English-speaking children's comprehension of relative clauses: evidence for general-cognitive and language-specific constraints on development

Children must possess some ability to process input in a meaningful manner to acquire language. The present study reports on data from an experiment investigating 3- to 5-year-old English-speaking children's understanding of restrictive relative clauses manipulated for embeddedness and focus. The results of the study showed that English-speaking children acquire right-branching before center-embedded structures. Comparisons made with data from Portuguese-speaking children suggest general-cognitive and language-specific constraints on development, and with respect to English, a clause expansion approach to processing in development.     

What's different in second-language processing? Evidence from event-related brain potentials

German sentences which were either correct, contained a selectional restriction violation, or a word category violation were presented auditorily to 16 native speakers of German (L1 group) and to 16 native speakers of Russian, who had learned German after the age of 10 (L2 group). Semantic violations elicited an N400 effect for both groups, but with a reduced amplitude and a longer peak latency in the L2 group. Compared to correct sentences, sentences with a phrase structure violation elicited an early anterior negativity followed by a broad centro-parietal positivity in native speakers. By contrast, there was no differential modulation of the early anterior negativity in the L2 group. A late positivity was also elicited in the second language learners, but it was slightly delayed compared to that shown by native speakers. This pattern is discussed in terms of different degrees of automaticity with respect to the subprocesses involved in sentence comprehension.     

Task difficulty and inertial properties of hand-held tools: An assessment of their concurrent effects on precision aiming

Aiming hand-held tools at targets in space entails adjustments in the dynamical organization of aiming patterns according to the required precision. We asked whether and how these adjustments are modified by the tool’s mass distribution. Twelve participants performed reciprocal aiming movements with a 50-cm long wooden probe. Kinematic patterns of probe movements were used as a window into the behavioral dynamic underlying performance of a reciprocal aiming task. We crossed three levels of task difficulty (IDs 2.8, 4.5 and 6.1) with two types of probe varying in their mass distribution (proximal vs distal loading). Movement duration was affected by task difficulty and probe loading (shorter for larger targets and proximal probe loading). Progressive deviations from a sinusoidal movement pattern were observed as task difficulty increased. Such deviations were more pronounced with proximal probe loading. Results point to a higher degree of non-linearity in aiming dynamics when the probe was loaded proximally, which might reflect employment of additional perceptual-motor processes to control the position of its less stable tip at the vicinity of the targets. More generally, the effects of probe loading on aiming pattern and dynamics suggest that perceptual-motor processes responding to task level constraints are sensitive to, and not independent from, biomechanical, end-effector constraints.     

Improving Public Perception of Behavior Analysis

The potential impact of behavior analysis is limited by the public’s dim awareness of the field. The mass media rarely cover behavior analysis, other than to echo inaccurate negative stereotypes about control and punishment. The media instead play up appealing but less-evidence-based approaches to problems, a key example being the touting of dubious diets over behavioral approaches to losing excess weight. These sorts of claims distort or skirt scientific evidence, undercutting the fidelity of behavior analysis to scientific rigor. Strategies for better connecting behavior analysis with the public might include reframing the field’s techniques and principles in friendlier, more resonant form; pushing direct outcome comparisons between behavior analysis and its rivals in simple terms; and playing up the “warm and fuzzy” side of behavior analysis.     

Representations in language processing: why comprehension is not “brute-causal”

I defend a claim, central to much work in psycholinguistics, that constructing mental representations of syntactic structures is a necessary step in language comprehension. Call such representations “mental phrase markers” (MPMs). Several theorists in psycholinguistics, AI, and philosophy have cast doubt on the usefulness of positing MPMs (Devitt, 2006; Rohde, 2002; Schank & Birnbaum, 1984). I examine their proposals and argue that they face major empirical and conceptual difficulties. My conclusions tell against the broader skepticism that persists in philosophy—e.g., in the embodied cognition literature (Hutto & Myin, 2012)—about the usefulness of positing mental representations in psychological models. Using my discussion of sentence parsing as a case study, I propose several conditions on an appropriate appeal to mental representations. Finally, I point out that the familiar arguments from productivity, systematicity, and inferential coherence suffice to establish that MPMs themselves have a constituent structure of a sort that resembles that of public-language sentences. This supports the idea that computational operations defined over MPMs are sensitive to their syntactic structure.     

The Effect of Prosody on Distributional Learning in 12‐ to 13‐Month‐Old Infants

Distributional information is a potential cue for learning syntactic categories. Recent studies demonstrate a developmental trajectory in the level of abstraction of distributional learning in young infants. Here we investigate the effect of prosody on infants' learning of adjacent relations between words. Twelve‐ to thirteen‐month‐old infants were exposed to an artificial language comprised of 3‐word‐sentences of the form aXb and cYd, where X and Y words differed in the number of syllables. Training sentences contained a prosodic boundary between either the first and the second word or the second and the third word. Subsequently, infants were tested on novel test sentences that contained new X and Y words and also contained a flat prosody with no grouping cues. Infants successfully discriminated between novel grammatical and ungrammatical sentences, suggesting that the learned adjacent relations can be abstracted across words and prosodic conditions. Under the conditions tested, prosody may be only a weak constraint on syntactic categorization. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Ought’ and Control

Ethical theorists often assume that the verb ‘ought’ means roughly ‘has an obligation’; however, this assumption is belied by the diversity of ‘flavours’ of ought-sentences in English. A natural response is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous. However, this response is incompatible with the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists, who classify ‘ought’ as a member of the family of modal verbs, which are treated uniformly as operators. To many ethical theorists, however, this popular treatment in linguistics seems to elide an important distinction between agential and non-agential ought-statements. The thought is that ‘ought’ must have at least two senses, one implicating agency and connected to obligations, and another covering other uses. In this paper, I pursue some resolution of this tension between semantic theory and ethical theory with respect to the meaning of ‘ought’. To this end, I consider what I believe to be the most linguistically sophisticated argument for the view that the word ‘ought’ is ambiguous between agential and non-agential senses. This argument, due to Mark Schroeder, is instructive but based on a false claim about the syntax of agential ought-sentences—or so I attempt to show by first situating Schroeder's argument in its proper linguistic background and then discussing some syntactic evidence that he fails to appreciate. Then, I use the failure of this argument to motivate some more general reflections on how the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists might be refined in the light of the distinction important to ethical theory between agential and non-agential ought-statements, but also on how ethical theory might benefit from more careful study of the dominant treatment of modals as operators in theoretical semantics.     

Are Computational Transitions Sensitive to Semantics?

The formal conception of computation (FCC) holds that computational processes are not sensitive to semantic properties. FCC is popular, but it faces well-known difficulties. Accordingly, authors such as Block and Peacocke pursue a ‘semantically-laden’ alternative, according to which computation can be sensitive to semantics. I argue that computation is insensitive to semantics within a wide range of computational systems, including any system with ‘derived’ rather than ‘original’ intentionality. FCC yields the correct verdict for these systems. I conclude that there is only one promising strategy for semantically-laden theorists: identify special computational systems that help generate their own semantic properties, and then show that computation within those systems is semantically-laden. Unfortunately, the few existing discussions that pursue this strategy are problematic.