The English Reformation in Wittenberg: Luther and Melanchthon’s Engagement with Religious Change in England 1521–1560*

ABSTRACT

Exploring the reception in Wittenberg of the historiographically often puzzling English Reformation, this article examines Luther’s and Melanchthon’s reactions in their correspondence. Relationships between Henry VIII and the Wittenberg Reformers deepened with an English embassy, led by Edward Foxe, to the Schmalkaldic League. The delegation was based in Wittenberg 1537–38; German deputations were in England in 1538 and 1539 (the year of the conservative Act of Six Articles). The Reformers’ responses show good general knowledge of events in England. Although Wittenberg had hoped for English conversion, Henrician theological ambiguity impeded negotiations with the League. The executions of Thomas More, Anne Boleyn and Thomas Cromwell caused the Wittenbergers to regard Henry with scepticism. Finally, Melanchthon's relationships to England after the deaths of Luther and Henry VIII are discussed. Developments under Edward VI made the English Reformation recognizable as part of the wider movement, and Melanchthon advised that English exiles in Germany should be treated as fellow-believers.     

The Care-Based Ethic of Nazi Medicine and the Moral Importance of What We Care About

This article reports on an inquiry into ideas used to justify the shift of medical ethos in Germany prior to and during the Nazi era, specifically the principles of care advocated by Erwin Liek and Karl Kötschau, the era's most influential medical theorists, who argued that commitments to care of individual sick persons (Fürsorge) had to give way to a preventive care that respects emerging needs of the entire society (Vorsorge). The article examines both the socio-cultural factors that shaped, and the far-reaching effects of, this manipulation of care. It argues that we should be attentive to the meaning and requirements of the care revealed in this debate, the ancient Greek idea of care as a concerned moral option.     

Heidegger and the contradiction of Being: a dialetheic interpretation of the late Heidegger

ABSTRACT

It is well known that, from the beginning to the end of his philosophical trajectory, Martin Heidegger tries to develop a fundamental ontology which aims at answering the so-called question of Being: what does Being mean? Unfortunately, in trying to answer this question, Heidegger faces a predicament: given his own premises, speaking about Being leads to a contradiction. Moreover, according to the majority, if not all, of the interpreters who admit the existence of such a predicament, Heidegger tries to avoid the contradiction in question. But is this the only way Heidegger tries to solve the predicament? In this paper, I argue that, in some of his late works and, in particular, in the Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger also takes into serious consideration the possibility of accepting the contradiction he faces in speaking about Being as true. If this is correct, Heidegger endorses what nowadays analytic philosophers call dialetheism, namely the metaphysical position according to which some (but not all) contradictions are true.     

Reply to John Turri

Abstract

In this article I develop Heidegger’s phenomenology of poetry, showing that it may provide grounds for rejecting claims that he lapses into linguistic idealism. Proceeding via an analysis of the three concepts of language operative in the philosopher’s work, I demonstrate how poetic language challenges language’s designative and world‐disclosive functions. The experience with poetic language, which disrupts Dasein’s absorption by emerging out of equipmentality in the mode of the broken tool, brings Dasein to wonder at the world’s existence in such a way that doubt about its reality cannot enter the picture.     

What is a Natural Conception of the World?

Continental philosophers such as Heidegger and Nicolai Hartmann and analytic philosophers such as Ryle, Strawson, and Jennifer Hornsby may be interpreted as using competing intellectual strategies within the framework of one and the same research programme, the programme of developing a natural conception of the world. They all argue that the Manifest Image of the world (to use Sellars's terminology) is compatible with, or even more fundamental than, the Scientific Image. A comparative examination of these strategies shows that Hartmann's strategy of stratification is superior to those of Heidegger, Ryle, and Strawson.     

Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility: The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time

Abstract

The confusion surrounding Heidegger’s account of death in Being and Time has led to severe criticisms, some of which dismiss his analysis as incoherent and obtuse. I argue that Heidegger’s critics err by equating Heidegger’s concept of death with our ordinary concept. As I show, Heidegger’s concept of death is not the same as the ordinary meaning of the term, namely, the event that ends life. But nor does this concept merely denote the finitude of Dasein’s possibilities or the groundlessness of existence, as William Blattner and Hubert Dreyfus have suggested. Rather, I argue, the concept of death has to be understood both as temporal finitude and as finitude of possibility. I show how this reading addresses the criticisms directed at Heidegger’s death analysis as well as solving textual problems generated by more limited interpretations of the concept.     

What Does Heidegger Mean by the Transcendence of Dasein?

Abstract

In this paper, I shall examine the evolution of Heidegger’s concept of ‘transcendence’ as it appears in Being and Time (1927), ‘On the Essence of Ground’ (1928) and related texts from the late 1920s in relation to his rethinking of subjectivity and intentionality. Heidegger defines Being as ‘transcendence’ in Being and Time and reinterprets intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. In the critical epistemological tradition of philosophy stemming from Kant, as in Husserl, transcendence and immanence are key notions (see Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, 1907, and Ideas I, 1913). Indeed, ‘transcendence in immanence’ is a leitmotif of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl discusses transcendence in some detail in Cartesian Meditations §11 in a manner that is not dissimilar to Heidegger. Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s understanding of consciousness and intentionality and Heidegger deliberately chooses to discuss transcendence as an exceptional domain for the discussion of beings in his ‘On the Essence of Ground’, his submission to Husserl’s seventieth-birthday Festschrift. Despite his championing of a new concept of transcendence in the late 1920s, Heidegger effectively abandons the term during the early 1930s. In this paper, I shall explore Heidegger’s articulation of his new ontological conception of finite transcendence and compare it with Husserl’s conception of the transcendence of the ego in order to get clearer what is at stake in Heidegger’s conceptions of subjectivity, Dasein and transcendence.     

Who Ministers to Whom: Matthew 25:31–46 and Prison Ministry

This essay sees Matthew 25:31–46 as Jesus’ offer of both gift and challenge: disciples will simultaneously minister to and be ministered to by Jesus in jail and prison. Following a consideration of two different dominant ways of interpreting the passage in the literature—what are sometimes called the missionary and the social justice interpretations—and Luther's reading of the passage as falling under the Fifth Commandment, the essay invites the reader to engage the transformative consequences of  “seeing” Jesus imprisoned in the U.S. criminal “justice” system.     

“Faith Alone”—Primus Inter Pares: Welcome to the Banquet

Faith alone represents the primus inter pares of the sixteenth‐century Reformation's four solas. Gary Simpson introduces five authors who critically explore and creatively extend the doctrine of justification by faith alone as Dialog with its Fall issues (2013–2017) leans into the 500^th anniversary of the Reformation (2017).     

Freedom from and Freedom for: Luther's Concept of Freedom for the Twenty‐First Century

This article examines Martin Luther's two fundamental claims around Christian freedom. Drawing on Luther, I suggest three primary characteristics of Christian freedom that should be recovered and championed in our twenty‐first‐century context: it is relational, it is a gift; and it contains within it an ethical imperative for the sake of the neighbor. Together, these three characteristics point to the fact that in a Christian understanding, “freedom” is never considered by itself, but only in the larger context of “freedom from” and “freedom for.”