Genetic Virtue Program: An Unfeasible Neo-Pelagian Theodicy?

In his article, “Genetic Engineering, Virtue-First Enhancement, and Neo-Irenaean Theodicy,” Mark Walker has ventured farther into science more than most when it comes to exploring theodicy. After exposing the Achilles heel of the traditional free-will defense, Walker develops the Irenaean and Augustinian responses to the anthropic problem. Most importantly for this discussion, Walker proceeds to propose Genetic-First-Enhancement as part of his neo-Irenaean theodicy formulation. Overall, there are two major concerns I raised: the impossibility of a gradient morality in the presence of free will, and the scientific impossibility of Genetic Virtue Program. However, my claims are falsifiable if future genetic modifications do indeed improve morality. Before that is proven, I agree with Walker that, yes, we should play God, albeit, with his proposed virtue-first program.     

Defending Cognitive Liberty in an Age of Moral Engineering

In 2009, Mark Walker first proposed the Genetic Virtue Project, advancing that science should explore using genetic engineering to eliminate moral evils just as it attempts to eliminate natural ones like disease. This seemed like an issue for the far future given the unique challenges. Walker focused on the wrong aspect of personhood, however, as moral engineering of the brain appears to be a more likely possibility. As early aspects of moral engineering the brain are in development, especially through the manipulation of the neural correlates of religious and political beliefs, emotions, and behaviors, I consider several issues surrounding this project so as to protect individual rights and prevent future harms. I advance an internal criterion for the field called Acceptability Across Ideologies to serve as a guide to protect against coercive and harmful technologies and analyze how current laws protecting cognitive liberty are lacking and in need of revision.     

Good News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics

Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about (ii). For any possible world at which the premise of Nelson’s argument is true, Karmo’s taxonomy classifies the conclusion of Nelson’s argument as non-ethical.

The Extended Mind Rehabilitates The Metaphysical Hegel

The nonmetaphysical interpretation of Hegel's philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. This article shows that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility and providing the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel's philosophy. This fully rehabilitates the metaphysical Hegel. The article does not argue for the truth of the metaphysical Hegel's claims. Rather, it defends the correctness of reading his philosophy as metaphysical.     

Whither Philosophy?

This article considers possible future directions of philosophy, based around the experience of the author as editor of the European Journal of Philosophy for about a decade. After some discussion of the original impetus for the journal, and of how the philosophy scene has changed since it was founded in 1993, the article focuses particularly on the themes of transcendentalism and naturalism as likely to shape the philosophical debates of the future, as they have done in the past.     

Genetic Moral Enhancement? Yes. Holiness? No

As moral human beings, we deplore our violence and try to rein it in through moral suasion and post-hoc restraint. Could genetic engineering help? Moral enhancement through genetic engineering might predispose us to performing good acts, good deeds. However, good acts alone, theologically speaking, do not count as either morality or holiness. Becoming a good and holy person-in-community is a process of freely chosen character development. While re-creating ourselves genetically to eliminate aggressive acts is not insignificant, such interventions constitute a starting point, not the endpoint, of living a meaningful life in relation to God. Bernard Lonergan’s notion of moral agency requires moral conversion and religious conversion, neither of which could be achieved through gene expression alone. Conversion requires free and intentional participation in moral character development. Finally, we note that salvation according to Christianity is not earned, regardless of a person’s good acts or good moral character.     

El pancalismo de James Mark Baldwin. Estética,psicología y constructivismo

Resumen

En este artículo nos proponemos realizar una exposición crítica del “pancalismo”, denominación que dio el psicólogo funcionalista James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934) a la ontología que corona su psicología evolucionista y su epistemología genética. Defendiendo que el pancalismo constituye uno de los mejores frutos del constructivismo, presentamos sus filiaciones teóricas generales, discutimos sus interpretaciones metafísicas—en las cuales el propio Baldwin cayó—y apuntamos algunas de sus implicaciones actuales.     

La detección de la mentira mediante la medida de la tensión en la voz: una revisión crítica

Resumen

Los analizadores de la tensión vocal son dispositivos que supuestamente detectan la ausencia de ciertos microtemblores en la voz, lo) que sería indicativo de que el sujeto está experimentando tensión. Desde esta perspectiva se asume además que todo mentiroso está tenso, por loo que los analizadores de la tensión vocal se comercializan como detectores de mentiras. En este trabajo presentamos la historia de tales artilugios y la base teórica sobre la que pretenden apoyarse, para pasar a continuación a examinar la investigación empírica realizada para contestar a cuatro preguntas clave: (a) ¿existen características vocales que se alteran cuando el hablante experimenta tensión?, (b) ¿existen características vocales que se alteran cuando el hablante miente?, (c) ¿detectan la tensión los evaluadores del estrés vocal?, y (d) ¿detectan la mentira? La respuesta que la investigación ha dado a estas preguntas cuestiona seriamente el empleo de los analizadores de la tensión vocal como detectores de mentiras.     

Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson,and the Difference it Should Make

P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, R. Jay Wallace, and Philip Pettit for problems due to individualistic assumptions.Thanks to an audience at Carleton University for helpful discussion.