Framing a Theological Response to COVID-19 in the Presence of the Religious Other

The Christian faith has a long history of responding to pandemics. Its past practice bore witness to the desire to care for others: it furnished an exemplary model with some notable exceptions. The dilemma that COVID-19 presents is that the understanding of viral spread now lies within the preserve of a professionalized health system. The evident risk as a consequence is one of theological quietism and being “unavailing.” Now is not the time for simple hyper compliance at the expense of an enquiring confessional claim. The ecumenical witness in solidarity with other faiths/religions lends itself to a desire to consider how the present pandemic crisis might serve as an invitation for a theological enquiry into wider planetary issues.     

Behold the lilies: Martin Buber and the contemplation of nature1

Christians attuned to ecological and eco‐justice issues typically welcome the thought that they are called by God to protect and to serve nature, as well as to respond to the needs of the poor and the oppressed. Drawing on Martin Buber's I‐Thou and I‐It conceptuality and highlighting Jesus’ command about the lilies of the field, this article argues that Christians also are called to enter into an I‐Ens relationship with nature, that is, to behold or to contemplate, as well as to protect and to serve nature, as they continue to address ecojustice issues.     

Critique of modernity in the philosophy of Nishitani Keiji

This article analyses Nishitani Keiji’s persistent critique of modernity and how it intertwines with other issues—such as nihilism, science and religion—in his philosophy. While Nishitani gained some notoriety for his views on overcoming modernity during WWII, this article will look at his relationship with the issue more in the scope of his whole philosophical career. Pulling together various strands that weave through Nishitani’s treatment of modernity, its relation to nihilism and his views for overcoming both, we find that it motivates his themes of Heideggerian critique of technology and Nietzschean redemption of tradition that combine with a reverse-Hegelian search for an originary ground that is grasped via existential realisation revealed through religious praxis. However, Nishitani’s approach raises some problematic questions on the social level due to the way it conceptualises modernity through a Nietzschean lens that leaves little room for modernity as a social and political phenomenon.     

The Option for Life

In today's Anthropocene, the reality of our growing global population, with its requirement of and strain upon the natural world, and our grave projected ecological outlook pose new challenges for Christian ethicists. How can both people and the earth flourish? Discussed within the context of theological and secular reflections on natural law, this article proposes one answer to such a question through a recasting of the human right to nature by way of a deep and wide understanding of vocation. Using Luther as a prototype who demonstrates the innate value of all life forms and offers an innovative working concept of vocation, it is here shown how an emphasis on vocation, when extended ecologically, can promote the option of life for all.     

Advocacy,Political Participation,and Citizenship: Lutheran Contributions to Public Theology1

Abstract : Martin Luther never developed a political theory, but his theology does inform the way Christians live in society, making it both public and political. Luther's “two kingdom theory” often has been misinterpreted to justify passivity and obedience toward civil authorities. Under closer examination, however, his theology applies to the everyday practices of politics, economics, and religious affairs. In the context of nation‐building, a Lutheran theology fosters citizenship not only as individual rights and responsibilities, but as active participation in civil society.     

Becoming a philosopher: What Heidegger learned from Dilthey, 1919–25

Wilhelm Dilthey is, famously, an epistemological pioneer for a second, ‘human’ kind of science that ‘understands’ life as we live it, instead of ‘explaining’ things as we observe them. Even today, he is usually cited for his role in the Erklären–Verstehen debate. My article, however, follows Heidegger's suggestion that we make the existence of the debate itself the problem. Whether there are different sorts of entity, different reasons for studying them and different means for doing so – such issues raise questions about science itself, not just about how to do it better. Moreover, what sort of philosopher is competent to address such questions? Heidegger argues that Dilthey's later writings intimate that it must be one who thinks from the ‘standpoint of (historical) life itself.’ This issue, says Heidegger, is ‘alive’ in Dilthey but is continually short-circuited by his very traditional plan for a ‘Critique of Historical Reason.’ Dilthey's unsuccessful struggles to produce this Critique are his gift to us, however. They encourage us to explicitly reconsider, as Heidegger does not only in Being and Time but throughout his life, what Dilthey cannot: If philosophy, like all human practices, is historical to the core, what is it to ‘be’ philosophical, about science or anything else?     

Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger's Destruktion of Metaphysics

Heidegger's Destruktion of the metaphysical tradition leads him to the view that all Western metaphysical systems make foundational claims best understood as 'ontotheological'. Metaphysics establishes the conceptual parameters of intelligibility by ontologically grounding and theologically legitimating our changing historical sense of what is. By first elucidating and then problematizing Heidegger's claim that all Western metaphysics shares this ontotheological structure, I reconstruct the most important components of the original and provocative account of the history of metaphysics that Heidegger gives in support of his idiosyncratic understanding of metaphysics. Arguing that this historical narrative generates the critical force of Heidegger's larger philosophical project (namely, his attempt to find a path beyond our own nihilistic Nietzschean age), I conclude by briefly showing how Heidegger's return to the inception of Western metaphysics allows him to uncover two important aspects of Being's pre-metaphysical phenomenological self-manifestation, aspects which have long been buried beneath the metaphysical tradition but which are crucial to Heidegger's attempt to move beyond our late-modern, Nietzschean impasse.     

Puzzles of Discourse in Being and Time: Minding Gaps in Understanding

Abstract

This paper takes issue with Heidegger’s claim that discourse and understanding are equally basic in the constitution of our making sense of the world. I argue that Heidegger cannot consistently establish this claim, and that discourse can be thought of as being more basic than understanding. The proposed line of thinking has the advantage of shedding light on both the finitude and the normativity of our making sense of the world. Thus, by setting up an exchange with the later Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule‐following makes it possible to develop an approach to the normativity of meaning which was not readily available on Heidegger’s account. Further, the paper offers an inquiry into a certain aspect of our finite sense of the world which, in spite of Heidegger’s marked attention to finitude, was obscured by his approach to discourse. The implications of the argument might be far‐reaching. The view of a basic role of discourse can put into question Heidegger’s guiding vision according to which time alone is ultimately the fundamental constituent of our sense of what there is. The engagement with Wittgenstein indicates, in conjunction with other themes of the paper, that there are certain perspectives and issues in phenomenology which are much closer to aspects of the analytic tradition than is usually granted.     

Circles of Solicitude and Concern

Abstract

Heidegger distinguishes between concern for things and solicitude for other Dasein. As Dasein is already being‐in‐the‐world and being‐with from the start, there is no need to define what another Dasein is to recognize it. In this paper it is argued that Dasein is thrown into circles of care, where the distinction between solicitude and concern is given. Although this undermines any attempts to regard a comatose patient as non‐Dasein, it raises questions about Dasein’s relations with animals. It is suggested that Dasein’s relations with animals could be captured by inserting another circle, for which the German word versorgen might be suitable.