FRANK TIPLER'S PHYSICAL ESCHATOLOGY

Abstract. Frank L. Tipler's book The Physics of Immortality is a striking attempt by a scientist to resolve the conflict between theology and science on the basis of a physicalist position that identifies theology as a branch of physics, and that calculates God “in exactly the same way as physicists calculate the characteristics of electrons.” Tipler's work may be seen as a scientistic myth, and its critique is organized around the three basic characteristics of such myths: (1) it is illogical in that it argues as if physics were in fact metaphysics; (2) it is grim in that its glorification of technology is insensitive to ethical issues; (3) it is meaningless in that its espousal of a strong theory of artificial intelligence empties concrete personal histories by subsuming them under abstractions that distort our understandings both of God and of resurrection.     

Concerning the integration of sciences: Kinds and stages

The detailed analysis allows to discern seven kinds of integration, namely: I₁ consisting in the synthesis of scientific disciplines from their elements, including disciplinary unification I₁; I₂ inclusion of a science in (reduction to) another, more general; I₃ — links between different sciences, especially establishing of common elements; I₄ — interdisciplines bridging various sciences; I₅ — combination of two (or more) disciplines into a new (complex) science; I₆ — a general approach to several domains or multidisciplinary unification; I₇ — transdisciplinary sciences about relations of the same type in various traditional domains. These kinds of integration are interwoven with processes of differentiation, viz. D₁ — internal differentiation of the sciences resulting of I₁; D₂ — interdisciplinary differentiation concomitant I₄, and D₃ — specialization of I₇ sciences in several sections. As a result integration and differentiation are combined in the pairs I₁ — D₁, I₇ — D₃, and D₂ — I₄. The processes of integration (and differentiation) may be presented schematically in the following (not strictly isolated one of another) sequence: in the 17th century started I₁ followed by D₁, and in the last decades by I₁ during the 18th and the 19th c. cases of I₂ and I₃ appear; I₄ (together with D₂) is unfolding since the late 19th century. Finally, I₇ (and D₃), as well as I₅ and I₆ pertain to the latter half of our century. Representative are for one thing I₁, I₄, and I₇ outlining the main stages of integration and at the same time connected with respective kinds of differentiation.     

AGAINST METAETHICAL IMPERIALISM: Several Arguments for Equal Partnerships between the Deontic and Aretaic

Virtue and deontological ethics are now commonly contrasted as rival approaches to moral inquiry. However, I argue that neither metaethical party should seek complete, solitary domination of the ethical domain. Reductive treatments of the right or the virtuous, as well as projects that abandon the former or latter, are bound to leave us with a sadly diminished map of the moral territories crucial to our lives. Thus, it is better for the two parties to seek a more cordial and equal relationship, one that permits metaethical pluralism, and acknowledges mutual dependence. I do not seek to prescribe how that relationship should look: this essay offers less a positive metaethical position than a prolegomenon to such a position, one that attempts to head off harmful attempts to reduce the territory of the aretaic to that of the deontic, or that of the deontic to the aretaic.     

EXAMINING THE BODHISATTVA'S BRAIN

Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain aims to introduce secular‐minded thinkers to Buddhist thought and motivate its acceptance by analytic philosophers. I argue that Flanagan provides a compelling caution against the hasty generalizations of recent “science of happiness” literature, which correlates happiness with Buddhism on the basis of certain neurological studies. I contend, however, that his positive account of Buddhist ethics is less persuasive. I question the level of engagement with Buddhist philosophical literature and challenge Flanagan's central claim, that a Buddhist version of eudaimonia is a common core conception shared by all Buddhists. I argue that this view is not only a rational reconstruction in need of argumentation but is in tension with competing Buddhist metaphysical theories of self, including the one Flanagan himself endorses.     

Quality of life

This article gives an overview of the field of psychotherapy in relation to other relevant fields such as body-therapy and spiritual counselling. It is shown how psychotherapy defines itself in isolation from or in comparison with its sister disciplines. Political boundaries between professions are described. The field of transformation is shown to be encompassing not only the health professions, the psychotherapy professions, and the professions dealing with spiritual emergency, but it can also be seen to contain intra-personal, interpersonal and extra-personal (social) dimensions.     

More than belief,but not more than belief and desire

Manuel A. Vásquez’ More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion paints a rich picture of what a ‘non-reductive materialist framework for the study of religion’ would look like. Although it receives strong motivation from the inability of the predominant meta-approaches of theorizing religion to take seriously a range of materially grounded religious phenomena, it suffers somewhat from a lack of independent and autonomous argumentation. This article explores a convergence between Vásquez’ main points and the basic elements of one of the most influential positions within philosophical semantics – namely the semantic holism of Donald Davidson. Because Davidson's holism (assuming its correctness) provides constraints on all forms of theorizing, the fact that Vásquez’ position, unlike the ones he critiques, conforms to those constraints lends it a degree of rational presumption.     

Intelligent-Design Theory: An Argument for Biotic Laws

A central thesis of intelligent‐design theorists is that physical and chemical laws and chance are insufficient to account for irreducibly complex biological structures and that intelligent design is necessary to account for such phenomena. This assertion, however, still implies a reductionist ontology. We need to recognize that reality displays multiple modes of being beyond simply chemical and physical modes of being, each of which is governed by laws for that mode of being. This essay argues for an alternate framework for understanding life phenomena that is neither philosophical materialism nor intelligent‐design theory.     

基础医学研究进展的还原论与系统论

从分子生物学、基因组学、蛋白质组学到糖组学,以还原论为哲学指导的医学研究已经取得了辉煌成果,与此同时,以系统论为哲学指导的系统生物学也日益受到关注,更被誉为新世纪生物学、医学研究的核心驱动力。还原论是系统论的基础和条件,而系统论则是还原论的归宿和终点,整个基础医学的研究进展经历了一场由还原论到系统论、再实现还原论与系统论辩证统一的演化过程。医学科学的发展历程闪耀着人类哲学理性思考的光辉,同时哲学思维也对医学研究进展做出了巨大的指导作用。     

Heidegger’s relevance for engineering: Questioning technology

Heidegger affirmed traditional technology, but was opposed to science-based modern technology, in which everything (including man) is considered to be a mere “resource”. This opposition was expressed in the form of deep questioning and a suspicion of superficial evaluation, because the true nature of things was often concealed, though disclosed at times. Ways in which engineers should question technology are proposed, highlighting some of the hazards and injustices associated with technology and also its subtle sociological and psychological influences. The demands of engineering ethics and the use of metaphor in design are other ways in which a narrowly rationalistic technological outlook can be confronted.     

Review Of The War Between Mentalism and Behaviorism: On the Accessibility of Mental Processes By William R. Utall.

Uttal's goals in writing this book are (a) to demonstrate that the war between mentalism and behaviorism is unwinnable because both sides are fundamentally flawed and (b) to describe a new version of behaviorism that resolves the conflict. The book is generally well written and contains many interesting and important points, but the goals are not attained because of weaknesses in some of the crucial analyses. For example, key terms such as mind and behavior are not defined; the scientific admissibility of inference is denied for philosophical reasons that are not relevant to inference as actually used; the accessibility of mind is both explicitly denied and implicitly assumed; two kinds of reductionism—between and within domains—are acknowledged but the distinction is not consistently maintained; and the proposed new behaviorism ignores rather than solves the old problems.