Embodiment and Animality

The aim of this article is to examine the problematic frontier that separates the phenomenology of the body and the phenomenology of animality. The main difficulty is to differentiate phenomenologically not only between embodiment and animality, but also between specifically human embodied experience and what is accessible to us through empathy in relation to the corporeality of the animal. I will tackle these questions by considering relevant textual material from the writings of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. On the one hand, I will show that although embodiment and animality are convergent on the level of the naturalistic attitude in Husserl’s Ideas II, they are divergent as soon as we place ourselves in the personalistic attitude, where the body enters into a different conjunction—namely, with the idea of person and of the spiritual world. On the other hand, Heidegger claims that, in spite of the abysmal bodily kinship with the animal, there is an essential difference between the human body and the animal organism, thus opposing the tendencies to humanize the animal and to animalize the human.     

Deleuze’s Difference

Abstract

This article delineates the core concerns and motivations of the ontological work of Gilles Deleuze, and is intended as a programmatic statement for a general philosophical audience. The article consists of two main parts. In the first, two early writings by Deleuze are analysed in order to clarify his understanding of ontology broadly, and to specify the precise aim of his understanding of being in terms of difference. The second part of the article looks at the work of Heidegger and Derrida in order to distinguish Deleuze’s conceptions of ontology and difference from theirs. A final section clarifies Deleuze’s efforts to undertake the construction of an ontology divergent from the dominant tradition and in contrast to the emphasis on the closure of metaphysics in the thought of Heidegger and Derrida.     

A CRITIQUE OF BOROWITZ'S POSTMODERN JEWISH THEOLOGY

Abstract. Borowitz's book is primarily a systematic response by a liberal Jewish theologian to his perceived challenges from rationalism on one hand and postmodernism on the other. It is within this context that Borowitz discusses issues of the relationship between modern science and Judaism. The first part of this essay is a summary of Borowitz's book. Here I locate Borowitz's place in the general discipline of Jewish philosophy and theology. The second part of the paper is a critique of Borowitz's discussion of postmodernism and liberalism. It is in this concluding section that the issues raised by contemporary science for Jewish religious thought are discussed.     

"先天"概念的源始意义的澄清--现象学的一个重要发现

与康德认为只有表现在意识行为中的“形式范畴”才具有先天性不同,胡塞尔认为不论是形式范畴还是质料范畴都具有先天性;先天与后天的区别,表示的正是一般对象与个体对象在本体论上的区别。这意味着在胡塞尔那里,“先天’’不再是“行为的名称”．而是“存在的名称”。海德格尔在充分肯定胡塞尔的这个思想的理论价值的同时,又对它做了“实质性的修正”,把先天与后天的区别最终归结为存在与存在者的“本体论区别”。     

Navigating Moral Struggle: Toward a Social Model of Exemplarity

Exemplars have the power to help people navigate various levels of moral struggle, from the relatively straightforward problem of lacking motivation to the much deeper problem of failing to see the moral realities that surround us. But there are also serious moral risks in the appeal to exemplars: we romanticize them, we make use of them in authoritarian ways, and we tend to forget how our choice of exemplars is conditioned by oppressive cultural formations. I argue that we need to develop a social model of exemplarity, attuned to social contexts of our exemplars themselves as well as the social processes of constructing and appealing to exemplars. More particularly, I argue that we need to develop space for thinking about exemplary groups, not just exemplary individuals, in order to develop the strengths and avoid the weaknesses in exemplarist moral theories.     

Luther and Gender: Shifts in Paradigms and Orientations

Considering the tenderness and detail with which Luther attends to matters “all about Eve” in his Genesis lectures—and how he treats the matriarchs in the Genesis narrative—we can say that gender and women constitute a central interest for the reformer. He developed, in his context, a new theological anthropology that valued women's biological distinction, difference within sameness in creation, and absolute equality in redemption and callings. While his gender ideology is a work in progress, Luther's instincts are modern, if not even feminist, when placing the uterus at the central place of the delivery of the saving incarnate Word.     

From body to body: A post‐gender politics for the cosmic homo1

This article engages in establishing some common ground, some human and humane politics for the global Luther, in contradistinction to the focus in much recent scholarship on difference/s as an almost hegemonic way of understanding human life. The aim is to move beyond feminist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial theories to a post‐gender politics by employing Judith Butler's concepts of performativity and “abject” bodies. Homo, the human being, will be the hermeneutical key for examining Luther's understanding of God's creation and incarnation as well as of baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the church. The aim is that of searching out Luther's differing performances of body, from the carnal body of the incarnate Christ and the human body to the spiritual body of church and community, and how these matter, materialize and intersect in the body of Christ as one body/homo.     

GARRETT ON THE THEOLOGICAL OBJECTION TO HUME'S COMPATIBILISM

Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger's 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger's reading of Kant, one must resolve two questions. First, how does Heidegger's Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger's reconstruction of the Critique? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam's model of a self-directed transcendental argument (‘The role of the transcendental within Heidegger's Kant’), and the second by examining the relationship between Kant's doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume's attack on metaphysics (‘The role of the horizon within Heidegger's Kant’). I close by sketching the implications of my results for Heidegger's own thought (‘From Heidegger's Kant to Sein und Zeit’). Ultimately, I conclude that Heidegger's commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality.     

Heidegger,Wittgenstein and St Paul on the Last Judgement: On the Roots and Significance of ‘The Theoretical Attitude’

The article examines Heidegger's lectures on St Paul and provides, in particular, a reading of their discussion of the remarks on the parousia in the letters to the Thessalonians. This reading serves a number of purposes. First, it makes clear how Heidegger's appropriation of a certain ‘anti-theological’ tradition helped first give a sense to his notion of ‘the theoretical attitude’, a problematic notion that plays a central role in his mature early philosophy. Second, it illustrates, and thus helps to refine the identity of, a particular kind of recognizably ‘phenomenological’ reflection that attempts to distance itself precisely from that ‘attitude’; and third, it points to a new perspective on some central and problematic themes in Heidegger's better known early writings and, in particular, their discussion of assertions. An identification of some remarkable similarities between Heidegger's remarks on the Last Judgement and remarks of Wittgenstein's help identify this perspective.     

Heidegger's Gods

The notorious difficulty of Heidegger's post‐Second World War discussions of ‘the gods’, along with scholarly disagreement about the import of those discussions, renders that body of work an unlikely place to look for a substantive theory of religion. The thesis of this article is that, contrary to these appearances, Heidegger's later works do contain clues for developing such a theory. Heidegger's concerns about the category of ‘religion’ are addressed, and two recent attempts to ‘de‐mythologize’ Heidegger's ‘gods’ are examined and criticized. The paper concludes by outlining four substantial contributions that Heidegger's later work makes to a phenomenological account of religion.