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231.
Gary Ebbs 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(2):343-367
W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism is confused in ways that have not yet been noticed in the literature. This may seem to favour Strawson's side of the debate. In fact, however, a proper analysis of the difficulties that Quine's reply faces suggests a new way to clarify and defend the view that logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms. 相似文献
232.
Andrew Specht 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(3):514-534
Despite his impressive influence on nineteenth-century philosophy, F. A. Trendelenburg's own philosophy has been largely ignored. However, among Kant scholars, Trendelenburg has always been remembered for his feud with Kuno Fischer over the subjectivity of space and time in Kant's philosophy. The topic of the dispute, now frequently referred to as the ‘Neglected Alternative’ objection, has become a prominent issue in contemporary discussions and interpretations of Kant's view of space and time. The Neglected Alternative contends that Kant unjustifiably moves from the claim that we have a priori intuitions of space and time to the sceptical conclusion that space and time are exclusively subjective. Most current discussions trace the objection back to Trendelenburg and often use him to motivate the objection. However, to date Trendelenburg's actual arguments and reasons for rejecting the Kantian view of space and time have not been sufficiently uncovered; my goal here is to fill this lacuna. By better understanding what Trendelenburg actually argued, we will be in a better position to assess whether the Neglected Alternative objection against Kant is successful. But in addition, Trendelenburg's own system is of independent philosophical interest, and my work here will shed light on one part of it. 相似文献
233.
Wolfgang Barz 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):79-92
I argue that the project of naturalizing intentionality is misconceived. Intentionality should not be considered as a challenge to our naturalistic world-view, but rather as something which gives rise to a logical problem: how to save the principle of indiscernibility of identicals from apparent counterexamples arising from intensional discourse. 相似文献
234.
Brandon Warmke 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2016,94(4):687-703
P.F. Strawson claimed that forgiveness is such an essential part of our moral practices that we could not extricate it from our form of life even if we so desired. But what is it about forgiveness that would make it such a central feature of our moral experience? In this paper, I suggest that the answer has to do with what I will call the normative significance of forgiveness. Forgiveness is normatively significant in the sense that, in its paradigmatic instances, forgiving alters the operative norms bearing on the interaction between the victim and the wrongdoer in certain characteristic ways. My project here is, first, to clarify the ways that paradigmatic cases of forgiveness alter the norms of interaction between victim and wrongdoer and to argue that it is in this respect that forgiveness is a normatively significant feature of our moral responsibility practices. Second, I show that most extant theories of forgiveness fail to explain the characteristic ways in which forgiving alters norms. Third, I offer a theory of forgiveness that accounts for this significant normative feature. I conclude by addressing two objections to my proposal. 相似文献
235.
Francis H. Palmer 《Developmental Review》1983,3(1):115-124
A perspective on the controversy over the effects of early childhood intervention is provided. Gray, Ramsey, and Klaus' book is reviewed. The results of the study are commented upon, and implications for the continuing controversy about the effects of early childhood intervention are suggested. 相似文献
236.
Dale F. Hay 《Developmental Review》1985,5(2):122-161
Freud's assertion notwithstanding, the attachment relationship is not “without parallel” in social life. Children's attainments in forming attachments to parents parallel the steps they take in relating to their peers. During the first 3 years of life, in both domains, infants come to recognize prospective social partners, communicate with them, engage them in patterned interaction, including both cooperation and conflict, learn from their presence and actions, and interact in idiosyncratic ways with particular companions. Toward the end of this period, children show signs of acquiring generalized concepts of the social relationships in which they engage. It is proposed that biological constraints on learning promote human infants' interest in and rudimentary abilities to interact with other members of their species. Subsequent incidental and intentional learning processes shape both the child's attachments and less intense relationships with other persons. 相似文献
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Colin Tyler 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2020,28(3):573-593
ABSTRACTAlong with utilitarianism, British idealism was the most important philosophical and practical movement in Britain and its Empire during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Even though the British idealists have regained some of their standing in the history of philosophy, their own historical theories still fail to receive the deserved scholarly attention. This article helps to fill that major gap in the literature. Understanding historiography as concerning the appropriate modes of enquiring into the recorded past, this article analyses the key historiographical commitments that underpin the writings of the early T.H. Green (section two), Edward Caird (section three), and F.H. Bradley (sections four and five). Section six explores the influence of Bradley's historiography. These approaches are linked by the belief that all thought can be properly understood only by critical historians who possess the appropriate tools with which to distinguish permanently valid truths from the transient imperfections with which those truths are mixed. A crucial division between them is the invocation of a neo-Hegelian Geist by the early Green and Caird, and Bradley's reliance on a progressive human nature. Moreover, the article establishes that R.G. Collingwood's highly influential theories of “absolute presuppositions” and “re-enactment” were taken largely from Bradley's historiography. 相似文献