilitude. I explain how to respond to Oddie's argument, and I recommend a class of weighted scoring rules that, I argue, genuinely measure accuracy while escaping the arguments of Fallis and Lewis as well as Oddie.     

Mnemonic emotion regulation: a three-process model

Emotion regulation comprises attempts to influence when and how emotions are experienced and expressed. It has mostly been conceived of as proactive (e.g. situation selection) or reactive (e.g. attentional distraction), but it may also be retroactive and involve memory. I term such past-oriented activity mnemonic emotion regulation and propose that it involves increasing or decreasing access to or altering the characteristics of a memory. People may increase access to a memory and make it more likely that it will be retrieved in the future, for example by rehearsing a pleasant memory. They may decrease access to a memory and make it less likely that intrusions will be experienced in the future, for example by repeatedly trying to stop an unpleasant memory from being retrieved. Finally, people may alter the characteristics of a memory and change its content or context, for example by replacing a negative impression with a productive interpretation. I discuss how mnemonic emotion regulation may be instigated (e.g. via elaborate rehearsal) as well as the different motives (e.g. hedonic motives) people may have for engaging in regulation. Also, I discuss possible benefits of, variations in, and improvements of mnemonic emotion regulation.     

Alcohol intoxication impairs eyewitness memory and increases suggestibility: Two field studies

Two field studies tested the effect of alcohol intoxication on memory for a live interaction at immediate, delayed, and repeated testing. In Study 1 (N = 86), one researcher presented bar tenants with (misleading) questions regarding a preceding interaction with another researcher. One week later, participants' memory was tested again. Study 2 (N = 189) added a delayed‐testing only condition. We hypothesized intoxication to impair memory and enhance suggestibility and explored whether time of testing affected the outcome on these variables. In Study 1, intoxication reduced completeness and increased suggestibility. In Study 2, intoxication reduced completeness and increased suggestibility in delayed‐only and repeated testing, compared with immediate testing. Sober participants benefited from repeated testing in Study 2, but not Study 1. Findings lend support for consolidation and decay theory and suggest that immediate (intoxicated) testing is preferable over delayed‐only testing. Findings provide little support for alcohol myopia theory.     

Social intelligence and interview accuracy: Individual differences in the ability to construct interviews and rate accurately

This research examined differences in interviewers’ ability to identify effective interview questions and to accurately rate interviewees’ responses. Given the theoretical association between these interview activities and the construct of social intelligence (SI), a performance‐based measure of SI was developed utilizing situational judgment test methodology. The initial step was to examine evidence of the psychometric properties and construct validity of the new SI measure. The SI measure, a test of general mental ability (GMA), and a personality inventory were then used to examine aspects of rater performance. Participants chose a set of interview questions and viewed interviewee responses during a videotaped interview. Results showed that people higher in SI and GMA chose interview questions judged by experts to be superior and were more accurate in rating interviewee responses. The SI measure explained variance beyond GMA and outperformed a trait‐based SI measure. Implications for the selection and training of interviewers are discussed.     

Manipulating memory associations changes decision-making preferences in a preconditioning task

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants’ memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants’ memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants’ decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.     

“Aha!” is stronger when preceded by a “huh?”: presentation of a solution affects ratings of aha experience conditional on accuracy

Insight has been investigated under the assumption that participants solve insight problems with insight processes and/or experiences. A recent trend has involved presenting participants with the solution and analysing the resultant experience as if insight has taken place. We examined self-reports of the aha experience, a defining aspect of insight, before and after feedback, along with additional affective components of insight (e.g., pleasure, surprise, impasse). Classic insight problems, compound remote associates, and non-insight problems were randomly interleaved and presented to participants. Solution feedback increased ratings of aha experience in both insight and non-insight problems, with this result being driven by responses to solutions that were initially incorrectly generated. Ratings of aha for correctly generated solutions decreased after the correct solution was presented. These findings have implications for insight research paradigms as well as informing teaching methods.