Love and Power,and the Development of the Brain,Mind, and Agency

In drawing on my own research and collaborative work with Karl Pribram, I show that love (affective attachment) and power (social control) play a central role in psychosocial evolution. When these relations are coupled in a self-regulating system of cooperative interactions, brain growth is stimulated, mind and agency develop, and stable forms of collective social organization are generated. Focusing on the endogenous dynamics of social collectives, the article is organized in four parts. (A "social collective" is defined as a durable arrangement of relations among two or more individuals that is distinguished by shared membership and collaboration in relation to a common function or goal.) Part I summarizes evidence from developmental neuropsychology and social science to show that stable psychosocial organization, across the human life span, is associated with social interaction organized along two dimensions. One dimension involves love, positive affective attachment, and the second involves power, social regulation of the aroused affective energy. Part II draws on Piaget's theory of cooperation and Bradley and Pribrams' theory of communication to describe how mind and agency are generated, and how stable organization is produced, respectively, from the relations involved in the arousal and regulation of affective energy. Combining elements of the two theories, Part III presents a sketch of a holographic model of collective organization in which goal-directed behavior is generated by a feed-forward process involving imaging and information processing of interaction along the two dimensions. Part IV shows how the model accounts for the emergence of human agency within the context of a more general evolutionary theory, such as Laszlo's. The article concludes with a discussion of my approach for building a "fully human theory of evolution."     

The understanding and self-reported use of emotional display rules in children with autism spectrum disorders

Two studies examined the understanding and self-reported use of rules for the expressive display of emotions in children with high functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASD) and in typically developing children. In Study 1, children from the two groups reported display rules equally often when presented with hypothetical situations that provided clear motives for using display rules, although emotion-masking displays were more commonly identified for vignettes with prosocial rather than self-protective motives. In Study 2, children were interviewed about display rule use in real life. Children with HFASD reported display rules less often, included more prototypical examples, and referred less often to prosocial motives than typically developing children. Children with HFASD appear to be aware of display rules, but are less adept at identifying the interpersonal functions of such rules than their typically developing peers.     

博弈决策影响因素及内在机制研究现状与展望

博弈决策是指“在包含利益相互依存的两个或多个参与者的博弈情境中所进行的行为决策”。博弈决策自进入心理学研究后已成为决策心理研究领域的热点。本文述评了博弈决策的影响因素及神经生理机制的研究现状;对未来研究方向进行了展望,包括加强内在机制研究与综合理论模型建构、改进和完善研究范式与加强对多种范式的考察、加强相关认知及情绪能力的作用机制研究、加强对语言等影响因素的跨文化与文化间比较、加强应用与训练研究。     

大学生压力事件与网络游戏成瘾:逃避动机的中介效应*

以472名男大学生网络游戏玩家为被试,考察了压力事件、网络游戏逃避动机和网络游戏成瘾的关系。结果发现:(1)大学生压力事件、网络游戏逃避动机和成瘾之间存在显著正相关。(2)压力事件除了对网络游戏成瘾有直接影响,还通过网络游戏逃避动机的中介作用对网络游戏成瘾产生间接影响。     

Computerized tabletop games as a form of a video game training for old-old

This research aimed at investigating the utility of a computerized version of a cognitively stimulating activity as a video game intervention for elderly. The study focused on the effect of a 6-week extensive practice intervention on aspects of cognitive functioning (vigilance, working memory (WM), inhibition, reasoning) of old-old participants (N = 29), randomly assigned to trained or active control group. The difference between groups was in the content of the extended video game practice – cognitively complex card game for trained and computerized version of a simple dice-game of chance for control participants. A pretest, posttest and a 4-month follow-up measurement was conducted. Results revealed improvements in both groups, except for improved reasoning found only in trained participants. These results suggest that: (1) improvements are dependent on the complexity of the program, (2) cognitively stimulating activity are a valid training procedure for old-old, (3) novelty of computer use is an important factor in determining training efficacy.     

人情与公正的抉择:社会距离对第三方干预的影响

第三方干预(third-party intervention)是一种重要的利他行为,它包括惩罚和补偿两种措施。本研究结合情境性问卷与实验法,采用修改后的独裁者博弈范式(Dictator Game,DG),让被试作为第三方对朋友或者陌生人的不公平行为进行干预,考察社会距离对第三方干预的影响。研究发现:(1)对于朋友提出的不公平方案,个体对其的惩罚轻于陌生人,而对第二方(无权者)的补偿没有显著差异。(2)个体对朋友的不公平提议的公平性判断高于陌生人,但提议引发的情绪体验没有显著差异。上述结果表明,社会距离可能通过影响个体对不公平行为的公平感知,进而影响其第三方干预行为。     

Should Versus Want: On the Relative Contribution of Injunctive Norms and Preferences on Trust Decisions

Despite much research on the determinants of trust among strangers, its mechanisms are understood only rudimentarily. Recently, it has been proposed that people trust strangers because they believe they should, thus complying with an injunctive norm even if it conflicts with their preferences. However, given the boldness of this claim and in light of independent arguments and earlier findings that suggest otherwise, the hypothesis requires critical scrutiny. Thus, we tested whether the decision to trust (in the trust game) is indeed more strongly driven by what people think they should entrust rather than what they want to entrust in two studies. We consistently found a stronger influence of “want” than of “should” on trust decisions even when controlling for the fairness aspect inherent in the trust game. Thus, our findings speak against a predominant role of injunctive norms for trust behavior and confirm that the latter is mostly driven by preferences. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A motivational perspective on punishment in social dilemmas

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behaviour while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behaviour and to increase cooperation is to establish a sanction system in that private resources are invested by individuals to punish uncooperative interaction partners. The present review is intended to provide an overview concerning motivational determinants of punishment in social dilemma situations. Specifically, we (a) outline that fairness concerns and revenge motivate individuals to punish uncooperative other individuals, (b) show that this is done especially when they possess the basic motivational orientation of a prevention focus. We (c) illustrate that individuals do not punish to acquire a good reputation in the eyes of others, and (d) elaborate on whether individuals punish to regulate satisfaction. Finally, we present empirically neglected motivational factors in studies on punishment in social dilemmas and discuss limitations and possible future directions in this field of research.     

Sharing losses and sharing gains: Increased demand for fairness under adversity

There is ample experimental evidence showing that people have a strong preference for equity in wealth allocation and social interaction. Although the behavior of gain sharing and responses to (un)fairness in allocation of wealth has been extensively investigated in studies employing economic exchange games, few studies have focused on how people respond to an unfair division of loss between individuals. In this study we developed a new variant of the ultimatum game and examined the participants' reactions to (un)fairness in both gain and loss sharing. Results from three experiments showed that the rejection rates to unfair offers were generally higher in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover, participants were inclined to associate loss with “unfair” and gain with “fair”, with stronger associations leading to higher rejection rates in the ultimatum game. Furthermore, in subjective rating, unfair offers were perceived as being more unfair in the loss than in the gain domain. These results demonstrate an increased demand for fairness under adversity and the importance of justice in liability sharing.     

Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.