The role of control functions in mentalizing: dual-task studies of theory of mind and executive function

Conflicting evidence has arisen from correlational studies regarding the role of executive control functions in Theory of Mind. The current study used dual-task manipulations of executive functions (inhibition, updating and switching) to investigate the role of these control functions in mental state and non-mental state tasks. The 'Eyes' pictorial test of Theory of Mind showed specific dual-task costs when concurrently performed with an inhibitory secondary task. In contrast, interference effects on a verbal 'Stories' task were general, occurring on both mental state and non-mental state tasks, and across all types of executive function. These findings from healthy functioning adults should help to guide decisions about appropriate methods of assessing ToM in clinical populations, and interpreting deficits in performance in such tasks in the context of more general cognitive dysfunction.     

Fairness and bargaining power in threshold public goods experiments

Experiments on three two‐person threshold public good provision games, namely, the simultaneous, sequential, and dictator games, are conducted to explore the motives behind giving. Players who move simultaneously are endowed with equal bargaining power, and players who move first are endowed with more bargaining power than players who move subsequently. Dictators are indubitably endowed with complete bargaining power. Since the differences between the bargaining powers of two players increase from the simultaneous to the sequential to the dictator game, comparisons among games allow us to trace whether the contribution behavior is motivated by fairness or is simply due to the strategic concern. The experimental evidence shows that the strategic concern explains the overall contribution behavior better than the motive of fairness. However, in the final round 26% of the dictators share the threshold evenly with their opponents, suggesting that some subjects do play fairly. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

有效测量元认知监控的新方法：Mastermind任务分析

元认知监控是元认知的核心成分,而且是内隐程度较高的心理活动。研究采用认知操作法,对经典的Mastermind游戏任务加以改编,结合访谈分析,探讨了适合考察元认知监控的任务难度和有效的元认知监控指标。研究结果发现：（1）对于大学生来说,在游戏4（要求从六种颜色中选出四种正确的颜色,且排列位置也要正确）中当知觉难度最大且又可以经过努力选择策略、根据反馈进行有效选择时,才会在最大程度上激发元认知监控,使得游戏成绩提高;（2）“监测时间”是元认知监测的有效测量指标,而“违背反馈次数”是元认知控制的有效测量指标。     

An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games

A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes thatAnn believes that Bob’s assumption is wrongThis is formalized to show that any belief model of a certain kind must have a ‘hole.’ An interpretation of the result is that if the analyst’s tools are available to the players in a game, then there are statements that the players can think about but cannot assume. Connections are made to some questions in the foundations of game theory.Special Issue Ways of Worlds II. On Possible Worlds and Related Notions Edited by Vincent F. Hendricks and Stig Andur Pedersen     

Exploring Master Therapists’ Use of Power in Conversation

Various theoretical approaches to therapy place different emphases on the use of power in therapy. In this study, we explore six master therapists’ use of power via communicational control for theoretical consistency. Results indicate that all therapists, regardless of their stance on power, use the role of therapist to exert power in an initial therapy session. Master therapists, in general, did appear to be theoretically consistent with their stated philosophies of therapy. Suggestions for future studies exploring power therapists have are included.     

社会医疗保险道德风险博弈与防控措施研究

通过对社会医疗保险道德风险产生原因与特征的探讨,根据不完全信息重复博弈模型对社会医疗保险道德风险进行了系统分析,据此提出了社会医疗保险道德风险的防控措施,以期实现对道德风险的有效防控,提高社会医疗保险基金的安全。     

Spirituality and education; inner and outer realities

There is a persisting tendency in attempts to define spirituality, to adopt a dualistic point of view which sees the spirit as somehow impenetrably inner, innate and introspectively perceived, interacting with the outer world through the body. As well as a strong intuitive sense of the correctness of this philosophical point of view, it also is supported by psychotherapeutic perspectives that speak of the private inner being. In this paper I will argue that this view is logically, epistemologically, morally, and psychologically problematic. It will be argued that the concept of an inwardness to our mental life can be distinguished from the view of that life as interior. The perspective that we have of our inward selves is learned and conditional upon a sense of an outer self, functioning and communicating in the public world. Rather than an ego centric conceptualization of spirituality based on the idea of the spirit as inner and logically inaccessible, I we might adopt a sociocentric perspective in which the supremacy of the ego is dissolved in favour of an understanding in which we see ourselves as part of the social and natural outer world in which we exist.     

“This way!”, “No! That way!”—3-year olds know that two people can have mutually incompatible desires

In theory of mind research, there is a long standing dispute about whether children come to understand the subjectivity of both desires and beliefs at the same time (around age 4), or whether there is an asymmetry such that desires are understood earlier. To address this issue, 3-year olds’ understanding of situations in which two persons have mutually incompatible desires was tested in two studies. Results revealed that (i) children were quite proficient at ascribing incompatible desires to two persons, and in simpler scenarios even incompatible desire-dependent emotions; (ii) children showed this proficiency even though they mostly failed the false belief task. Overall, these results suggest that there is an asymmetry such that young children come to understand the subjective nature of desires before they understand the corresponding subjectivity of beliefs. Possible explanations for this asymmetry are discussed in light of conceptual change and information-processing accounts of theory of mind development.     

“To eat or not to be eaten?” Collective risk-monitoring in groups

The importance of risk-monitoring has been increasing in many key aspects of our modern lives. This paper examines how individuals monitor such risks collectively by extending a behavioral ecological model of animal foraging to human groups. Just as animals must forage for food under predatory risk, humans must divide valuable material and psychological resources between foraging activity and risk-monitoring activity. We predicted that game-theoretic aspects of the group situation complicate such a trade-off decision in resource allocation, eventually yielding a mixed equilibrium in a group. When the equilibrium is reached, only a subset of members engage in the risk-monitoring activity while others free-ride, concentrating mainly on their own foraging activity. Laboratory groups engaging in foraging under moderate risk provided a support to this prediction. When the risk-level was set higher, however, “herding behavior” (conforming to the dominant behavior) interfered with the emergence of equilibrium. Implications for risk management are discussed.     

The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision making

People often do not realize they are being influenced by an incidental emotional state. As a result, decisions based on a fleeting incidental emotion can become the basis for future decisions and hence outlive the original cause for the behavior (i.e., the emotion itself). Using a sequence of ultimatum and dictator games, we provide empirical evidence for the enduring impact of transient emotions on economic decision making. Behavioral consistency and false consensus are presented as potential underlying processes.