COSMOLOGY AND THEOLOGY: THE REEMERGENCE OF PATRIARCHY

Abstract. Recent developments in cosmology have enticed several thinkers to follow leads from cosmology into new possibilities in theology and philosophy. Thus, we have seen an increasing number of books and essays offering proposals for creative relations between theology and cosmology. New constructions for theology are appearing that lead us toward a new rationality in theological thinking. This rationality seems especially familiar for anyone working in feminist thought, not so much as a repristination of Enlightenment philosophy and its strongly patriarchal overtones, but rather as a new form of postmodern patriarchy that grows out of revolutions in cosmology, mathematics, and quantum physics. This sense should be tested especially by comparing these new “theologies” with other feminist visions or alternative perspectives. This comparison will not only uncover signs of a reemergence of patriarchy within the new cosmologies, but will also suggest ways in which new cosmological views can both provide a source for new creative thinking in theology and be sensitive to the best of feminist thought.     

Characteristic patterns of word association responses in institutionalized elderly with and without senile dementia

This study examined the responses of 91 institutionalized elderly persons to the Goldfarb-Halpern Word Association Test (1981), Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 24, 233–246. Subjects with senile dementia evidenced a characteristic pattern of responses which included marked reduction of paradigmatic responses, no decrease in syntagmatic responses, and a marked increase in unclassifiable and multiword responses not previously reported in the literature. The declines and increases appeared linear and progressive with severity of dementia. The pattern was distinct from that of any other adult group previously tested with this tool. Institutionalized elderly subjects without senile dementia performed similarly to previously tested noninstitutionalized elderly. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.     

Divine Action and the Natural Sciences

The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences and the Vatican Observatory have jointly sponsored a series of conferences exploring the overarching question: How can we conceive a personal God creating and active within the universe described by the natural sciences? The volumes include significant contributions to the field, although I highlight two important weaknesses: (1) theology is not adequately respected as an active conversation partner capable of advancing the agenda under discussion; and (2) insufficient attention is paid to the many scientific and philosophical uncertainties that plague the overall project.     

Critical thinking skills and reflective judgment development: Redefining the aims of higher education

Educators who agree that critical thinking and intellectual development are appropriate aims of higher education do not always agree on what constitutes good thinking. This study examined the relationship between two constructs that attempt to describe that aim: critical thinking as defined by the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal and a stage model of adolescent and adult intellectual development described as reflective judgment. In a 2 × 4 design, 119 women students at four educational levels were matched on high and low extremes of critical thinking scores and were compared on the basis of their scores on the Reflective Judgment Interview.The results indicate: (a) a significant main effect for educational level: students at higher educational levels achieved higher scores on the reflective judgment measure; (b) a main effect for critical thinking: high critical thinking subjects out-performed low critical thinking subjects on the Reflective Judgment Interview; and (c) while low critical thinking subjects were homogeneously low in reflective judgment levels, high critical thinking subjects had significantly greater variability of Reflective Judgment Interview scores.     

Cognition in music

A cognitive/constructive view of music is put forth that diverges from traditional conceptions of music (e.g., music as sound; music as behavior; music as communication). The present view attempts to be compatible with the evidence of historic style changes that have occurred in the notated repertory of Western music. Two levels of cognitive processing are proposed: processes on the level of particular styles (germane to a certain period, culture, or community) and processes that are generic, universal, or cross-stylistic. Twelve such generic processes are described in detail. Several problems in the research stemming from earlier definitions of music are explored. In particular, attention is given to the artifacts of theoretical analysis (e.g., scales, chords, and discrete pitches) and their influence on music-psychological research.     

Children's use of perceptual set

The effects of perceptual set and of “sequential visual noise” on the identification of briefly exposed pictures were examined in 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults. Subjects were asked to indicate whether a brief target matched a standard. The standard picture was presented either before the target picture (to establish a set) or after the target. The target was presented either alone or last in a series of six brief pictures (i.e., in noise). Adults and 8-year-olds were at ceiling when the target was presented alone, but set facilitated their identification of the target in noise. The 5-year-olds benefited from set both when the target was presented alone and when it was presented in noise. These findings suggest that set for a specific target picture functions similarly at all ages.     

APOLOGIA PRO SCRIPTURA SUA, OR MAYBE WE GOT IT RIGHT AFTER ALL

Abstract. A summary of the progress of biogenetic structuralism as an approach to the social and behavioral sciences is presented, from the publication of Biogenetic Structuralism in 1974 to the present. The difficulty that many scholars have found integrating neuroan-thropology and comparative ethology into an understanding of cultural, and particularly of religious, phenomena over the past almost two decades is considered. More specifically, the articles of James Ashbrook and Mary Lynn Dell published in the same June 1993 issue of Zygon as this article are analyzed and responded to. These authors critique Eugene d'Aquili's work of integrating neuropsychology and religious experience primarily by analyzing Brain, Symbol & Experience , which d'Aquili co-authored with Charles Laughlin, Jr., and John McManus, H. Rodney Holmes's article in the same issue of Zygon analyzes the whole corpus of d'Aquili's religion and science work as it appeared over the years in the pages of Zygon and in other articles and books as well as in Brain, Symbol & Experience. This critique is likewise carefully considered and responded to. Finally a proposed trajectory of d'Aquili's (and Andrew Newberg's) future work in their ongoing project integrating neuropsychology and religious experience is elaborated. This involves, not only expansion of their general theoretical approach, but also empirical testing of hypotheses relating brain function to religious experience using PET scanning and some newer MRI visualization techniques.     

Mark Twain's life‐long fascination with phrenology

Samuel Langhorne Clemens (Mark Twain; 1835–1910), American humorist and writer, followed scientific and medical developments, and relished exposing questionable practices and ideas. In his youth, he pondered how phrenologists were assessing character, and in 1855 he copied sections of a phrenology book and a skull diagram into a notebook. Later, in London, he had two phrenological examinations by Lorenzo Fowler—one without and the other after identifying himself. Following his “test,” which produced contrasting results, he began to ridicule phrenologists and phrenology in Tom Sawyer, Huckleberry Finn, and other works. He underwent at least two more head readings in the United States, and in Eddypus, an unfinished work from 1901 to 1902, he maintained that phrenologists base their insights primarily on how people dress and answer questions. Although now lampooning the craniological tenets of phrenology, Twain never seemed to reject the idea of distinct faculties of mind associated with specialized brain organs.     

The lives of Mary Foote: painter and Jungian

Mary Foote (1872‐1968) was a successful early twentieth century American artist who suddenly closed her New York studio in 1926 to go to Zurich to study with Jung. There she joined his ‘Interpretation of Visions’ seminars (1930‐1934), which she recorded and edited. This work won Jung's praise and his friendship, but all too often Foote was seen merely as a secretary or background figure. Deirdre Bair's biography of Jung suggested that Foote's life and work deserved fuller study, if only to rebalance our view of Jung's early women followers. This paper takes up that work to ask how Foote's early life and career led to her important work in preserving and describing Jung's earliest attempts to apply his theories to clinical practice.     

Why did Mary Shelley Write Frankenstein?

Mary Shelley’s novel “Frankenstein; or, the Modern Prometheus” is presented here as her encoded image of unconscious emotions too painful for her waking personality to deal with. Her innovative image of man-made life is taken as emerging from the confrontation of her hopes for secure love with painful events in her life with Percy Shelley. This paper proposes that her novel served as a waking expression of unconscious feelings of hurt in reaction to Percy. The monster’s role is here decoded as her way to consciously process the idea that parts of her relation to Percy were so hurtful as to deform it into a miscreant. It is further proposed that the losses and frustrations of her earliest years inclined her to accept Percy’s violations in the hope of the secure love she longed for. The answer offered to this paper’s title accounts for why “Frankenstein” is taken to refer to the unnamed monster and not its creator.Anthony F. Badalamenti is a research scientist in psychiatry. He has a private practice in psychoanalysis and works at quantifying psychiatric research with Columbia University Psychiatric Institute, The Nathan Kline Institute and The University of New England. He holds PhDs in mathematics from Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute and in systems from Bell Telephone Laboratories. He is a member of the Society for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, from whom he received a distinguished research award, the American Mathematical Society, the Society for General Systems Research and the New York Academy of Sciences. He has published over 60 papers in psychiatric research.