Neuroscience in Pursuit of the Holy: Mysticism, the Brain, and Ultimate Reality

Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew B. Newberg's The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience presents a core theory regarding the neurophysical nature of mystical experience; extensions of this theory, focusing upon near-death experiences and the nature of religion itself; and buttressing arguments proposing that genetically based neurophysical "operators" within the brain compel human beings to think in certain ways. On the basis of this work, the authors pose a "metatheology," suggesting that certain brain operations may underlie all the religions of the world. The core theory, its extensions, and related arguments are discussed in turn, concluding with commentary on the authors' constructive theology.     

Genes and Citizens: Can Moral Philosophy Learn from Evolutionary Biology?

The claim that moral philosophers have something to learn from recent neo-Darwinian theory cannot be sustained – at least, not in the case of the three theses characteristic of the latter on which I concentrate. The first thesis, reductionism, is open to some serious, and familiar, objections. Neo-Darwinism can escape those objections only by weakening its position to a point at which it can no longer be described as distinctively reductionist. The second, atavism, mistakenly attempts to generalise from the apparent persistence of` ‘vestigial’ behaviour patterns. Third, neo-Darwinists are frequently guilty of a number of confusions over the relation between fact and value. In conclusion, I point out that neo-Darwinism derives a certain ideological dynamic from the misleading supposition that patterns of explanation which succeed in one area necessarily apply in others. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Relations among functional systems in behavior analysis

This paper proposes that an organism's integrated repertoire of operant behavior has the status of a biological system, similar to other biological systems, like the nervous, cardiovascular, or immune systems. Evidence from a number of sources indicates that the distinctions between biological and behavioral events is often misleading, engendering counterproductive explanatory controversy. A good deal of what is viewed as biological (often thought to be inaccessible or hypothetical) can become publicly measurable variables using currently available and developing technologies. Moreover, such endogenous variables can serve as establishing operations, discriminative stimuli, conjoint mediating events, and maintaining consequences within a functional analysis of behavior and need not lead to reductionistic explanation. I suggest that explanatory misunderstandings often arise from conflating different levels of analysis and that behavior analysis can extend its reach by identifying variables operating within a functional analysis that also serve functions in other biological systems.     

The Possibility of Meaning in Human Evolution

Science undermines the certitude of non-naturalistic answers to the question of whether human life has meaning. I explore whether evolution can provide a naturalistic basis for existential meaning. Using the work of philosopher Daniel Dennett and scientist Ursula Goodenough, I argue that evolution is the locus of the possibility of meaning because it has produced intentionality, the matrix of consciousness. I conclude that the question of the meaning of human life is an existentialist one: existential meaning is a product of the individual and collective tasks human beings undertake.     

Divine Action in the World of Physics: Response to Nicholas Saunders

Nicholas Saunders claims that, in my view, divine action requires and is confined to indeterminacies at the quantum level. I try to make clear that, in speaking of "gaps" in physical causality, I mean that the existence of intentions entails that determining law explanations alone cannot give a complete account of the natural world. By "indeterminacy" I mean a general (not quantum) lack of determining causality in the physical order. Construing physical causality in terms of dispositional properties variously realized in more or less creative ways in different contexts may be most helpful in developing an account of divine action.     

The Nature of Physical Reality

This account of the dynamical theory of chaos leads to a metaphysical picture of a world with an open future, in which the laws of physics are emergent-downward approximations to a more subtle and supple reality and in which there is downward causation through information input as well as upward causation through energy input. Such a metaphysical picture can accommodate both human and divine agency.     

A Guide to Thinking about Emergence

A basic survey of the issues that arise in discussing emergence is presented, together with suggestions on how the concept should be approached. Emergence is an alternative to reductionism. The emergence story invites us to see that nothing transcends nature like nature itself; it is a radically new way to think about the natural order, and it reshapes our ideas of matter. Special attention is given to the idea of meaning in life. Three options are discussed for thinking about the meaning of life: that it is fundamental to the nature of things, that it is an illusion, and that it is an emergent property of matter. The third option is favored—that the universe has no telos, and yet makes possible the spontaneous emergence of purpose. Caution is advised against exploiting the idea of emergence. The most important task is to understand the science of emergence and only then to move into interpretations from the humanities and theology.     

AN AUGUSTINIAN PHILOSOPHER BETWEEN DUALISM AND MATERIALISM: ERNAN MCMULLIN ON HUMAN EMERGENCE

In claiming the independence of theology from science, Ernan McMullin nevertheless saw the danger of separating these disciplines on questions of mutual significance, as his accompanying article “Biology and the Theology of the Human” in this edition of Zygon shows. This paper analyzes McMullin's adoption of emergence as a qualified endorsement of a view that avoids the excesses of both dualism and materialism. I argue that McMullin's distinctive contribution is the conceptual clarification of emergence in the light of a precise understanding of matter, in light of Aristotelian metaphysics and Darwinian theory. As applied to human nature, McMullin retains an Augustinian outlook that sees spirit as emergent in the human body and which posits a credible biblical hermeneutic. I indicate briefly how McMullin's perspective could be fortified by a fuller natural theology.     

Reductionism and Antireductionism: Rights and Wrongs

Abstract: Scholars are divided as to whether reduction should be a central strategy for understanding the world. While reductive analysis is the standard mode of explanation in many areas of science and everyday life, many scholars consider reductionism a sign of “intellectual naïveté and backwardness.” This article makes three points about the proper status of antireductionism: First, reduction is, in fact, a centrally important epistemic strategy. Second, reduction to physics is always possible for all causal properties. Third, there are, nevertheless, reasons why we want science to discover properties and explanations other than reductive physical ones.